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Organising Pop : why so few pop acts make pop music.
Michael Lewis Jones.
At any one time thousands of pop acts aspire to making hit records - the only
guarantee that the music they make is indeed popular music . Of these aspirant acts ,
only a tiny percentage actually make pop records that have a chance of reaching a
mass market for popular musical products. What is more surprising is that only one-
in-eight of pop acts signed by major record companies goes on to attain popular
success . This study is concerned to discover lvhat it is about the nature of record-
making that so regularly ends in the failure of the vast majority of pop acts signed to
major record companies.
As a search for the answer to a question, this research study begins by attempting to
define and qualify the terms of its analysis. Within this, the position of the researcher
and the methods of data collection allowed by that position are explored in some
detail. This exploration is necessitated by the singularities of my position as
researcher - not only do I discuss record making from the perspectives gained
through my own experience of that activity; I also explore a record I helped to make.
The method applied in this case, `Intellectual Autobiography', is novel, but not
unprecedented. Additional data is generated through an adaptation of an allied
methodology - that of `Interpretive Interactionism' - in the construction of the `case
histories' of two further pop acts who also failed to make hit records for major
companies.
The `singularity' of this research project is further expressed in the nature of its
theorisation - where theory is the goal rather than the medium of the study. This does
not render it an exercise in empiricism, however. The nature of the subject matter
should indicate how problematic is the making of music that becomes popular music
only through the agency of mass sales. In exploring the coincidence, interaction and
mutual dependency of music-making and musical commodity-making, this study
analyses the production processes of popular music. It does this, firstly, by
considering what representations exist of popular music production in the literature
on popular music. It then suggests that concepts developed in the field of
Organisation Theory can assist in the further development of the understanding of the
industrial processes of popular music production.
The analysis of the data generated in the construction of the three case histories
through the application of Organisation Theory concepts leads to the proposition that
a `supra organisation' is called into existence by the process of record-making. The
study then draws the conclusion that this notion of the `supra organisation' can be
utilised as an heuristic device for the analysis of record-making as a dynamic whole.
Suggestions are then made for further research into popular music-making which
proceeds from an appreciation of the need to treat record-making holistically and to
access it through a modified version of the practice of ethnomethodological
ethnography.
Introduction.
This study seeks an answer to a single question: why do so many popular
music acts signed to major record companies fail to make music that becomes
popular? Quite clearly, when dealing with a term as fluid as `popularity' and with the
equally broad, and connected, notions of the `success' or `failure' of pop acts and the
records they make, a considerable degree of qualification is required. Before
examining these terms more closely, we need to identify the origin of the question,
itself. This study was motivated by a combination of two statistics: firstly, of all pop
acts extant at any one time, only a tiny percentage will win a record deal with a major
company; and, secondly, only one-in-eight of these signed pop acts will go on to
make a profit - where `profit-making' is the immediate evidence that the act's work
sold in the kind of quantities that verified its popularity. In turn, profit-making from
mass sales is the only real guarantee that the act will continue to record its music and,
therefore, continue to exist as a pop act beyond the most local of levels - at least until
the next round of record releases takes place.
The provenance of the statistics referred to above will be discussed in Chapter
One but, already, it should be apparent that much more than the terms so far
identified will require qualification in the early stages of this inquiry (in fact the
inquiry can only proceed through such a process of qualification). For example, we
will need to clarify the choice and nature of the term `pop act'; we will need to probe
the implied connection between making popular music and `making a profit'; and we
will need to confront the further implication that music-making and record-making
are discrete but connected activities where the `success' or `failure' of pop acts is
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concerned. All of this will be the work of the introductory chapter, here I wish to
draw attention to a more fundamental and foundational issue - that of the singularity
of this work as a Ph.D thesis in Popular Music Studies.
My reason for mounting the attempt to address the phenomenon of the
extremely high failure rate amongst aspirant pop acts is a complex one but is linked
inextricably with my own experience of making records over a thirteen-year period. It
is linked, also, with the fact that I had been a pop fan for a very long time before I
began to write, and to collaborate on, songs that might attract the attention of record
companies. As an avid consumer of pop I took certain pre-conceptions of how pop
success is created with me into the music industry. The usefulness of these pre-
conceptions was quickly exploded. Equally quickly, what had begun as a thrilling
exercise in making pop music turned into a demanding and dismaying encounter with
the protocols of survival as a pop act. Without over-dramatising the experience, it can
certainly be described as a learning-curve of considerable upward-steepnesss.
As a consequence of the decline in the fortunes of Latin Quarter, the pop act
of which I was a member, I needed to find new ways of generating an income. In the
earliest phases of that transition away from a complete reliance on song-writing and
record-making as the sole source of my income, I became involved in a variety of
pop-related projects - from developing courses in song-writing and in music industry
practices in a variety of academic arenas, to the earliest stages of pop management
with a large number of acts. The more diverse, and, in some ways, concentrated,
became my attention on the various processes involved in creating music and in
creating pop groups, the more I became concerned with the general question of why
pop happens in the ways that it does.
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Inevitably, when I committed to researching pop, I needed to clarify precisely
what it was that I intended to research. Initially, I determined to research not only the
`processes' of becoming a pop act, but also how these processes might be argued to
inflect the making of pop music, itself. Further, because I had begun to read the
academic literature on pop, I wanted to examine why it was that accounts of popular
music-making tended not to consider that such inflections are the very core of the
pop experience. On narrowing my concerns to these (enormously broad!) parameters
I was then forced to recognise that it was my own experience that had driven me to
argue the connections between `pop processes' and the practices of pop composers as
the `core of the pop experience'. Even so, my `experience' was no longer limited just
to that of the act I had been involved with, it now stretched, in a disordered and
unstructured way, to the concerns and practices of the many aspirant pop acts I had
begun to come into contact with.
As a consequence of making these cumulative recognitions I then determined
that, in order for me to mount a popular music research project of any kind, I needed
to explore how my experience of making pop connected with my position as
researcher - for, whatever aspect of popular musical experience I researched, it would
remain the case that my judgements would be informed by a hidden `reservoir' of
`prejudices' or `prejudgements'. In this way, while I remained committed to
exploring why pop `worked' in the ways that I believed that it did, I needed to
systematise my research in such a way that my `prejudices' could be explored.
Further, I needed to explore why it was that I could not find my experience (this
`broader' experience that included interactions with aspirant pop acts) reflected in the
academic literature on popular music. From this more precise focus, I then began to
re-read the literature with a new awareness - an awareness that I was making my own
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judgements about judgements made within that literature from an untheorised body
of `experience'. On undertaking this differently-informed reading the previously-
quoted statistics took on a new significance for me - a significance that had two
'phases'.
Firstly, the recognition that vastly more acts fail rather than succeed helped
me connect my own experience, and the experiences of many of the acts I had
encountered over the years, with the literature on pop. It did this for the reason that
Latin Quarter had `failed' and for the reason that so many of the acts I came to
encounter would never `succeed'. I then realised that the tremendous profligacy of
the music industry spoke of a way of understanding the production (and, perhaps, the
reception) of popular music that was different from the various representations made
of those processes in the literature on pop. Further, and secondly, the realisation that
different methods of accounting for pop might exist was strengthened by the
discovery of a marked tendency within even the literature that drew attention to this
profligacy - which was that its consequences were not factored into the judgements
made in those texts, whether these were about pop music, pop acts or the music
industry itself.
The identification of an apparent over-sight in the literature on pop did not
give me licence simply to proceed with research because, while my research area was
now more closely defined, it remained the case that the conduct of research would
still be likely to be informed by my `prejudices'. What was then required was a
method that allowed me, simultaneously, to draw on my experience and to reflect on
what it was I was drawing on - and to make both processes accessible to the reader.
The different aspects of this research practice will be discussed at the appropriate
junctures, but a sense that the `singularity' of this research lies not simply with the
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position of the researcher but in the impact of that position on the conduct of research
itself, should already be apparent.
Understood against this background, what makes this research study distinct
is that it exists more as a search for theory rather than as the testing of an existing
theory against fresh `evidence'. This is not to suggest that no theories exist within the
broad, if under-developed, work that comprises the emergent discipline of `Popular
Music Studies'; rather, it is to acknowledge that, in the first instance, I came to the
academy from the field. On this basis, it would be illegitimate to `discover' theory in
the academy and then to apply it in a comparatively indiscriminate way to whatever
aspects of either popular music production or consumption pre-occupied me. Because
of this reversal of the `normal' research journey (at least in the foundational stages of
this research) I considered it vital to explore what judgements I had made of how pop
is conducted as a musical and as a business practice not as a preliminary to study, but
as an intrinsic part of the process of research, itself. What, then, gives this work its
singularity is that it works towards theory rather than through it - but this does not
mean that it exists as simple empiricism.
The fact that so very few pop acts achieve recognisable pop success
problematises the pop process. In whatever ways we define the terms, the processes
that result in the `success' of a tiny handful of pop acts and in the `failure' of the vast
majority, do not explain themselves. This study will begin by exploring the origin of
the statistics of `success' and `failure'. It will then proceed by exploring the
representations made within the literature on pop of the processes that might have
produced those statistics. Following this, it will be necessary to explore more fully
the implications of my position as researcher for the bearing this has on the collection
and analysis of data. Data will then be generated through the medium of case
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histories of three pop acts who all failed to produce successful albums for major
companies. Analysis of this data will then be conducted within and through the
theoretical framework suggested by the conduct of the inquiry, thus far. From this
analysis, conclusions will then be drawn both on the specific question of the high
incidence of failure amongst signed acts and on any wider implications for the further




In advance of the necessary clarification of terms referred to in the
Introduction, it is worth indicating the central concerns of this study. The purpose of
this research is to investigate, and to seek explanations for, the root causes of the
extremely high failure rate amongst pop acts signed to major record companies. It
concentrates on the production processes of popular music-making for the reason that
the fate of the majority of acts and the records they make is sealed within those
processes. Arguably, that the majority of pop records fail to achieve mass sales is a
self-fulfilling prophesy - either they are withdrawn by record companies before
selling begins or they are released but are neither marketed nor promoted with the
effort and will that might bring them to the attention of a mass market of record
buyers.
On this basis, the primary focus of this study will be on the various tiers and
forms of interaction that take place between pop acts and all the related intermediary
figures and organisations involved in organising the production of popular musical
products. In focusing attention on these `interactions' - which, together, constitute the
production processes of popular music-making - the suggestion is not implied that
the reception and consumption of music is unimportant; rather, it is to suggest that
the market for popular musical products is not a perfect one. As remarks in the
Introduction will have indicated, only a tiny percentage of aspirant acts are signed by
major record companies and, of these, only a further small percentage go on to
achieve mass sales. Whatever the audience makes of the music it hears, we need to
recognise that the music available for them to listen to is limited by decisions made,
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in the first instance, by music producing companies and, subsequently, by music
producing companies in interaction with music-making acts.
The history of popular music is a history of mass selling records - but for
every `hit' there have been many more `misses'. Pop records neither make
themselves nor sell themselves. Given this, it is reasonable to suggest that aspects of
their making must connect with aspects of their selling, or failure to sell. This is not
to make the further suggestion that, simply, `the public wants what the public gets'
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(to quote The Jam) but it does indicate that the `organisation' of pop might be at least
as important as the aesthetics of pop where the making of hit records is concerned.
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Organising Pop:
Why so few pop acts make pop music.
Chapter One:
Making Music in the Hope of Making Popular
Music.
Part One: Esta blishing the Field .
Introduction.
'The point is that Rock and Roll, as I see it, is the ultimate populist art-form,
democracy in action, because it is true: anybody can do it'
(Lester Bangs - The Penguin Book of Rock and Roll Writing London, Viking,
1992).
What interests me about this observation is its conclusion: 'anybody can do it'.
If anybody can make Rock and Roll, how do we explain the fact that, as soon as we
begin to look for evidence of this 'populist democracy' in action we immediately run
into the reality that very few people, in fact, exercise this 'democratic' right? Rather,
there are few makers of Rock and Roll and enormous numbers of consumers. If we
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set aside the various notions which see an act of consumption as an individual sense-
making and, therefore, authoring practice, and concentrate instead on who picked up
the guitar or plugged in the sampler in the first place, then hard statistical evidence
about how many people are playing their own original variant on, or version of, Rock
and Roll in Britain at any one time, is almost impossible to come by.
Sara Cohen, in her work on Rock music in Liverpool, refers to the 'large
number of bands in the city' (1991. p. 19) but argues that this condition is not unique
to Liverpool, whatever the heritage of the 'Merseyboom' of the 1960's; instead, she
cites the work of Bennett (1980); White (1983) and Finnegan (1992) as some of the
very few studies that research the experience of local music-making and she repeats
(with minor qualification) Finnegan's estimation, based on her study of music-
making in Milton Keynes, that there is one Rock band for every one thousand
inhabitants of a city (and, by implication, for the population as a whole). Despite the
fact that this suggests a staggering fifty-six thousand Rock acts extant at any moment,
and mindful of the fact that we need to factor-in Negus's (1992) codicil to this figure
- that there are even more musicians who are not 'sporadically visible at a local level'
and need to be counted in to the total (and that 'rock' is not the only popular music
style) - the most provisional and preliminary conclusion we can draw from this single
statistical source is that still comparatively few people appear to seize the democratic
potential offered by Rock and Roll as an'art-form'.
I have chosen to begin with the quotation from Lester Bangs because his
sentiment seems, to me, to be far removed from the reality of how 'Rock and Roll' is
made. This does not mean that I consider Bangs a 'bad writer' but to criticise his
observation is to connect immediately with the ongoing assertion of the 'right' of pop
music to be taken seriously. Without wanting, here, to condense the whole history of
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Popular Music Studies (PMS) it is fair to observe that the right to research this
particular aspect of popular culture has been particularly hard won. It has been forty
years since Raymond Williams began to explore the anatomy of Leavisite 'Mass
Cultural' disdain for popular products but its pervasiveness in elite institutions
persists to this day. Pop music has been the last of the popular cultural industries to
be granted attention by academia. This helps to explain the paucity of information on
the actual experience of the lives of pop musicians available to us. What it means,
also, and more generally, is that as the study of popular music is now at least
admitted by academia, there is a need to go beyond the first engagements with
antipathy for popular products and to cut through the hyperbole that surrounded those
encounters. When we discuss the making of 'Rock and Roll', then, whatever its
stylistic variations and the fascinating convolutions of its history, what we confront
in any study of this music is the fact that it is recorded music that has always been
made to be sold in great quantities. 'Anybody' can pick up a guitar but not everybody
can make a record of the sounds they make with that guitar; and far fewer can hope
that the record they make will become whit', a popular success.
Popular Music.
On the above basis, that popular music (especially since Rock and Roll) is
recorded music that has always been made to be sold in great quantities, and from
this point onwards, I intend to use the term 'Pop' as a generic description for all music
that is made on these terms; and 'Pop Act' as any act that makes such music. My
reasons for this are, in the first instance, to avoid the kind of pejorative conflicts
about the nature and value of specific styles - 'Indie', 'Folk', 'Dance' 'Metal', 'Rock', 'R
& B', and so on, are all imprecise terms and carry with them an ideological baggage
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accumulated through years of music journalism. I use 'Pop Act' partly because it
serves a pragmatic function as a dual singular/plural descriptor; partly also because,
as above, I use the term 'pop' in a generic way; but my use is also guided by the need
to avoid further pejorative conflicts around the notion and degrees of 'artistry' in the
performance and composition of popular music.
The notion of the 'pop artist' is very much a part both of the historical
development of pop itself and of the major changes in the ways that pop has been
written about over the decades. To introduce what would be a largely unsustainable
distinction between 'acts' and 'artists' at this, or at any stage, would be to sow
confusion rather than to aid clarity. To prefer 'pop act' over 'pop artist' is to avoid
making any premature judgement about the relationship (or about the impossibility of
a relationship) between 'art' and 'commerce'. It seems self-evident that pop music is
not entirely manufactured - all composition begins in the human imagination - and a
related series of creative as well as organisational and administrative actions are
required to bring pop music to the attention of the public. What remains at issue in
studies of pop is the nature of the relationship between creativity and industrial
practices; the extent to which they serve and depend on each other; and on whose
terms that service, and that dependency, is initiated and sustained. Whether we prefer
to acknowledge it or not, pop has always been as much about selling manufactured
commodities as it has about making music. Somehow human musical creativity and
industrial processes (where these are also organised human actions) do interact to
create pop music and it is this interaction and its consequences for what becomes
popular music that will frame this discussion.
For example, pop differs from classical music, not just stylistically, but in the
more fundamental way that, in the making of pop records, the recording process is
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used to treat the notes of the musicians rather than to document the performance of a
group of musicians who are interpreting a previously written score. Whatever its
expression, all forms of pop music since the earliest years of Rock and Roll have
used the studio as a site of additional, or even definitive, composition. Not only is the
generic 'pop' justified in the above way, but the pivotal place that recording has in the
realisation of some music as popular music (see below) carries within it the
inextricable connectedness of the desire to make popular music with the need to
invest capital in order that that desire should stand a chance of realisation.
Put simply, and in advance of any more detailed discussion, record
manufacture (as well as the promotion and distribution of records) has to be paid for.
'Pop acts' make 'pop records' and it is reasonable to argue that they all make them in
the hope that they sell millions of copies of those records - not just because they are
ambitious but because pop records have to sell in mass quantities in order to be
popular (again, see below). In order to achieve this aim, or at least reach a position
where it might be realised, a pop act needs to be signed to a record company. On this
basis, it is also reasonable to argue that in order to gain the attention, not just of
record companies but any organisation that might help them realise the goal of
signing to a record company, pop 'composers' compose in the anticipation that a
market exists, or can be brought into being, for their particular creations because this
is the only basis on which a record company will pay to make records of their work
and pay, also, to promote and distribute them. Before proceeding, I need to make it
clear that I intend to concentrate on pop acts that sign, ultimately, to major record
companies in order to eliminate any impacts on their fate that might have issued from
distinct limitations or inadequacies associated with the address made by small
companies to huge markets.
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Sketched in the very general way, above, this combined set of observations is
contentious. It is contentious for reasons already partly touched on - PMS is still in its
infancy; not only is there a dearth of ethnographic study of emergent and, therefore,
aspirant pop acts, there is also a comparative dearth of studies of how record
companies work with pop acts to make pop records. I will work on the assumption
that the decision to pursue pop music-making is indeed inflected by the desire to
realise the twin goals of recording compositions and selling large quantities of those
recordings and that this will involve emergent pop acts in a continuous recognition of
the need to be 'signed' to a record company. Cohen's work displays the degree to
which emergent pop acts measure themselves against both their understanding of
where they 'fit' musically in terms of their particular overview of what, in the past,
has been successful as 'pop music', and also how they might attain the status of a
signed act. What complicates the issue is that the fate of a pop act is not necessarily
reducible or traceable solely to the sound they make. Although I will work from the
simple definition of pop music expressed above (that pop is music that is recorded
with the aim of mass sales) the emphasis of this study will not be on making
recordings, as such, but on the conditions ofmaking records - which is a much wider
field, indeed.
Pop acts want to make records; record companies have to make commodities
for sale. I will discuss the implications of the latter in greater detail below, but the
point needs to made that, even when recording defines pop, it is not the whole of pop.
Pop acts, not just pop songs, become commodified by record companies. At every
stage of the commodification process there are issues that bear on how the act
addresses either the total process of becoming commodified or aspects of this -
signed acts do not simply concentrate on recording alone. At the hub of
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commodification are the compositions that the act brings to the record company and
the issue of how to record them to best effect often dominates the time an act spends
under contract to a record company. But who decides what that 'best effect' consists
of, how they establish its pursuit as the defining experience of being signed to a
major company, and how this extends beyond the studio to a conception of the total
of the act as a commodity are all questions that will need to be addressed in the
course of this study.
Organising Music.
We cannot separate pop music from the conditions of its production (in the
broadest sense) simply because it would not exist if it was not for the organised
systems of manufacture, dissemination, distribution and sale. I can anticipate the
types of criticisms that might immediately be raised against this observation (what,
for example, were Cohen's acts playing if it was not pop music?) and I will elaborate
on this point below; here I want only to affirm that, because pop is music that is
created through, and is sustained by, the music industry (and not by the record
industry alone - see later); it cannot exist viably, for any great length of time, away
from the prerogatives of how the production process is organised and realised within
that industry. Arguably, all acts that make original pop music, whether this is
stylistically innovative or not, are in one of four states - either they are seeking a deal,
making a record, enjoying success or suffering failure. Pop music isn't viable away
from an orientation or a direct connection to the production process because, crudely,
if acts can't make money from selling records then they have to go back to their 'day
jobs', or to no job at all as is usually the case to-day. On this basis, how to
characterise the form and nature of production in the music industry, and what this
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system of production can come to mean for its products and their producers, will be a
central theme of this study; as it has been throughout the comparatively brief history
of PMS. Its centrality flows from the earlier recognition that pop is music that is
made not just by musicians but by musicians together with industrial capital.
'Capital', in the music industry, is a combination of cash invested in
machinery, buildings, material and personnel, organised around the singular aim of
creating and selling records. As we have noted, this fact alone severely compromises
the notion that 'anybody can do it'; the only people who can truly make 'Rock and
Roll' are the ones that the music industry chooses to invest in and, as we shall see,
very few of these 'chosen ones' actually go on to make 'Rock and Roll' in the fullest
sense of 'making it'. Rather, the majority confirm the origin of the music industry
cliche (hinted at above), 'don't give up the day job'. Making pop music is an activity
that was, during the years of full employment especially, always pursued at night; not
just because this is when dance-halls or clubs are open and audiences are available,
but because it was the only time when people who had jobs they disliked could write
and rehearse the material they hoped would make them 'Rock and Roll Stars'. Yet, it
is precisely because people make this commitment to music-making, rather than
simply to consuming music, that the music industry exists in the way that it does. As
a result of the unique relationship between 'supply' and 'demand' (see below), what
makes the status of popular music as an industrial product so contested and
controversial is the very high level of unique, human creativity involved in its
production.
If we consider this last point above more closely, we are faced with an
apparent contradiction: how can pop music be said to be 'created through, and ..
sustained by, the music industry' and then, almost immediately, be shown to exist
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beyond its confines? Part of what I will argue is that pop music-making, even in its
rawest forms, never truly exists beyond the boundaries of the music industry. Clearly,
this is to make an assertion ahead of any analysis, but if we look in more detail at the
relationship between music-making and the industrial production of pop records
(although, again, ahead of the main discussion of this relationship) then we can
identify a signal difference, not just between Pop and other manufacturing industries,
but between it and what have come to be called the 'cultural industries'. Where
manufacturing is concerned, the ingredients for making steel occur naturally; they are
combined only because some companies want to make cars or kitchen sinks from that
material in the near certainty that a large-scale, social demand exists or can be created
for them. The ingredients for records also occur 'naturally', in and through the
determination of some people to make music; but the contrast with manufacturing
industry is that, in the former, supply is called into being only when the potential
demand for a product has been established; where music-making is concerned, the
supply exists whether there is a demand or not - making music exists because people
want to enjoy themselves creating music and not just because some company has
identified a way of making money from the manufacture of musical commodities.
Certainly, why people enjoy creating music is connected with their enjoyment of
consuming the products of the music industry (pop stars and their records) and
because they almost all will want to be part of the music industry themselves; but we
can still contrast pop music-making with other, key cultural industries. For example,
where the Film and Television industries are concerned, it is not the case that 'people'
are 'out there' making films or game shows; people with ideas and the requisite
technical materials have to be combined on the basis of an anticipated demand before
production in most other cultural industries can go ahead. This is not the case with
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pop music at the level of raw supply; that it becomes the case, and the consequences
of this 'becoming', will, again, form a theme of this study.
That it is 'not the case' that record manufacturing companies have to wilfully
combine the 'raw ingredients' of popular music - how the act sounds, how it looks,
what interesting stories can be told about why and how the act makes music - before
they can begin production should not blind us to the fact that these companies still
perform an important, and distinctive, version of these activities. What record
companies do is to select from hundreds of aspirant acts and then refine and
commodify the ones whose music they choose to record. They engage in 'refinement'
out of their understanding of potential market for the act and its records; they
commodify because this is their business; and they do both despite the fact that acts
have already achieved a degree of self-organisation and refinement in order to have
attracted the attention of a record company in the first place.
To make the last recognition, above, is to confront immediately what is
perhaps the central tension between record companies and pop acts (and, therefore, in
what we eventually help create as popular music, by consuming the outcome). What
pop acts have is a sense of self-identity formed around the creative pleasure they
derive from making music. What record companies have is the power to make hit
records. What record companies deploy when they choose to sign an act is their own
sense of why they believe that a market can be made for the commodified totality of
the sound and the identity of the act. In commodifying sound and identity, record
companies bring their own developmental conceptions and practices to bear on the
beliefs and practices that already exist within the act and between the act and
whomever, thus far, they have come to work with (largely, but not solely, managers
and their employees). When the various parties contract with each other, it is fair to
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say that the contract, however detailed, cannot ever fully specify or de-limit these
'developmental' practices.
Record-making can be argued to be a distinct variant of commodity
production, even of cultural commodity production, in that the contracted parties
work neither to blue-prints nor to treatments and scripts. In record-making, all
participants work to verbally negotiated estimations of the sound of pieces of music
(either as live performances or in various stages of recording). Further, these
'estimations' are couched in the imprecise and esoteric terms of the 'hit' potential of
those sounds. If the business of commodification is to take raw material and to
transform it into a successful commodity then we need to recognise that the complex
questions of how to set about the transformation of the act and its material into a
commodified form that a record company can sell (where the company will always
have its own, distinct, organisational priorities to respond to and comply with) will be
continually open to contest between act and company. These questions will be open
to contest because spheres of developmental competence cannot be delimited and,
even more so, because what is being commodified is not just a sound but (usually) a
group of human individuals. From this, the issues that concern me are those that
relate to the potential impacts of the (necessary) commodification process on all pop
acts, and not solely on ones that make hit records.
As we have noted, what record companies bring to the making of pop music
is capital; but capital is not an abstract and neutral force, it is an organised, and
organising, 'creative' one. What I mean by this is that we miss much of the detail of
industrial production if we conceive of capital only as capital goods. 'Capital' in the
music industry is not just the money to spend on recording studios, on pressing
plants, on distribution systems, and on media advertisements, it is the employment of
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individuals organised into teams of people to transform 'raw material' into a saleable
commodity. These people will necessarily work towards organisational goals and
within organisational parameters - particularly within budgets and to schedules - but
it does not follow that individuals will either interpret goals or organise their tasks in
identical ways; they will have their own senses of what makes a hit record or a
successful commodity and this 'sensibility' must be understood as a 'creative' one.
Negus has provided considerable insight into the patterns of recruitment and the
working methods of record industry personnel and an exploration of his findings will
form a large part of this study. Here we need to acknowledge the need always to
remain aware that the problem of dealing with terms like 'capital' is that they tend to
describe in huge 'brush strokes'. Equally, theories of capitalist production and,
specifically, cultural production under capitalism, will operate at high levels of
abstraction. What this study will concentrate on will be how acts 'come to' record
companies and what happens to them there, rather than on any wider discussion of
the nature of cultural commodities and cultural, industrial practices, however
compelling these might be.
All private industries are capitalist, whether manufacturing, service or
cultural, but not all firms within an industry, let alone all industries, operate in an
identical manner. The music industry is made up of thousands of individual firms but
the activities of that industry are dominated by a handful of major record companies.
In general, the way that all these firms conduct their business is very different from
the way that the Ford Motor Company conducts its business, but they are not less
'capitalist' for this. In this research I will deal with the ways in which the individual
employees of the music industry attempt to 'actualise' the capitalist goal of 'profit
making' in and through their relations with pop acts. What complicates their aim to
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make profit is that what they must work with is not inert raw material but the creative
acts of living individuals. At the very least, this demands a very different
commodification strategy but, more than this, it involves a strategy that must harness
and reconcile two powerful forces that are not necessarily congruent - the company
will always wants a return on its investment and the pop act, in which the investment
is made, will want, and expect, hit records. There is a tension here borne of the
intensity that high expectation brings, but the tensions are greater than this. A
company will always have many acts signed at any one time. This means, at the very
least, that all those acts are at different stages of the record-making process. The
company must deploy its resources and organise its time as effectively as possible
and this will almost certainly mean an inequality of attention between acts. However
'important' an individual act might be to a company, they are still one amongst many
- no act is bigger than a company - and, in this very fundamental sense, the individual
pop act will always contend with a force greater than itself. On this basis, it does not
prejudice this argument to observe that, when two such unequally resourced 'partners'
combine, the potential power to define goals, and to specify methods for obtaining
those goals, must lie with the stronger of the two. In this way, the issues of where
power lies in record-making and in popular music, in general, how it is wielded, and
with what effects for the 'health' of a pop act, will never be far from the centre of this
discussion.
Before proceeding, and especially in view of the broad characterisation of the
nature of the operation of, and relationships between, firms that make up the 'music
industry' made in the preceding paragraph, it is worth stating here that I am aware
that a substantial debate surrounds the question of changes in cultural industrial
organisation, and that these, in turn, are part of a much wider debate on changes in
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capitalism itself since the end of the 70's (see, for example, Todtling, 1996).
Hesmondhalgh (1996) gives a useful account of these, connected, debates. He
identifies two, broad positions: firstly, there are theorists who argue that market
fragmentation, the importance of independent labels, and 'new consensual
relationships between small, large and enormous companies' obtain within the music
industry; and that, therefore, the music industry is an exemplar of the trend away
from Fordist mass production and towards 'Flexible Specialisation' (FS) and 'post-
Fordism' within capitalism, in general. He then contrasts these views with an account
of a changing capitalism that has restructured along new lines of integration in order
to secure centralised, oligopolistic power at a global level - a restructuring in which
'the continuity of patterns of power in the recording industry' has been maintained. In
my examination of the experiences of pop acts signed to major record labels, I intend
to remain mindful that the music industry does not remain static in its practices and
also that the analysis of how record companies operate has changed and developed
through the work of successive theorists; but I propose to concentrate on what these
theorists say, and can be argued to assume, about how pop acts experience major
record companies rather than on how those companies have changed in their patterns
of ownership and with regard to smaller labels and independent service providers.
All pop acts want to 'give up the day job'. Some do; some survive long
enough to be able to call pop their job; but what contextualises their separate fates is
not how well they make music but how well that music, and its makers, are organised




The Different Fates of Signed Pop Acts.
Organising Commodities.
Simon Frith has observed,
The power of music comes .. from its popularity. Music becomes a mass culture
by entering a mass consciousness .. mass music is recorded music, records which
don't sell don't become popular, don't enter mass consciousness whatever their
particular artistic claims (and) their authenticity.
(Simon Frith, The Sociology of Rock, Constable, London, 1978 p. 203).
Frith's observation is a powerful one: in one stroke he separates pop music makers
into the 'seekers' and the 'arrived'; the 'aspirants' and the 'achievers'. If we connect this
sentiment with the work of Cohen, Finnegan, Bennett and White then we can begin
to 'map' the reality of how 'the ultimate populist art form' exists in practice. Put
simply, some people decide to write, play and perform versions or variants of popular
music; a very small percentage of these pursue their interest in pop to the point of
signing a contract with a major record company (Cohen quotes a rough 'rule of
thumb' estimate that 'less than one percent of bands' would ever win a record contract
- Cohen, 1992, p. 3). Once signed, however, that contract is not in itself enough to
ensure success; as Cohen, again, observes 'fewer still would attain success'. On this
basis, pop music is 'successful' music in the overtly quantitative sense that records of
compositions have sold in a 'mass' way. Yet, in making this, seemingly simple,
recognition we have to consider how far Frith's description of popular music as 'mass
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music' completes the separation of 'pop' from the ideal expressed in the quote from
Bangs at the beginning of this discussion.
In his attempt to establish what, musically, distinguishes Rock from other
styles of popular music, Allan Moore is eager to secure the term 'style' as an
expression of
a degree of consistency which can be found in its musical rules and practices.
(Moore, 1993, p. 1).
He does this in order to distinguish his identification of 'Rock' from other theorists
who have discussed it as a 'genre' or a 'form' of music; but I take Frith's point to
indicate an anterior 'state' to the description of any popular music in stylistic terms:
mass sales are the guarantee that music that was written to be recorded and mass-
marketed as popular music is confirmed as popular music, whatever its 'musical rules
and practices'. In this way, pop has no 'essential' characteristics (however engaging it
is to explore and discuss different aspects of style, genre and form); simply, 'pop' is
recorded music that sells; if it doesn't sell then it is 'proto-pop music'; and it is this
that Cohen's acts played.
The term 'proto-pop music' is, admittedly, an unusual one, but it is useful
'strategically' in the sense that it draws attention to the fact that 'hit' records represent
only a fraction of the total of the music that aspires to popularity at any one time. So
used are we to considering the whole of pop music as a combination of music that is
currently commercially available, together with music that has been commercially
successful in the past, that we tend to ignore the fact that there is much music we
never hear (or never heard). This is overwhelmingly because the vast majority of pop
acts are never signed by record companies, but it is also because so few acts that are
signed go on to make successful records (see below). Consumers of popular music
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remain, for the most part, ignorant of both the processes of its manufacture, in the
broadest sense of its 'mode of production', and the struggles of those who reach the
point of entry into the 'manufacturing stage'. As researchers in PMS, we cannot
replicate this ignorance. In order to realise the full significance of the observation that
popular music is commercially recorded music that has sold in mass quantities, we
have to understand how it became that way; and one way of doing this is to identify
what it was that prevented much of the music that aspires to popularity from realising
itself as popular.
Clearly, consumers and researchers alike are encouraged to ignore pop's
production processes, not simply by the excitement of consuming successful pop
music and by the various distractions of the promotional process, but also by the
difficulty of accessing the day-to-day practices of record companies and the virtual
impossibility of accessing the daily lives of aspirant pop musicians. This is why
Cohen's study is so important and why it is now so often quoted in the literature on
popular music; it 'opens up' the subterranean world of the 'local band' and it does it
very convincingly; but, nevertheless, by opening up the world of aspirant pop acts,
Cohen thereby raises the question, 'what happens next'? What happens between 'self-
indulgence in the bedroom and the kitchen' (Cohen, 1991, p. 23) and the entry into
'mass consciousness' (Frith, 1978, p. 203) of a tiny handful of pop acts?
Keith Negus, (1992) is the most recent researcher in PMS to attempt to
analyse the process of the commodification of music. We find another 'rule of thumb'
in his work - a study that looks not at emergent acts but at the practices of the labels
that almost all acts dream of signing to. In passing, he reflects on the chances of
success that such acts can expect:
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Record company staff assess potential acts with a working knowledge that
approximately one in eight of the artists that they sign and record will achieve
the level of success required to recoup their initial investment and start to earn
money for both themselves and the company.
and, as he notes elsewhere,
A large number of acts do not achieve any form of success whatsoever.
(Negus, 1992, pp. 40-41).
Negus repeats this ratio of one successful act to eight unsuccessful acts at
several different junctures and much of his analysis concludes with the insight that,
even though conscious and deliberate and under-taken by seasoned professionals, so
fragile and vulnerable to disruption and breakdown are the relations and conditions
of production within record companies that a failed product can be the result of these
breakdowns. What Negus does not conclude, although all his references to the extent
and regularity of failure point in this direction, is that failure rather than success is the
typical product of major record company activity.
This same objection could be made with regard to all the other researchers
who have repeated similar `rule of thumb' statistics on the majority failure of signed
pop acts. For example, Hirsch (1972/ 1992) cites an observation made as early as
1964 by Schemel and Krasilovsky that,
fewer than 20% of over 6,000 (45 r.p.m.) singles appear in record retail outlets',
while far fewer still would have gone onto sell in mass quantities over the
counters of those retail outlets. (Hirsch, 1992, p. 135)
Hirsch uses this statistic to develop his own understanding of record industry
operation that identifies 'over production' as the key to the large gulf between signed
acts and successful acts:
27
Overproduction is a rational organizational response in an environment of low
capital investment and demand uncertainty. Under these conditions it is
apparently efficient to produce many "failures" for each success. (Hirsch, 1992,
p. 135)
In The Sociology of Rock (1978) Simon Frith makes two, related
observations on the subject of the gulf between ambition and success: Firstly the
unsupported observation,
It has been estimated that there are fifty thousand rock groups in Britain, of
which less than a thousand has even a hope of getting a recording contract.
(Frith, 1978, p. 76)
and then one supported by his own analysis into (presumably) BPI statistics:
cultural industries have to make available a far greater number of goods than are
eventually successfully marketed. In 1976, for example, British record
companies issued 3,512 singles of which 229 made the top twenty, and nearly
four thousand albums (including more than a thousand classical discs) of which
about two hundred made the top thirty. (Frith, 1978, p. 75).
Notably, Frith takes the need 'cultural industries' exhibit to make available many
products that are destined to fail almost wholesale from Hirsch. In Sound Effects
(1983) 'the, new, totally revised version of The Sociology of Rock', to quote its book-
jacket, Frith makes significant modifications to his overview of popular music-
making (see chapter three) but he continues to draw on Hirsch's argument, albeit with
different examples:
the culture industry has to make available a far greater number of goods than are
eventually sold. Of the four to five thousand LP's that are issued every year, for
example, only about 10 percent make money, and only another 10 percent cover
their own costs.. Because record companies don't sell most of the titles they
release, they must, instead, maximise the profit on the records that do sell .. the
records that do well cover their own costs many times over and so cover (the
costs of the failures) as well' (Frith, 1983, p. 101-102).
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Taken together, these observations represent a near-thirty year tradition of
acknowledging the large-scale failure of pop acts that sign to major record
companies, but this 'tradition' exists only as a by-product of research that
concentrates on other aspects of popular music-making (of the nature of 'Rock
Music', of the organisation of record companies, and so on). Perhaps the 'telescope'
needs to be reversed. Much music is made, not just by aspirant acts, but by record
companies signings, with the intent of it being realised as 'popular'. Studies of
popular music tend to trace the roots of 'popularity' to intrinsic aspects of the music
itself (Moore and many others), or to the ways in which pieces of music articulate the
cultural concerns of the audience for that music (Frith 1978, Chambers 1985,
Reynolds 1990). In this study, I do not intend to offer some replacement explanation
for the popularity of music; rather to propose that if we examine commodification
procedures from the point of view that these result more often than not in failed
commodities, we might gain a different perspective on the movement from proto-pop
music to pop music, proper.
On the basis of the above, this study is motivated by the need to suggest
answers to a single question: why is it that seven out of eight acts signed to major
labels, fail? We do not have to ask why the music industry lives with such a high
failure rate; the answer is, simply and quite brutally, because it can afford to. As Frith
made clear twenty years ago, so enormous is the income generated by successful acts
that the 'failures' are easily paid for. For example, at the time of writing, the most
recent estimate of the earnings of Oasis in the period 1995/6 have been put at over
One Hundred Million pounds. Because the industry is so guarded about real earnings
we will never know the true figure, but the gross from ticket sales alone for Oasis'
(August 1996) Knebworth concert was over five and half million pounds, not
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including the sales of merchandise, broadcast rights (and subsequent royalties
yielded), franchises, and the revenues from the sales of the concert video. But the fact
that success pays for failure still does not explain why, and how, failure comes about.
If overproduction is the root cause of large-scale failure (as Hirsch and Frith
argue) then the simple conclusion we can draw from this argument is that most acts
fail because most acts are never intended to succeed. While these views will need to
be explored in greater detail before we can consider accepting them at face value, we
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still need to ask how this process manifests itself in the everyday reality of life in the
music industry, when all acts that sign record contracts do so in the belief (in which
they are encouraged) that they are destined for success. Negus breaks this pattern of
explanation by arguing that, despite the fact that success ultimately pays for failure,
advance costs are now so high that record companies would ideally like all their acts
to succeed; that they do not he attributes to the hazards inherent in the
commodification system (as we shall see). Again, however, this explanation begs
similar questions to those that are raised by Frith's analysis of the operation of the
music industry. What neither Hirsch, Frith nor Negus does is to analyse the music
industry from the point of view of the experience of pop acts signed to major record
companies. As a result, the fates of those acts are treated as merely the outcomes of
music industry procedures, decisions and practices; the acts are passive entities rather
than actors in their own destinies.
In this study, I intend to explore the life-experience of several pop acts, all
signed to major record labels, and all of whom failed to make hit records. My aim
will be to uncover how the processes of failure manifest themselves in individual
cases. The location of the search for answers to the question of large-scale failure is
the commodification process. This site of musical and business activity can be
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addressed, more specifically, by asking the following, related or constituent,
questions:
(1). Are there any common features in the experience of failed pop acts that
might be understood as typical? If so,
(2). Do these 'features' stem mainly from flaws within the constitution of acts;
flaws in music industry practices; or from regular combinations of particular aspects
of both?
In pursuing an answer to these questions, this study is not conducted with any
belief that a single-factor explanation exists for the familiar occurrence of failure. For
example, it might be valid to argue that there is no need to 'explain' why so many pop
acts fail'; their failure is self-explanatory, they were simply 'not good enough'. But to
enter the territory of 'good' and 'bad' is to enter the arena of taste, as if this is some
quantity of the mind, rather than a quality of social experience. It is also to enter the
territory of the audience; as if this is a social 'given' rather than an economic
construct. There is no space here to explore every one of the multiple dimensions
engaged in the decisions of some people to write music; of others to pay for it to be
recorded and promoted; and of still others to buy or not to buy the resultant records.
Rather, this study will concentrate on the paradox of why it is that the music industry
appears to be such a hazardous environment for pop acts. The address made to this
question, this 'paradox', then proceeds from the recognition that what appears as only
a single 'phase' of the life of a pop act (record-making) needs to be understood, itself,
as a process, as a force-field of multiple interactions within the act; and between the
act and all those agencies that, together, constitute the 'music industry'.
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Conclusion .
If we return to the early 'lives' of pop acts (as represented in Cohen's work), it
is safe to assume that when an aspirant act signs a record contract it will do so in a
state of great excitement and in the anticipation of considerable material success.
Yet, all acts sign in the certainty (if not the knowledge) that they have a one-in-eight
chance of realising that success. In a 'macro' sense, the likelihood that an act will fail
is pre-determined, but, if it was possible to take a'sna_pshot' of all the acts signed to a
major record company at any one time, how could an outside observer (or even
members of the acts concerned) tell which seven of any eight would be likely to fail?
This study will be concerned to examine the experience of failed pop acts. The
method for this 'examination' is broached, below; but the decision to take this course
in the search to understand of how the profligacy of the Music industry works in
practice, is the one established above: if we are to understand the fates of pop acts we
need to know not just what motivates them but what the effects are of the
relationships they develop in their pursuit of the goal of mass sales. On this basis, we
need to know why they make, individually and collectively, the decisions they do
about how to develop 'careers' in the music industry. Only by tracking them through
the stages of formation to failure can we begin to establish and identify whether
factors in their formation as acts contributed to their falling foul of the enormously
high hurdle represented by the daily practices of record companies; or whether,
simply, those 'hurdles' defeat all but the most determined. As a result, we may be able
to develop a new sense of why it is that, of thousands of 'proto-pop' makers, only a
tiny minority actually make music that is popular.
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Part Three:
Methods - Preliminary Observations.
Introduction
So far in this discussion it has been necessary to 'put on hold' a number of
issues that relate to the clarification of key terms used in this analysis. It has also
been necessary to delay larger questions of method. But the reasons that inform the
choice of what can be postponed until the essence of the research project has been
sketched out are themselves indicative of methodological choices that derive from an
as yet unstated and unexamined methodological position.
In the following chapters I will need to look more closely at the 'range' of
traditions that contribute to PMS and also, in greater detail, at studies of different
aspects of popular music-making; even so, it has not been possible to proceed
without referring to these 'traditions' and to some of the most prominent of those
'studies'. This is a work within an emergent research discipline, one that is not yet
fully-constituted either in terms of its methods or its objects of analysis.
Consequently, the construction of the argument thus far betrays tensions within this
emergent field: notably that it is already apparent that this will be a study in the
'context' of popular music-making rather than one that focuses on the creation of
musical 'texts'. As a study in and of the context(s) of popular music-making this
research is a work of Sociology rather than Musicology. Certain conditions are
created by this recognition, 'conditions' that will need to be returned to at later stages.
Here it is necessary to observe that sociology is a mansion with many rooms and,
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arguably, each of those rooms is defined by a method for generating knowledge about
a subject area (rather than simply by the subject area itself).
Firstly, and broadly, this research is apparently 'Qualitative' rather than
'Quantitative' - it concerns itself with the experience of individuals and groups of
individuals rather than with data derived from anonymous swathes of people grouped
in categories of one kind or another. This acknowledged, we need to establish what
kind of qualitative method we are dealing with. Already, several phrases have been
used in this introduction that hint at the position of the researcher: notably, a brusque
dispatch of 'the various notions which see an act of consumption as an .. authoring
practice'; an admission that the choice of the opening observation (by Bangs) was
informed by its being 'so far from the reality of how Rock and Roll is made'; and a
further abrupt dismissal of 'issues of opinion about whether one raw material
producer is an "artist" and another is not'. None of this is accidental. It stems from my
own address to the process of making records and is borne of my experience of
making records.
Between 1983 and 1996 I was a member of the pop act Latin Quarter. Latin
Quarter recorded and released five albums (a sixth is in preparation; the fifth was
written, recorded and released during my period of research for this study). Latin
Quarter first signed to the, now defunct, independent label 'Rockin' Horse' in 1984.
This label was taken over by Arista Records and, while with them, Latin Quarter
achieved a British Top Twenty hit with 'Radio Africa'. Success in other, mainly
Western European and Scandinavian, countries followed but the experience of
recording an album for Arista proved particularly fraught; with the result that Latin
Quarter produced a record, 'Mick and Caroline', than no-one involved in making the
record (not act, manager nor record company) could find any merit in. So destructive
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was the experience that Latin Quarter's career declined from then - but not before
recording a subsequent album for RCA and releasing further albums for RCA
Germany and the German independents, VMG and SPV. At the same time, the
parallel career of Latin Quarter's manager, Marcus Russell (my oldest friend, his and
my entry into the music industry were contingent on each other) improved to climax
in his managership of Oasis, currently the most successful British pop act of the
Nineties, and already one of the most successful British pop acts of all time.
Consequently, I have been through the processes of forming a pop act, writing songs,
signing deals, having hits, and failing to sustain a career in popular music.
Meanwhile, I have experienced at close hand another's rise to the pinnacle of pop
success.
Without exploring these experiences in any greater detail here, the bare fact of
my having undergone them should indicate that this is not a standard exercise in
qualitative research: my position as researcher in pop is not compromised by them,
but is certainly problematised by my coterminous position as a maker of pop music.
Even so, it is my contention that qualitative research is, itself, versatile enough to
allow for the conduct of a research project by someone whose research 'journey' has
not followed the accepted conventions of an identification of a research object within
the academy followed by data collection in the field; but one that has, in part,
reversed this process. I came to the academy with many experiences in the making of
popular music and with many opinions already formed about how pop is made. I then
went back out' into the music-making 'field' to generate more data. What I propose to
analyse here is my own experience of making records together with the experience of
others and to set what I find against what, so far, has been written about the business
of record-making. In this way, I hope to determine whether new ways of considering
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the record-making, and popular music-making, processes can be suggested. In this
aim, I have to acknowledge that I come to the business of researching the music
industry with a perspective on that industry and its practices that cannot be undone or
set aside. If I cannot set these perceptions aside then I need to make them explicit. I
come to this research with prejudices (judgements already made), but even in this
attempt to organise a research project into and through those prejudices, I change
them. They are changed by being made to account for themselves; they will be
changed by being asked to bear the weight of fresh evidence. Even so, I need to
confront the methodological implications of the existence of these 'prejudices' before
I can use the experiences from which they derive as a point of comparison with the
experiences of other music makers. Further, I have to address the methodological
implications of exploring my own experience as a primary part of this research.
Before beginning this address and before outlining, more precisely, the essentials of
my methodological practice, it is necessary to consider more closely the frequency
with which signed acts make misses rather than hits.
Evidencing the Extent of Record Label 'Failures'.
No-one keeps track of the pop acts that come and go and that never sign
record deals (although some research of the fate of acts signed to the National Bands
Register' might prove instructive). Equally, no-one keeps track of acts that sign to
majors and fail to produce the anticipated hit records. Certainly, there are biographies
of acts and there are the thoroughly researched articles of 'Record Collector'
magazine to help draw up 'histories' of acts; but, at best, these are 'one-sided'
histories, told either by partisan authors (cf. the work of Johnny Rogan) or else they
are based on interviews with just one member of a pop act. Even when the 'act' might
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be a single individual, we only get the story (or as much of it as they know and are
willing to tell) in their own words. The 'real' story of an act's experience on a record
label needs to be composed from contributions from all those involved in the
production of a record (in the widest sense of production) and in the preparation of an
act for the market-place. Essentially, the act has only a partial view of its own
position and progress and any fuller account of an act's failure can take time and
effort to unearth.
When we consider the researchers who have commented on the high casualty
rate amongst signed acts, we find that, in almost all the cases where an attempt has
been made to demonstrate the high ratio of failures to successes, that ratio is
evidenced by an analysis of record releases to chart performance. In the recent past,
Lopes (1992) and Christianen (1995) have taken their lead from the earlier work of
Peterson and Berger (1975) and have offered similar exhaustive analyses of the chart
performance of releases on a label-by-label basis. We will need to return to these
writers in the next chapter. Here we should consider Frith's (1974) use of a similar
comparative method that is more specifically targeted to the discussion in hand. This
is an exemplary piece of work. Frith traces the fortunes of all the singles released in
Britain during the period 1972/3 and he draws some very useful conclusions from the
exercise. There is not the space here to conduct a comparable exercise but I intend to
adapt Frith's method in order to draw attention to some of the potential weaknesses of
the quantitative approach to issues of success and failure.
Before beginning this exercise, I want to identify why I intend to distinguish
the music industry or music business from the record industry. In Negus's work (but
he is certainly not alone in this) there is a tendency to make 'record industry' stand for
the whole of the experiences encompassed in making pop music; in other instances,
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'record industry' and 'music industry' are used interchangeably. The distinction
between those employed by record companies and those employed in other music-
related occupations needs to be maintained because, particularly in the case of
emergent acts, many individuals with their own working methods, business practices
and, more importantly, agendas will be encountered long before, and if ever, a
representative of a record company strays across their path. In fact, this is implicit in
Cohen and Finnegan's observations about the scale of unsigned pop act activity at any
one time. All playing or performing acts will encounter their local 'representatives' of
the music industry - people that, as a loose definition, earn part or all of their income
from facilitating and servicing local pop acts. Already, this is controversial ground,
the extent to which local managers, local studio owners and engineers, promoters, PA
hire companies, roadies, DJ's, graphic designers, promotions firms, free-lance and
local journalists and the like can be considered as 'facilitators' and 'service providers'
is extremely contentious and will be referred to throughout the later stages of this
discussion. The point here is that, while the major record companies form the centre
of the music industry, for the obvious reason that they pay for, promote and distribute
records, they are not the whole of it: signed acts spend little time in direct contact
with record company employees in their working lives; rather, they have to develop
relationships across the widest field of agencies that can assist them in their own self-
organisation and self-promotion.
When an act signs to a major label it will have already developed a
considerable number of relationships with 'external' agencies that help to sustain the
act as a working entity. It is reasonable to allow that these relationships might bear on
how the act understands the sound it makes; where it is positioned with regard to
other acts; to the market for pop music; and to the likelihood that it will achieve
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success. In this way, and in however restricted a role, there can be many more
'participants' in record-making than, strictly, the pop act and the record company.
'Success' and 'failure' are relative terms; before a contract is signed, every act will
have survived different moments of failure and attained different types of success.
Each act, therefore, is unique in a dual sense: firstly, it is made up of distinct
individuals; but, secondly, it is unique in that its history is entirely its own. However,
whether the constituent features of that history are equally unique is a matter for
research and discussion. Before this point becomes more elliptical, (for the want of
that 'research' and 'discussion'), it will be helpful to `set the scene' in the manner
indicated above - by establishing how many signed acts fail to attain mass sales.
Surveying new releases.
I decided to track the chart performance of singles released by major labels
during one week in 1995 and to cross-reference the results with any evidence of
album sales by the acts in question - either at the time of the release of the single or
in the course of the calendar year. I took as my starting point for this brief survey the
issue of 'Music Week' dated the fourth of February, 1995 ('Music Week' does not
print volume or issue numbers). I chose to begin the survey with this issue because
January is a 'slow' time for the record industry - it is the post-Christmas aftermath
when the disposable income of most consumers is likely to be at its lowest.
Instructively, the first issue in February also carries an analysis of market share, by
company, for the last quarter of the previous year. Dynamically presented as a series
of graphs in striking colours, this analysis breaks down market share by company,
label and distributor in the form of bar charts and line-graphs. The text accompanying
the graphs explains the process of the compilation of market performance statistics
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with reference to the guidelines established by the 'Chart Supervisory Committee' - a
committee of the British Phongraphic Institute (BPI) - and shows, not unsurprisingly,
domination of the market by the major record companies, at that time Polygram,
BMG, Sony, EMI and Warner. The headline, 'Polygram pulls clear in the market-
share race' and the tall Polygram bar, at thirty-two percent more than double the share
of its next nearest rival, BMG (thirteen percent) is, as is the intention, a graphic
depiction of the 'health' of Polygram as a successful label. Although volume sales are
not represented, there are references throughout the article to impressive sales figures
and all of this information is used to justify the claim that 'the business (is) emerging
decisively from recession'. But, crucially, what these figures do not indicate to either
the casual reader, or even to an informed reader from within the music industry, is
the efficiency of Polygram, BMG, Sony, and so on.
The 'Music Week' quarterly analysis shows that certain companies are selling
records, are capable of competing in the market-place, which is perhaps a vital aspect
(if not the defining aspect) of business efficiency; but what they do not reveal is the
ratio between the number of releases and the number of hit records; neither do they
show the 'condition' of the label's 'roster' of acts - how many acts had their records
rejected by the company; how many are in contractual limbo; how many of the acts
that are selling records are actually recouping outlay and investment?
Understandably, no company wants this kind of information to become public
knowledge and, while 'Music Week' is an effective trade journal, it tends only to deal
with these issues in a post hoc way - by reporting on the sacking of key figures and
hinting at the reasons for their dismissal with guarded references to 'the disappointing
recent performance of the company'. Yet, from experience, the main topic for
discussion within record companies is exactly this issue of the 'hidden' indices of the
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performance of labels and companies and new staff recruits (almost always from
other companies) come with tales of mismanagement and crisis at their former label
with which to regale new colleagues. On this basis, testing the veracity of high failure
rates can at least be addressed by comparing releases with hits; testing the accuracy
of the ratio on an industry-wide level; and, more instructively, on a company-by-
company basis, is far harder to accomplish.
If we return to the issue of tracking the chart performances of new releases
then, in the edition of 'Music Week' in question, ninety-six singles were released
during the week in question (two hundred and thirty-six albums were also released).
Of the singles, eight were distributed by Polygram, which is not necessarily to argue
that they were originated by Polygram or by one of its subsidiary labels but the
likelihood remains that the majority would be - in fact, in this case, all the singles
were releases on labels directly controlled by Polygram, among them A&M, Motown
and Island. Of the other major companies, EMI distributed nine singles on seven
labels (including Capitol, Parlophone, Chrysalis and Virgin); BMG distributed six on
five labels (including RCA and the US-based major MCA which is usually counted
as a major company in its own right but evidently lacks its own British distribution
apparatus); Sony distributed nine singles on six labels (including Columbia and
Epic); and Warner distributed seven singles on five labels (including Elektra, WEA,
East West and Reprise). Of the total singles released during the week, thirty-seven
percent were released by major companies. This may seem a comparatively small
figure, but if we look more closely at the releases then the following can be observed:
(i). Of the remaining releases, the major distributors were Pinnacle who exist
solely as a distributor of releases of minority, often tiny, independent ('indie rock')
labels. This same observation then applies to SRD (thirteen titles distributed, almost
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all House/garage/techno tracks); and Jetstar (thirteen titles on thirteen labels,
predominantly reggae releases).
(ii). Releases on major labels distributed by major companies were,
overwhelmingly, chart-oriented including several by established artists. In fact the
release pattern was almost identical in each case - one release each by a major act;
Gloria Estefan, Tom Petty, Sting, Annie Lennox and Del Amitri on Sony, Warner,
EMI, BMG and Polygram, respectively - supported by a smattering of up-and-coming
indie rock acts - Supergrass, P.J. Harvey; less-bankable former 'names' also in the
'indie rock' category - Siouxsie and the Banshees, The Smiths (a 'catalogue' release);
hugely successful US acts that meant little in Britain - Live, Garth Brooks; and all
supported by a large number of 'dance' acts; including some with a chart 'history' - C.
and C. Music Factory, Marley Mark with others that were likely to be 'one-off
releases.
Frith makes the point in 'A Year of Singles in Britain' that, 'not all records are
aimed at the charts' (Frith, 1975, p. 39) and he offers a compelling break-down
('compelling' in the sense that he made 'good guesses') about the likely reason for the
release of particular singles. In 1972/3, two thousand, nine hundred and forty-one
singles were released - an average of fifty-seven singles per week. In 1994, Five
thousand one hundred and one singles were released - an average of ninety-eight
singles a week, which makes the week of proposed new releases catalogued by
'Music Week' on the fourth of February (the sixth to the twelfth of February)
absolutely typical in terms of the sheer number of releases. Overall, single releases
were seventy-five percent greater than they were in 1972/3 and there was less
evidence that singles were not 'aimed at the charts' although certain of Frith's
observations continued to hold good (the Tom Petty, Annie Lennox releases would
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fall into the category of 'album trailers; the reggae market apparently continues to
survive on the odd chart hit so finely tuned are its releases to the capacity of its
market). But, even without hard evidence, we can anticipate that the sheer volume of
sales had changed the 'chances' of singles in the 1990's and, thereby, perhaps altered
the rationale for their continued release.
Without entering into a fuller exploration of the changing status, and release
strategies, for singles in contemporary Britain, the fact remains that day-time radio
air-play policies (which still tend to concentrate on chart material) and the still
limited opportunities for new music video broadcasting continue to make 'exposure'
of new acts a problematic business for record companies. With so many more singles
being released than was the case twenty-five years ago, this can only mean that more
singles will fail in the market-place; while those that succeed in securing chart
placings will be under continuous competition from high volumes of new releases
and will, therefore, be likely to remain on the chart for fewer weeks than comparable
single releases in the Nineteen Seventies. Certainly, many of the five thousand 1994
releases would have only registered as 'chart singles' because retailers are now guided
by 'Music Week's' Top Seventy-Five rather than, say, 'Melody Maker's' Top Thirty as
they might have been in the Seventies. Perhaps, in this sense, 'chart entry' is
devalued; if not, a chart placing of somewhere between fifty and seventy-five is
surely indicative of comparatively low sales (of which, more below). If we consider
the different fates of the single releases in this brief survey (counting only those on
major labels) the following can be observed:
(i). In the week after release, three of the singles entered the charts; two
weeks later nineteen further singles charted. Twenty-two entries out of thirty-nine
releases is a healthy eighty-six percent 'success' rate and an initial reversal of the
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eighty-seven percent failure rate of the 'rule-of-thumb' under consideration. The
reason for the discrepancy between three and nineteen singles over two weeks will
be, simply, that the three singles to chart first would have been released at the
beginning of the week surveyed by 'Music Week' (it is also possible that they had
already been available in 'special formats' a few days prior to 'official' release).
(ii). Once we begin to consider the length of time spent on the charts, the
'optimistic' picture above begins to darken. Of the twenty-two initial chart entries,
four dropped out after one week; eight after two weeks; and three more after three
weeks. By the eleventh of March only six singles remained on the charts and only
two of them were in the top ten - 'Don't Give Me Your Life' by Alex Party on MCA
but distributed by BMG; and No More I Love You's' by Annie Lennox, on RCA, also
distributed by BMG. Of the other four, Sting's, 'Only a Cowboy Song' had peaked at
fifteen for two weeks; while Gloria Estefan and Del Amitri had reached nineteen and
twenty-one respectively, but had dropped several places every week thereafter.
(iii). Frith's 1975 observations on 'album trailers' tended to hold true for
several of the singles that entered the chart, whatever the duration of their stay. For
example, The Smith's 'Ask' appeared for one week only at sixty-two but this presaged
the release of their entire back catalogue and exactly one month later there were six
Smiths albums in the Top Fifty. The same applied to releases by Siouxsie and the
Banshees; P.J. Harvey; John Lee Hooker; Garth Brooks; and Del Amitri. The singles
by Sting and Gloria Estefan had been taken from already successful albums and the
Annie Lennox record was part of the promotional build-up towards the release of
'Medusa'; a very successful album release in April.
If we take it as granted that most singles will be derived from album-projects
(not all will be - dance singles are very often 'one-offs' by DJ's and mixers) and that
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the major record companies will be looking for strong album sales to begin, in
Negus's words, 'to recoup initial investment and begin to make money', then an
examination of the connections between singles by new artists and subsequent
successful album releases begins to change the picture quite dramatically. Just by
linking chart entries with album sales we can reduce the number of 'successful' artists
from twenty-two chart entrants to eleven acts - on the basis that eleven of the new
entrants neither registered obvious 'hit' singles, top ten entry, nor registered as large-
selling album acts later in the year; these were simply chart entries of brief duration
and, probably, very limited sales. Of the eleven 'successes', Alex Party had a hit
single that didn't spawn a major selling album; Sting and Gloria Estefan's tracks had
been taken from already successful albums; the Smiths was a 'posthumous' release;
Garth Brooks and John Lee Hooker sold to a very limited market (John Lee Hooker,
especially, whose 'revival' was based largely on his appearance in a Budweiser
commercial); the Siouxsie and the Banshees album charted only briefly; P. J .
Harvey's album was her third and did not stay on the album chart for long; Annie
Lennox released an album of covers as a follow-up to her hugely successful first solo
album 'Diva'; while the Del Amitri album was a fair-sized hit but this from an act in
the tenth year of its career.
Viewed through the particular lens of the connection between singles
'performance' and album sales, each of these 'successful' acts would be in a very
different condition - some might still be climbing the 'spiral' of music industry
success, while others might be on a downward course. For example, the fact that Del
Amitri had a small hit single and that this helped album sales for a few weeks might
not have been enough to secure them a subsequent album release; Annie Lennox's hit
single, on the other hand, would have been encouraging for the company in the run-
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up to the release of a follow-up to a hugely successful first album; Siouxsie and the
Banshees record company might be very concerned that a long-established act's 'sales
base' appeared so narrow; while John Lee Hooker's company would be pleased at the
unexpected bonus of charting an album by a veteran bluesman. But what is more
important for this study is that the only successful new act either to emerge from, or
feature in, the entire list of thirty-nine releases by major labels during the week of the
sixth to the twelfth of February was 'Supergrass' whose single 'Mansize Rooster'
(their second) entered the chart at Twenty but lasted only two further weeks before
dropping out. Later they scored a hit with 'Alright' and they were, consequently, one
of EMI's successes of the year (their album, 'I Should Coco' was the thirty-first
largest selling album of the year).
Suddenly, then, thirty-nine releases are reduced to one successful new act;
not, of course, that the majors would not be pleased to sell records by all the other
acts mentioned above, but record companies need continuously to look to the future,
to the replacements for Sting and Gloria Estefan. To have found one Supergrass is a
triumph, after Latin Quarter's 'Radio Africa' was a hit for Arista (and the song had
been released previously on two independent labels) the company went for four years
before they registered another hit single by a British signing. Major record companies
are able to absorb huge losses in their search for successful acts; and the work of
searching goes on relentlessly, as the figures here indicate - ninety-seven singles a
week from five companies. But, if we allow that five thousand singles in a year does
not mean five thousand separate acts, the scale of failure is still enormous - while
Supergrass were gladdening the hearts of EMI employees, what became of Royal
Trux and Dead-Eye Dick, released in the same week?
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The last point above can be amplified if we consider the end of year statistics
for 1995. A quarter of the One Hundred best selling singles of the year were by
'debut' acts; a reasonably 'healthy' figure; but only nine of the year's one hundred best
selling albums was a debut release. Four of the top selling debut albums were
'novelty' releases - the huge selling 'Robson and Jerome' album (a TV tie-in from the
programme 'Soldier, Soldier'); 'Sax Moods' and 'Pan Pipe Moods' (easy listening
music) and the 'Riverdance' 'album of the show'. Of the others, one was by an
American act, Foo Fighters, with the remainder being British signings to major
companies (two on EMI; two on Polygram; and one on Sony). This is not to say that
every other 'new signing' to a major label would be judged to have failed if its first
singles or first album did not register in the respective top hundreds at the end of the
year, but, crucially, without far more precise information on a label's roster; the
extent of budgets; the commitment of staff, and so on (see below) the value of this
kind of survey begins to break down.
Assessing the 'Quantitative' approach to 'Success' and 'Failure'.
The problem with the kind of speculation I make above (for example, with
regard to the likely reception within companies of the chart performance of acts) is
not that it may be less rather than more accurate or less rather than more informed; it
is that it is only speculation and no more. 'Music Week' may well be the 'bible' of the
music industry but it actually contains very little information of the kind that might
illumine the day-to-day lives of acts signed to record labels. For example, it does not
record sales figures, beyond indicating whether a single (or an album) has qualified
for silver, gold or platinum status. Further, the publication of a list of singles set for
release in the next week gives those records a deceptive sense of equivalence, rather
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like the publication of a race card in the sports pages of a national newspaper; but
there is no equality in the music industry; all contracts are separately negotiated and
confidential and it is certain that no two acts will receive identical treatment from a
record company. Obviously, we would expect records on major labels to have much
larger promotional budgets than releases by independents, but it is very likely that
budgets will vary considerably within companies, as a whole, and even within labels.
Without access to this information we cannot gauge how the chart, and sales,
performance of a record was received within the record company; for example, I
assume, above, that Polygram would be disappointed with the Siouxsie and the
Banshees record, they may not have been, the act may well have paid for the
recording themselves. Without knowing the extent of the recording and the
promotional budgets for a new act; or the extent of recoupable debt for an
'established' act, we cannot know the sales target figure for a release by that act.
Without knowing the sales target figure, and with no access to actual numbers of
records sold, we can't judge whether the act in question is regarded by their label as
either succeeding or failing. Equally, and partly as a consequence of this, we have no
way of knowing the condition and morale of the 'team' involved in the release of the
record (discussed later, but the combination of key functionaries in record release and
promotion) and of how their collective efforts (or lack of them) might be influencing
determination inside the company to pursue an on-going sales campaign around a
particular act. Further, we might read in 'Music Week' that an employee has left a
company, but we have no way of knowing whether and how this departure might
have affected acts that this person may have held key responsibility for. We might
also read about changes in personnel and policy at a corporate level but, again, we
have no way of tracking these changes to their effects on acts.
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Taken together, then, it is possible to generate speculative evidence to support
the claim that a large proportion of acts signed to major record companies are
unsuccessful; but this type of evidence has severe limitations in terms of its
usefulness. In the above instances, we have no way of determining whether or not the
one-to-eight 'rule of thumb' is accurate because we have no information about the
roster of acts signed to labels controlled by major record companies. If we knew who
was signed, we could begin to gauge the proportion of successful acts to unsuccessful
acts within companies. 'Music Week' does offer a cursory, weekly guide to new
signings and, at the end of the year, will 'sum up' the 'key signings' on a label-by-label
basis. By using this data it would be possible to keep track of the 'progress' of
signings but, again, we would soon arrive at the limitations of this quantitative
approach outlined above. Yet, to be concerned with a lack of comprehensive
quantitative data is, largely, to miss the point about how the music industry works.
However comprehensive it was, analysis of this kind of data could still never convey
the 'life' of a major record company. Essentially, the type of data required to verify
and to explain the high proportion of failed acts on major record labels will always be
qualitative in kind; for the reason that definitions of 'success' and 'failure' are
constantly shifting, not just as debts rise and income fails to keep step, but as
personnel, and corporate policies, come and go. All acts want to 'make it'; and
signing a 'deal' will always bring with it a sense of achievement; but signing is truly
only 'the end of the beginning'. Whether the number of acts that sign to major record
companies that actually go on to 'make it' fully - to enter mass consciousness and stay
there for an appreciable period - is one to eight, or one to a hundred, is not the issue;
the issue is that, for the majority of pop acts, 'signing a deal' is a ticket to failure and
that 'destination' is often reached surprisingly quickly.
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Conclusion.
The fact that failure, and large-scale failure at that, is an industry 'constant'
should be a disturbing recognition not just for researchers but for all aspirant pop
acts. That it tends not to be, in either case, is a product of the continuing, comparative
obscurity of the business of making recorded music. That the major commentators on
the general, industrial experience of making popular music are often reliant on 'rule-
l
of-thumb' figures at key junctures in their respective arguments tells us much about
how under-researched music industry practices still are; and if academics who live to
research have unearthed so little, then we can only imagine what little 'hard'
information is available to emergent pop acts on the conditions and demands they are
likely to encounter in the business of progressing to the goal of making hit records.
One outcome of the 'lack of access' to the experience of making pop -
through all its stages - referred to previously, is that this helps to reinforce stereotypes
about cultural production that tend to deflect from its fundamental, profit-oriented
nature. For example, 'Q' magazine (the most successful pop publication in Britain in
the last decade) represented the business of recording in this way:
Little is known of this twilight world, where an impenetrable language is spoken,
body clocks are scrambled and the sound is 'proofed'. And yet its here, witnessed
only by frowning operatives, installed behind enormous banks of implausibly
complicated equipment, that musicians can often deliver their finest
performances ... a rarely seen stage of Rock's creative process. Knob that flange
back. Give it some reverse glissando phase down.
('Q' Magazine supplement).
This piece can be criticised in a variety of ways and from a range of
perspectives but, for these purposes, what we can note is the confidence the editor's
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have in the ignorance of their readership that they can patronise them in this way.
Certainly, the style is tongue-in-cheek (it is also sycophantic) but the sub-text is one
that advertises the 'intimacy' of the glimpse into 'rock's creative process' offered by
the free photo supplement. But how can still images convey the process of making
records; of transforming compositional ideas into compositions; and what can they
tell of the multiple pressures these acts and their producers were under at the very
moment the photographs were taken (and of how those pressures may have inflected
compositional and commodification decisions)? What this kind of myth-making
exercise achieves is the maintenance of an ideology of the ineffability of artistic
creation; together with a mystification of the business of making records.
With no other sources of information on the music industry available to them
(other than, perhaps, the usually cryptic reminiscences of local music industry
casualties), new pop acts have little beyond the inaccuracies and glosses of the music
press to inform their music-making activities, in the broadest sense. All pop acts that
want to 'make it' (see Cohen, 1991) really do have to travel from 'the bedroom and
the kitchen' to 'mass consciousness'; but each act is forced to 're-invent the wheel' in
terms of its self-organisation and preparation for'stardom' (where notions of 'stardom'
can be very far removed from the realities of life on a record label). Viewed in this
way, it should not be surprising that, while many acts set out on the journey few
arrive; or that fewer still remain in the consciousness of the mass for any great length
of time.
If we accept that a predominantly quantitative approach to record-making is
inadequate to the task of representing the qualitative nature of the practical activity of
individuals whose job it is to convert the music and identities of acts that are signed
to major record companies into popular music products; then, it is my intention,
5 1
firstly, to establish what writers on the music industry have had to say about these
'individuals' and their working methods and practices. I then intend to examine the
experience of three acts, Respect, Roadhouse and Latin Quarter, that met with
different types of 'failure' on major record labels. In this examination I will
concentrate on how the evolution of the act affected interactions within itself; and
between its representatives and those record company employees and other
significant individuals involved in the recording and promotional processes. I do this
with the aim of attempting to answer the primary question of why it is that so many
signed acts fail to make hit records - but always in terms of the two supplementary
questions that ask whether, and in what ways, a commonality of experience might
exist to explain the fate of failed pop acts.
This examination will need to be prefaced not just by a further, more detailed,
statement of my research methods but by an exploration of my position as researcher,
for the reason that I am far 'closer' to some of my research material than is normally
the case in an exercise of this kind. Finally, I hope to draw some conclusions about
how researchers might approach the territory of determining why it is that so many
acts fail to achieve what they have every right to expect to achieve on signing to a
major record company - if not success, then at least a very good shot at it.
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Chapter Two:
Making Records and Making Commodities:
a Range of Views.
Introduction.
The main work of the previous chapter was the identification of a little researched
and little regarded cultural phenomenon: that, viewed from the experience ofpop acts
signed to major record labels, the main product of the music industry is not success,
but failure. Various estimates of the extent of this failure were considered and, while
it could not be finally verified, the 'rule of thumb' figure that, for every eight acts
signed to major record labels, only one will succeed, gives some indication of how
rare success in popular music really is. What we need to appreciate, before beginning
to examine this phenomenon more closely, is that, to make such an observation flies
in the face, firstly, of 'the facts'; when these are understood as the extremely healthy
balance sheets of the major companies. For example, as 'Music Week' reported, in
mid-1995 EMI Music Group 'announced its seventh consecutive record results ...
with turnover up 24% to £2.2 Billion and profits up 20% to £294.9 million': "failure"
is not a word a major company would readily or recently recognise. Secondly, this
way of representing the experience of making popular music not only flies in the face
of how most consumers experience pop; which is to say, vicariously, as their
favourites enjoy the glamour of international stardom; but it also strikes at the very
heart of the notion of 'popular' music itself - to re-echo Frith, popular music is
recorded music that enters 'mass consciousness', music that is made with this
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intention but that fails to realise its goal may, stylistically, be pop, but it is never
fully-realised as such because it fails to sell. From whatever angle we approach it, as
sound, statistic or thrill, pop music always dazzles us with the enormity of its success
rather than dismays us with the vastness of its failure.
Before exploring the record-making experiences of three acts who were
signed to major labels but who failed to make hit records, and, further, as a
springboard for establishing a method towards that exploration, we need to consider
what analyses of the relations that exist between pop acts and major labels have so
far been made. Popular Music Studies (PMS) as a distinct discipline (or as an inter-
disciplinary area) is still in its infancy. Even so, Richard Middleton was able to
observe in 1990 that 'a comprehensive bibliography of popular music.. would require
a book to itself (Middleton, 1990, p. 297). Popular music is, then, much written
about but its study is only now beginning to be systematised. As observations in the
previous chapter made clear, there are important socio-historical reasons for this gulf
between wider social interest and enjoyment in pop and its academic study, and the
particular consequences ofthis disjuncture tends, still, to define the field of study.
Very schematically, the literature that attempts to theorise the development of pop
music can be argued to have passed through four phases:
1. 1890-1940. If we take pop music to be one of the cultural responses to the
rise of the mass urban populations of the end of the Nineteenth Century, then,
between 1890 and 1940, no substantial attempt was made to discuss or analyse it as a
new cultural phenomenon; excepting the work of Issac Goldberg who furnished a
well-researched account of the rise and practices of `Tin Pan Alley' song-writers and
publishers during the first three decades of the century (Goldberg, 1961). Pop was not
brought inside the academy, its only place was as evidence of the worthlessness of
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popular products in debates that contrasted the debasement of culture through the rise
of cultural industrial products and a mass market for Hollywood films, popular
newspapers and magazines, cheap novels, and dance music. This contempt for 'mass
culture', articulated most completely in the pages of 'Scrutiny' (1932-53), the
mouthpiece of the Leavis's, has continued to exert an influence in the Universities
and other elite institutions ever since. What compounded the issue, and gave a cast to
debates about pop that those who argue its serious study have yet to escape, was that
a far more thorough critique and condemnation of cultural industrial production, and
of pop music especially, came from within Marxism, ostensibly the polar opposition
to the elitism of the influential 'Scrutiny' group. In sum, in the opinion of the Mass
Culturalists', the commodification of creativity was a debasement of the creative act.
2. 1940-1970. In 1941, Theodor Adomo published his essay 'On Popular
Music'. It would be wrong to imagine that this essay somehow 'contributed' to or
even 'founded' Popular Music Studies. In the first instance, there was no PMS to
'contribute' to; in the second, not only did Adorno's work fit easily into a Mass
Culturalist' frame of reference (therefore one entirely unsympathetic to pop and,
presumably, to its study), but it tended to be other aspects of Adomo's work,
particularly on Television, that were absorbed into the US academic mainstream
during the expansion of interest in Mass Communications and Media Studies in the
1950's. It was not until the late-60's that the work of Adorno, as a member of the
'Frankfurt School' (the school of critical Marxism founded in 1923, and forced to re-
locate to the USA by the rise of Nazism), together with the work of 'dissident'
Marxists from a variety of countries and historical periods, became generally
available for close-reading and discussion inside the resurgent British Left. When
young pop enthusiasts began to theorise the cultural position of pop, and especially of
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Rock music, they formulated that theorisation through an engagement with what
radical texts were available. Adorno's (impeccably Marxist) condemnation was a
bitter pill to swallow and the most rigorous work in early, British PMS engages with
Adorno in the development of a theoretical legitimation of the study of popular
music. We will need to return to Adorno's specific criticisms of popular music,
below; but, to precis his case, the commodification of creativity is not only a
debasement of creativity, it is politically pernicious because it contributes to the
passivity and the ideological enslavement of the mass of the population.
3. 1970-1985. From the end of the Sixties through, very roughly, to the mid-
Eighties, PMS issued, principally, from the fount of Rock journalism. This is not
entirely true of US research into pop - where the Mass Communications tradition
'permitted' the study of popular music - but this tended to limit theorisation either to
Functionalist or Quantitative approaches, as the work of Hirsch 1972, Peterson and
Berger 1975, and others, testifies. PMS, in this country (and also, despite the fore-
going, in the USA as well), grew largely as a result of the efforts of individuals who
had their roots in the Rock journalism of the period but who also intersected with
academia in different ways, and at different times; individuals who were committed
to the idea that pop music was a valuable area of study. This, originally and
understandably, was not a large group. Central among them were Simon Frith,
Charlie Gillett and Dave Laing who not only produced some of the first, book-length
analyses of aspects of popular music-making, but who also collaborated on
magazines like 'Let it Rock' and the 'Rock File' series of paperbacks. Graham
Vulliamy and Edward Lee wrote extensively on pop's place in the school curriculum,
while academics like Richard Middleton and David Horn helped connect these
initiatives with the work of a tiny handful of older, mainly musicologists, who had
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pioneered the embrace of non-classical musical forms within that discipline - Wilfred
Mellers and Charles Hamm, for example.
From the beginning, and given Rock's American origins (and African and
European roots), there was an international dimension to reflective journalism and to
the emergent Rock scholarship. This crystallised in the formation of the International
Association for the Study of Popular Music (IASPM) in the early-Eighties. Again, it
is very schematic to present this as a unified 'movement' when it contains large
numbers of people working in different fields who employed different methodologies
for different ends; even so, the formation of IASPM does indicate a willingness to
connect; and the spirit of that connection was a undoubtedly informed by the
'communalism' of the Rock years and by a shared determination that pop be treated
seriously by academia. Seen in this light, while the contest with Adorno in the
theorisation of pop can be argued to have elevated certain concerns above others, this
nonetheless demanded a rigour that simple journalism could not (had no need to)
deliver. Very generally, the Rock tradition tended to agree with Adomo that the
commodification of (musical) creativity was pernicious, but made an exception of
Rock for a variety of reasons. The work of Laing (1969) and Frith (1978) is notable
in all of this for their (separately and differently argued) determination to avoid the
simple assertion of Rock's 'difference' from pop. In their hands, the value of the study
of popular music needed to be demonstrable and consistent and, in this, the
'inconvenient' fact of Rock's commodification needed to be confronted and
surmounted.
4. 1985-Present. As Marxism lost the academic centrality it had gained in the
Social Sciences during the expansion in Higher Education provision in the 1960's,
new modes of understanding challenged Marxism's deterministic tendencies and its
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blindness to oppressions other than the politico-economic. In short, the rise of post-
Marxist critique (and its coincidence with the decline of the certainties of Rock
Music and the Rock 'community') has opened the study of pop to new theoretical
systems. Amongst these, the legacy of the Rock tradition's concern with the
conditions of popular music production has not been lost; but new ways of analysing
the uses made of popular music have broadened the debate about the issue of the
commodification of popular cultural products and have found new grounds to argue
the value of pop production and pop consumption.
All that such a very general sweep through popular music research really tells
us is that, since roughly the late-1960's, some theorists have been determined to take
pop music 'seriously', but 'taking pop seriously' means taking an entire form of
cultural expression 'seriously'. Given the academy's resistance to the study of pop,
what this has meant is that research opportunities into pop production and pop
consumption have been extremely limited. Frith makes this point in British Popular
Music Research (1981) and, despite progressive changes in the status of popular
music research in the intervening years, there is still 'much to do' with regard to
researching this field. Consequently, when we narrow our focus to consider only
those texts that deal with how pop is produced, then what complicates the issue is
that, not only are these few, but the studies themselves are not simply 'dedicated'
studies of popular music production. Instead, the principal studies of record company
practices exist as studies of wider aspects of the cultural and social place of popular
music written in different eras and from different theoretical perspectives.
To consider, firstly, the more general implications of this last point above: to
make a pop record is to produce a musical-cultural artefact through the agency of the
record industry. As previous remarks have indicated, unlike other areas of cultural
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production, the study of popular music is divided between disciplines in a way that
limits full communication between contributing theorists. In broad terms, the study of
Popular Music is divided between Sociology and Musicology. Because sociologists
make assumptions about what musicians do from their reading of how the industry
works, they have great difficulty in explaining how musical practices connect with
industrial practices. The reverse is then true of musicologists; the latter make claims
about music made for major record companies as if industrial practices have no
significance for the fates of composers and performers (post-modernists ignore both
and elevate consumption over production). Understood in this way, to study popular
music is at once to study music-making, to study cultural, industrial production and
to study the cultural place of the consumption of popular musical products. Theorists
of popular music-making are, thus, divided not simply by different theoretical
perspectives within each constituent area of study, they are divided by fundamental
differences of discourse between those areas. This is not to say that attempts are not
made to 'bridge the gaps' but, as yet, no truly common ground exists between
theorists of 'text' (musicologists) and theorists of 'context' (sociologists). On this
basis, PMS is 'co-disciplinary' rather than 'inter disciplinary'. Further, even where
theorists share a common interest (and, to a degree, common perspectives and related
discourses), the long-term academic disdain for pop music has, to an extent, distorted
the course of inquiry in the sense that earlier theorists have exhibited a tendency to
make a general case for or against pop music as a context for whatever aspect ofpop
production or consumption that concerns them most. This is an additional ,
complicating feature in any review of popular music literature .
In the recent past, Longhurst in Popular Music and Society (1995) has
supplied a convincing general overview of the academic study of popular music. As
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the title of the work suggests, his main concern is with sociological theories of
popular music-making (although he does provide an introduction to musicological
accounts of pop, as well). Similarly, although from a much narrower focus, Laing
(1994) and Hesmondhalgh (1996) have both furnished recent accounts of the
trajectory taken by non-musicological studies of pop. More than this, these latter two
have concentrated on summarising the development of the debate on the relationship
between popular music-making and the industrial production of pop records. At the
risk of making an amalgam of these texts, a similar 'line of march' for this aspecr of
the study of popular music is discernible in each study: Adorno's essay of 1941, On
Popular Music, is collectively cited as the 'point of departure' (this is also true of
Middleton's 1990 comprehensive, musicologically-informed work as well).
Following this, the next most significant text is Hirsch's from 1972 - where the
lengthy gap is eloquent of academia's disdain for popular musical products. Friths,
1978 work, The Sociology of Rock (together with his updated version, Sound
Effects, 1983) is next in line and the publication, in 1992, of Keith Negus's
Producing Pop brings us up-to-date. There are various parallels and over-laps, as well
as oppositions, between these four works and these will be discussed below; here we
need to consider how this study requires, simultaneously, to refer to these
'foundational' texts, and also to be distanced from them.
Essentially, each of the above theorists has a wider object in view than
'simply' the study of how records are made: Adorno wanted to castigate popular
culture; Hirsch to apply Functionalist Organisational Theory to a novel area of
production; Frith to 'rescue' pop from Adorno's condemnation; and Negus to posit the
rise of a 'global' mass entertainment industry. As Longhurst, Laing and
Hesmondhalgh all, separately, indicate, there is a wider literature on the record
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industry than is represented by these four works. Of particular interest to me are the
works of Hennion (1983/ 1990) and of Stokes (1977) (see below), but the problem,
from the perspective of this research, with much of this other work on the record
industry, is that it is either quantitative (Ryan 1985, Lopes 1992, Christianen 1994),
didactic (Harker 1980, Chapple and Garafalo 1977), or sensationalist (Dannen 1990,
Knoedelseder 1993). This does not mean that none of these works is interesting or
that no further texts exist that can shed light on different aspects of record-making
Stratton (1982a, 1982b, 1983) Gronow (1983), Harron (1988), and Jones (1992),
among still others, have all furnished useful analyses of specific dimensions of the
record-making process - but Hirsch, Frith and Negus all offer comprehensive
overviews of record-making in ways that other theorists do not. It is for this reason
that we encountered their work early in this analysis - to the extent that, largely, it is
their differential under-development of the identification of the high failure rate of
signed pop acts that has led us thus far. Adomo demands inclusion because his work
provided a point of departure for the more academically-inclined Rock theorists of
the late-60's.
An overview of record company relations with pop acts cannot be achieved
simply by 'touring' a 'typical' record company and pointing out that it is the work of
one department to sign acts and of others to market, promote and sell those acts and
their products as commodities. What both 'Quantitative' studies and 'hostile' studies
of the record industry lack is a sense of the place of the pop act in the industrial
equation. While this dimension will also be argued to be insufficiently addressed in
the work of the four theorists in question, their work might still be jointly understood
as, variously mounted but deliberate, attempts to examine how record-making is
pursued (rather than either how 'bad" record companies can be or how relations
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between individual record companies have changed). Because popular music-making
is a form of popular culture, there are, clearly, multiple issues to consider in the
reproduction, for sale, of popular musical items. On this basis, where necessary, the
work of other theorists will be drawn on in the course of this discussion, but the four
theorists in question remain those most closely associated with systematic study of
music industry practices.
Assessing the Industrial Production of Popular Music - preconditions:
Before we begin to look more closely at the work of Adorno, Hirsch, Frith
and Negus, the following points need to be borne in mind:
1. In the previous chapter, the assertion was made that we might be likely to
gain new insights into popular music-making, firstly, by approaching the industrial
process of the commodification of music from the point of view of the experience of
pop acts; and, secondly, by allowing that the analysis of the very high failure rate
amongst signed pop acts might equally produce new understandings of how popular
music is made. In both instances we need to remember that 'overproduction' already
exists as an explanation for the high failure rate amongst signed pop acts, and also
that isolating the production of pop from its consumption might produce its own
flaws.
In response to the issue of 'overproduction', I think it futile to deny that
overproduction, if it is not the root, structural 'cause' of failure, as such (if it was, then
all acts would be equally prone to failure), then it is still the context of failure (not
everyone can succeed, can make 'hit' records). This is the true worth of 'Quantitative'
studies of the record industry; they can show quite clearly that, every week, there are
too many records chasing not too few consumers but too few chart positions. The
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point here is that, even if all consumers bought four records a week instead of one
record occasionally, chart positions would still be both consumers' and record
companies' measure of success. On this basis, it is likely that, even if the volume of
sales goes up for individual records, their rank ordering will still cause consumers to
consider low or non-entrants, failures. Arguably, even if a 'failure' under these
conditions of high volume sales sells fifty thousand records rather than fifteen
hundred or less as they may do today (which would mean that the record company
might recoup its costs), the company might still seek to replace the act that made the
record with one they hope will sell whatever the volume of sales it takes to reach
number one in the sales chart. What concerns me is that the 'simple' recognition of
over-production at the level ofthe record industry as a whole cannot account for why
failure happens in individual cases.
2. As to the issue of an emphasis on production rather than consumption then
certainly we will need to remain aware that when we buy a record by a pop act, we
buy more than a sound fixed to a carrying format; what we buy is a commodified
experience of the act that made that record. We buy not only the sound they make, we
buy with it the experience of how they look, what their 'story' is and we buy into
where they are placed culturally - so the purchase says something about us, about our
tastes, about who we think we are (Hesmondhalgh quotes Gainham's reference to this
dimension of cultural commodity consumption in terms of their indirect rather than
direct use-value as 'markers of position and difference' - Hesmondhalgh, 1996 p.
481). Negus is concerned that we recognise that what the record industry now sells is
a 'total star text' (see below) - we don't simply buy a Madonna record, we buy,
almost, a memento, our 'piece' of Madonna, the star', and we display our
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identification with her and with what we imagine she represents through our purchase
of a copy of her latest work.
Although an exploration of consumption is beyond the scope of this study, it is
fair to assert that the decisions that record companies make about what acts to
commodify and how to sell the resultant commodities are related entirely to the
expectation that a market of consumers exists, or can be created, for those
commodities or commodified acts. In attempting to realise their expectation that an
act can be transformed into a successful commodity, the record company will,
simultaneously, be involved in the creation of a market for their commodity and a
commodity for the market they are attempting to create. Seen in this way, the
conditions of success are as much a part of preparation for the market-place as
performance within it, and, as we have seen, the majority of signed acts 'fail' on their
way to market rather than, strictly, within the market-place itself. This is the
phenomenon that forms the object of this study.
3. Before we begin to discuss the work of these theorists (together with that of
Adorno) in any greater detail, we need, firstly, to dispel any notion that there is some
kind of equivalence among them. For example, the work of Hirsch's quoted in this
context is an excerpted version of an essay published in 1972; the work of Frith's that
I will pay most attention to (The Sociology of Rock) was published in 1978. In
contrast, Negus's book, Producing Pop appeared as recently as 1992. Not only, then,
are we considering different 'types' of text - essays and books, written with different
objects of analysis and from different research perspectives; we are also, arguably,
considering three different 'record industries' - the US record industry of the late-
1960's; the British industry of the mid-1970's; and the 'global' industry of the early-
1990's. Clearly, we are forced, not just by these differences in the relevant secondary
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source material, but by the task in hand, to work at a high level of generality and
abstraction if we are to identify consistent features of record company practice,
particularly over such great distances in time and between foci of economic activity.
I begin this consideration of studies of the record industry with the work of Hirsch
rather than with that of Adorno, for reasons that will be made clear in the course of





The title of Hirsch's essay, Processing Fads and Fashions: An Organisation-
Set Analysis of Cultural Industry Systems tells us much about its thrust: that cultural
industries are made up of organisations that 'process' products in response to (or
perhaps to help create) 'fads and fashions'. In making even this fairly tame re-
statement of the essay's title, the number of analytical pathways beckoning us is quite
daunting. For example, from the latter half of the title we might be encouraged to
begin with a definition of culture and an analysis of cultural expression; or we might
start from the rise of industry and trace the connections between an industrial
economy and the commodification of cultural expression. Conversely, if we isolated
the first half of the essay's title, we would enter the sphere of consumption rather than
production and, perhaps, be tempted to discuss the creation of markets or audiences
for popular products and the connections between their consumption (and
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production) and the various expressions of youth culture and their connections with
popular music. All of these topics will be familiar both from the literature on Pop and
from the wider literature of Media Studies and Cultural Studies. In an effort to
contain the potential for distraction in order to keep the question of the roots and
processes of the failure of signed pop acts in view, I want to concentrate on what
made Hirsch's study so distinctive - the notion of 'organisation-set analysis' and of
how this can be articulated through, and helps articulate, a discussion of record
company practices. This, in turn, will help clarify his particular identification of the
roots of large-scale failure in the pursuit of 'overproduction' as a deliberate
entrepreneurial strategy.
The value of Hirsch's study (and also the source of controversy in its analysis)
is not that he was the first theorist to draw attention to the consequences of the
industrial production of cultural goods (Adorno did this and we will need to consider
his work at greater length); rather, Hirsch's was the first to attempt to specify the
organisational methods of cultural producers. Frith tends to conflict with Hirsch
because of the 'trivialisation' of the audience for pop that 'fads and fashions' seem to
suggest (although Frith doesn't articulate this, his main struggle is with Adorno);
Negus, on the other hand, argues exactly against Hirsch's portrayal of these
'organisational methods'. I^Ven so, as the first writer to truly broach the close study of
the field, Hirsch's characterisation of the business of record companies as a system
for creating cultural products or commodities is still of enormous importance.
Hirsch's distinction between 'cultural' and 'utilitarian' products focuses the rest of this
discussion and is worth quoting at some length.
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Cultural products may be defined tentatively as "nonmaterial" goods directed at a
public of consumers, for whom they generally serve an aesthetic or expressive
rather than a clearly utilitarian function.. Records .. are predominantly cultural
products .. non-material in that (they embody) a live, one-of-a-kind
performance.. The term "cultural organisation" refers here only to profit-seeking
firms producing cultural products for national distribution. (italics in the
original. (Hirsch, 1990, pp 127/8).
Before going on to consider how Hirsch describes the working methods of
'cultural organisations' as 'profit-seeking firms', it is worth examining how, by using
a quotation from Toffler, Hirsch specifies the core-work of a record company:
.. the record manufacturer.. sells what appears to be a performance. But it is not.
It is a replica of a performance, a mass-produced embodiment of a performance..
The book publisher, in effect, does the same. The original manuscript of the
poem or novel represents the author's work of art, the individual, the prototype.
The book in which it is subsequently embodied is a (manufactured) (sic) replica
of the original. (Hirsch, 1990, p. 128)
In using this quote to help him build his case, Hirsch, instead, undermines
his case. This observation will be developed below; here we need to specify the
salient features of the 'case' that Hirsch makes:
1. Some types of 'artists' make works of culture that are capable of 'mass
reproduction'; cultural organisations have evolved distinct methods both for signing
'art objects' for mass reproduction and for taking these, as cultural products, to
market.
2. The work of the 'cultural industry system' is, on the above basis, to
filter 'new products and ideas as they flow from "creative" personnel'.
3. Artists' compete with each other for the attention of the 'entrepreneurial
organisation'. The 'art objects' they produce must then compete with others to gain,
through'mass media coverage', the attention of the mass audience.
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4. The role the mass media play in relation to 'art objects' is that of
`gatekeeping'.
5. A novel and productive way to analyse organisations within the
'cultural industry system' is to consider not how they integrate with the social system
but more how their'goals may be constrained by society'. In this,
The organisation is assumed to act under norms of rationality, and the subjects of
analysis becomes its forms of adaptation to constraints imposed by its
technology and "task environment". (Hirsch, 1990, p.128)
6. Record companies have two 'boundaries': input (product selection) and
output (marketing). At the 'input' boundary 'talent scouts' operate with the sole
purpose of selecting 'cultural products for organisational sponsorship and promotion'.
These 'talent scouts' have a high degree of autonomy; they are separated
professionally from the 'administrators' or the 'technical and managerial levels of the
company'. The latter set 'budgetary limits' but, and distinctively, 'contracted artists
and talent scouts are delegated (sic) the responsibility of producing marketable
creations' with the result that, 'administrators are forced to trust the professional
judgement of their employees'.
7. This system of production can be described as 'craft administration of
production', where production is organised along 'craft rather than bureaucratic lines',
distinguished particularly by the 'minimisation of fixed overhead costs' - artists are
contracted and not directly employed; their earnings are not guaranteed but devolve
from royalties .
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8. This system of production is favoured because demand is uncertain.
Demand uncertainty stems from the fact that 'consumer taste preferences' are volatile
and mass media gatekeeping decisions are not controllable.
9. At the output 'boundary', organisational practices are more bureaucratic
because promotion and distribution systems need to be organised systematically in
order to minimise uncertainty.
10. The Mass Media wield considerable autonomous power. They
function as 'institutional regulators of innovation'. Cultural producing organisations
are responsive to the 'taste' decisions of media 'gatekeepers' and will reproduce
similar materials 'until the fad has run its course'.
11. Because the Media have the power to 'regulate innovation' (by
allowing only certain products through to the mass audience); and because cultural
industrial organisations have the power to choose to mass reproduce the work of
artists, the consumer is forced to choose from 'cultural styles and items "preselected"
for consideration by 'role occupants in the managerial and institutional subsystems'.
Even so, that consumers still exercise choice, if only from a preselected range of
products, means that both the producers and the disseminators (organisations and
media) will be responsive to consumer 'voting' by promoting some styles (and artists)
and dropping others.
12. Cultural industrial organisations seek to evade the penalties of their
particular 'task environments' (conditions at their two boundaries) by implementing
three distinct, 'proactive' strategies:
(1) The allocation of numerous personnel to boundary-spanning roles; (2)
overproduction and differential promotion of new items; and (3) co-optation of
mass media gatekeepers. (Hirsch, 1990, p.133)
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13. As the previous chapter noted, Hirsch characterised overproduction as
'a rational organisational response in an environment of low capital investment and
demand uncertainty'. These twin conditions give rise to the inescapable fact that the
'number of .. records .. released annually far exceeds .. consumer demand for these
products'; from which it is reasonable to conclude that 'it is apparently more efficient
to produce many "failures" for each success'.
14. Very few record releases enjoy 'large-scale' promotion. Companies
'rank order' releases in order to draw the attention of media gatekeepers to selected
products. If these fail, 'substitutes' can be drawn from under-promoted items.
Evaluating Hirsch.
The problem with isolating a single piece of research and then deconstructing it, the
better to construct some other analytical model for some other purpose, is that this
will always give that piece a status and prominence within a much wider body of
literature that, perhaps, might not be justifiable. My reason for beginning with
Hirsch's essay and not, say, with Adorno's 'On Popular Music' (which also explores
popular music-making as cultural industrial production) flows not just from his
recognition of the large-scale failure of pop records (and with them, although
unmentioned, pop acts) but from his attempt to specify failure as systemic. In this
novel attempt, Hirsch contributes a number of new insights to the study of record
production; and, further, he makes a number of applications of what were then quite
new theories of media production to the specifics of cultural production in the music
industry. Not only, uniquely, does he tie 'Overproduction' to a clear analysis of the
'Filter System' of record production; he also specifies how the 'input' stage of
production can be characterised as 'craft administration' (a key aspect of record-
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making that Adorno only asserted was the case) and shows how the 'output' stage
culminates in consumer choice of 'pre-selected' material in a way that is less emotive
than Adorno's 'pre-digestion' but also more concretely displayed. If we add to this list
his challenging recognition of the components of 'demand uncertainty' and the
centrality of his application of media 'gate-keeping' in this, Hirsch's essay could fairly
be said to be 'seminal' in the development of the systematic study of Popular Music.
Again, because Hirsch's essay introduces new concepts about cultural
industrial production and consumption and applies what were then very new ideas
about how the mass media work, he tends to present music-making and music
consumption as an unbroken, and quite rational, 'chain' - 'artists and mass audience
are linked by an ordered sequence of events'. This 'chain' stretches from ideas in the
imagination of composers to ideas in the consumer's imagination (the 'nonmaterial
goods' that serve 'aesthetic or expressive' functions). This is not to suggest that there
is no energy, no human activity, in the forging of the 'links' of this chain - there are
'artists; 'talent scouts'; wily executives who release enough product to outwit wily
media 'gate-keepers'; and consumers who, at least, 'rank order' 'pre-selected' cultural
products. Even so, Hirsch's account is 'bloodless'; it is the work of a functionalist
whose only concern is with how a record company 'functions' as a cultural industrial
organisation. Once more, there are connections here with the work of Adorno. It is
still the case that, to begin to look more closely at Adorno would be tangential, at this
point; but if Adorno was angered by what he considered to be the passivity of the
'mass audience', Hirsch remains unmoved. The condition of the audience and their
use of pop is not his concern. This, I will argue, is a further flaw in his argument.
Despite its measured pace and precise connecting of postulates, there tend
to be, in the course of the essay, changes in vocabulary and expression that have the
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effect of considerably clouding the objects of study. Hirsch tends to 're-position'
creators, creativity and the created in the development of his argument; this re-
positioning, in turn, makes 'bloodless' what is, in fact, a series of intense, conflicting
and over-lapping interactions between pop acts and record companies in the course of
record-making. Although we need to appreciate that Hirsch's focus was not solely
record-making (he simultaneously considers film and book production), and that
some conflicts around changes in vocabulary might stem from his need to move
between particular and general, it remains the case that, by specifying who produces
what, differently, at different stages of his argument, Hirsch presents a contradictory
account of record-making.
For example, at one stage in the essay, cultural organisations are said to
choose from a range of 'art objects' produced by artists. These 'art objects' then
become 'cultural products'; and one form of cultural product is the pop record. This
account fits with the quote Hirsch takes from Toffler, in which a distinction is drawn
between the consumption of a 'performance' and the consumption of 'a replica of
performance, a mass-produced embodiment of a performance'. In this account of pop
music-making, the pop act is artistically autonomous; and the record company is,
simply, the manufacturer of copies of an 'art object'. But there is a confusion here,
and also a contradiction with other representations that Hirsch makes of the role of
the record company and its relationship with 'art objects'. In these 'other
representations', records begin as 'raw material' (as 'singers' not even as songs) and
become 'products' or 'commodities' under 'supervision'; or they begin as 'cultural
innovations' and end as 'fads'; or, even, they begin as 'cultural items' and end as
'cultural items'. Such is the importance that the contradictions inherent in this
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portrayal have for the further development of this study, as a whole, that I propose to
identify them as a series of numbered points.
1. Even by Hirsch's own account, record companies do more than make
'replicas' of 'performances'. As he notes, 'contracted artists and talent scouts are
delegated (his italics) the responsibility of producing marketable creations, with little
or no interference from the front office beyond the setting of budgetary limits'.
What is novel in this analysis is that, through it, Hirsch identifies record-
making (and cultural production in general) as distinct in its organisational methods
from manufacturing industries. It is important that this distinction is made and,
largely, Hirsch is accurate in specifying where the distinction, or one crucial aspect of
the distinction, lies. By separating company executives (by which he means,
effectively, the board of directors who administer the company on behalf of share-
holders) from 'technical personnel'; and by demonstrating that these technical
personnel (or 'contact men', never women) must be allowed considerably autonomy
in their search for 'creative raw material', Hirsch sums up the typical division of
responsibility within a record company. Put simply, the managing director in any
'territory' (major record companies operate 'globally' at least to the extent that they
have offices in all of the countries in which people are able to buy pop records in
large quantities) is appointed by the higher echelons of the company to assemble a
team of A&R personnel (the 'contact men' in Hirsch's parlance, that sign acts);
Marketing personnel (to prepare the acts and their material for mass marketing); and
Promotions personnel (to take the act and its records to the media, and to the market
by any other routes). If this 'team' works (i.e. has hit records that lead to profit-
generation) then everyone keeps their job; if not, people are sacked; if particularly
successful, people move on to better jobs - Hirsch doesn't go into this detail, but all
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this is implied. The difficulty arises when we look more closely still at what this
'team' of 'contact men' does in relationship to the raw material they bring to the
company; and to how this connects with Hirsch's observation that it is the joint
responsibility of 'artists and talent scouts' to produce 'marketable creations'.
2. Hirsch represents consumption in this way:
Feedback from consumers, in the form of sales figures .. cues producers and
disseminators of cultural innovations as to which experiments may be imitated
profitably and which should probably be dropped. This process is analogous to
the preselection of electoral candidates by political parties, followed by voter
feedback at the ballot box. The orderly sequence of events and the possibility of
only two outcomes at each checkpoint resemble a Markov process. (Hirsch,
1990, p.133)
Again, this is abstraction at its most extreme; it is an and account of pop
consumption and enjoyment. But is it accurate? A 'Markov Process' is a stochastic
one: the next step in the process depends only on the current condition of the process,
not on any cumulative momentum. As Hirsch puts it,
no product can enter the societal subsystem (e.g. retail outlets) until it has been
processed favourably through each of the preceding levels of organisation,
respectively. .. This model assumes a surplus of available "raw material" at the
outset.. and pinpoints a number of strategic checkpoints at which the oversupply
is filtered out. (Hirsch, 1990, p.133)
This is the heart of his argument (and it is exactly where Negus focuses
his critique). My criticisms parallel Negus's but with a key difference (as we shall
see); here what needs to be realised is that Hirsch invokes a dynamic process that is
continuous - 'contracted artists and talent scouts are delegated the responsibility of
producing marketable creations' - which he re-presents as a Markov one - 'no product
can enter(the next stage) .. until it has been processed favourably'. The issue is that
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Hirsch suggests a collaborative process (between 'contact men' and 'artists') but then
refuses the conclusion that the consequences of such collaboration - which,
reasonably, can range from the very positive to the very negative - will come to bear
on the condition of the product at any stage of its existence; for what is 'checked' at
the 'checkpoints' is the condition of the 'art-object-transformed', not whether the
original performance is still likely to engage the attention of an audience bound to
'fads and fashions'.
To put it another way, a song or 'art object' does not pass through a simple
process of replication. It appeals to 'common sense' to imagine some 'artists' being
chosen over others to enter the replication process; and it is similarly appealing to
imagine only some of the 'chosen' gaining success. But these appeals can only be
sustained if we reduce record-making to, exactly, a sterile process of replication;
'sterile' in the sense that the process has no impact on the product. As soon as we
admit that the process involves collaboration between processors and the processed
then the impact of the former on the latter is identified as a constant structural feature
of the business of record-making. In this version, what the consumer is offered is not
the inviolate, replicated 'art object', but the total of all the process interactions and
decisions that the art object together with the artist have experienced and under-gone
on the way to the consumer's attention. On this basis, it is simply not the case that the
product stands or falls on its merits at each 'level of organisation' as if the preceding
levels had no bearing on its condition. Further, what is consumed is not (or, at least,
is not necessarily) the 'art object' as intended by the pop act; but the industrial
product, the commodity, that has emerged out of the shared need of acts to contract
to record companies in order to reach the mass market; and the record companies
need for new products to sell in the mass market to generate profit. Ultimately, we
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must search for the roots of the mass failure of signed pop acts in the difference,
identified previously, between the replication of 'art-objects' (songs, compositions,
musical texts) and the transformation of acts and their texts.
Hirsch tends, conceptually, to avoid the conflict identified above, by his
characterisation (after Stinchcombe) of the cultural-industrial organisational system
as 'craft administration of production'. Again, this appeals to 'common sense': pop
acts are not the direct employees of record companies; they begin their creative life
outside of any direct connection with a record company and they appear to control
the conditions of their production, at least within the scope of the schedules and
budgetary limitations of the recording process. Further, they are not salaried by
record companies; as Hirsch argues, they tend to bear the risk of their occupation by
agreeing a royalty on the sale of replicas of their performances; or on the public
broadcast of those replicated performances. The question remains, though, whether
this is evidence of a 'craft' mode of production, in which 'artists' work on 'art objects'
and have autonomy over the production process (where capitalist authority is
confined to the system of reproduction); or whether, in fact, record-making is in
reality an exotic variant of the capitalist mode of production in which, despite
appearances, pop acts are involved in commodity production and are subject to its
rigours - most notably a loss of artistic autonomy to the authority and routines of
capitalist production. When the latter is argued to be the case then we engage some of
the most fierce debates in Popular Music Studies; debates which trace their origin to
Adorno's 'On Popular Music', published in 1941 but which took as their setting the
rise of Rock Music at the turn of the 1970's. For this reason, we need to widen the





In his review of Negus's Producing, Pop Laing observes,
I sometimes wonder what course popular music studies might have taken if
Theodor Adorno had turned east to Moscow instead of west to New York when
he fled from Nazi oppression in the 1930's. There would have been none of the
brilliant pessimistic brooding of that 1940 essay 'On Popular Music' and most
subsequent serious writers on that same subject would have not found it
necessary to wrestle with Adorno's harsh categories, (Laing, 1994, p. 223)
Adorno's essay, 'On Popular Music' is more savage than 'brooding' but it is
certainly pessimistic. The danger of contextualising such a work is that of reducing
the historical development both of Marxism, and of Marxism's account of the rise
and development of capitalism (and the whole of human history, consider the
'Communist Manifesto'), to a few short sentences. Suffice it to say that Adorno wrote
from New York because he had escaped death at the hands of the Nazis (Walter
Benjamin, who was far more optimistic about the Cultural Industries, had already
taken his own life in flight from them); and perhaps what speaks through Adorno's
work is his intense frustration with the masses, both in Europe (where they were
slaughtering each other in a 'capitalist war') and in the USA (where they seemed
content with their lot under a capitalism already more 'advanced' than that of Europe,
despite the recent Depression). If this characterisation of the broad context of
Adorno's writing is not too crude then 'frustration', even 'exasperation', seems to drive
77
the essay which sets off at a rapid pace that is maintained throughout. So 'rapid' is the
pace that a conceptual 'sleight-of-hand' occurs early in its development which, unless
caught and addressed, enables Adorno to plunge the reader, through a series of stark,
historic 'oppositions', into the depths of his pessimism and contempt. These
'oppositions' are either written or implied and they range across the 'popular' and the
'serious'; 'mass culture' and 'high culture'; even 'Europe' and 'the USA'. Together they
give the essay its scale and its depth.
To return, then, to the premises of Adorno's argument; first, he avoids
analysing the historical gulf (that he claims exists) between 'popular' and 'serious'
music. He is able to do this by arguing that as,
..the present study is concerned with the actual function of popular music in its
present status, it is more advisable to follow the line of characterization of the
phenomenon itself as it is given today than to trace it back to its origins. This is
the more justified as the division into the two spheres of music took place in
Europe long before American popular music arose. American music from its
inception accepted the division as something pre-given, and therefore the
historical background of the division applies to it only indirectly'. (Adorno,
1990, p. 302)
At once, then, Adorno is able to 'prove' what he has only asserted, namely
that the differences between 'popular' and 'serious' music are 'generally taken for
granted', with the effect that 'people regard the values within them as totally
independent of one another'. Despite the fact that he declares his intention to not take
these values for granted and to 'translate these so-called levels ('popular' and 'serious')
into more precise terms, musical as well as social', by ignoring the roots of the
division he is able to swiftly introduce his own, again essentially untheorised,
description of popular music in this way:
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'A clear judgement concerning the relation of serious music to popular music can
be arrived at only by strict attention to the fundamental characteristic of popular
music: standardization. The whole structure of popular music is standardized,
even where the attempt is made to circumvent standardization. Standardization
extends from the most general features to the most specific ones'. (Adorno, 1990,
p. 302).
The rest of the analysis contained in 'On Popular Music' flows from the
concept of 'standardisation', and a compelling analysis it is. But, arguably,
standardisation is not the fundamental characteristic of popular music, recording is;
and, if this is the case, then Adorno's subsequent analysis of the 'production of
popular music' (p. 306) is enlightening but not definitive. This then affects how we
might approach what characterisations of the 'production processes' of pop
subsequent writers have developed in response to their own readings of Adorno.
Put plainly, in the absence of an analysis of how 'popular' music separated
from 'serious' music in Europe (at least in this influential essay), Adorno's analysis
becomes 'ahistorical'. The 'historical background' of 'the division' between 'popular'
and 'serious' music needs to be 'directly' applied to music in the USA, because we
need to know why, even in the form in which Adorno discusses them, the
'industrialised' aspects of popular music-making developed in the way that they did.
We need to know this because, at least in the Marxist account of history, there are no
social developments in capitalism that develop through their own volition; all social
developments occur through struggle, and their 'shape' (although always changing
because social relations are continually dynamic) is a function of the methods of
struggle and the relative strengths of the contending forces. Admittedly, this language
is very abstract; we need to bring real faces, and real sounds, to the issue. Why, for
example, did 'Ragtime' develop when it did; become the musical phenomenon that it
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became; sell the sheet music and make the publishing fortunes that it did; and how
might it have influenced the deployment of industrial practices to ensure that similar
fortunes be conjured? Not just (or not at all) because 'the masses' are easily
hypnotised by 'standardised' forms of music; rather, this music 'found' the masses
through a continuous process of compositional 'discovery' and the commercial
creation of 'markets' for music out of masses of people. In this way, composers and
Music Industry entrepreneurs and their employees are active forces, in relation to
each other and in relation to the need to create markets to sell, musical, commodities.
There is something far too passive about 'the masses' in Adorno's essay,
and something far too conspiratorial and manipulative about capital. The tendency in
'Frankfurt School' arguments to represent the working class and capital in these ways
has long been recognised in accounts of that school's strengths and weaknesses. They
are attributed most usually to the forced political and geographical re-location of the
Frankfurt theorists, away from the collapse of the 'revolutionary possibilities' of
Europe and into the domain of a newly-prosperous and increasingly powerful
American capitalism (see Middleton, 1990, p.37 ). The essay is almost a lament for
the loss of European 'standards' in the face of the massive (in both senses of the term;
as something huge; and as something 'of the masses') capitalist-cultural machinery of
USA (Adorno's other targets were the film and, later, television industries). This is
why it is easy to locate Adorno in the field of the 'Mass Cultural' pessimists, and also
why his criticisms of pop as music are open to challenge. Throughout his essay,
Adorno consistently elevates 'serious' European music above, implicitly, 'pernicious'
US popular music, in a way that implies, rather than states, that 'musical
characteristics' are autonomous and therefore comparatively easy to identify and to
set against each other. In brief, there is too little 'culture' (as the product of human
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interaction and conflict) and too much 'mass' in his account of popular music. If we
set aside Adorno's views on what makes pop standardised as music, and consider his
views on the 'mode of production' of popular music, then the core of his views is
expressed in the following quotation:
So far standardisation of popular music has been considered in structural terms -
that is, as an inherent quality without explicit reference to the process of
production or to the underlying causes for standardisation. Though all industrial
mass production necessarily eventuates in standardisation, the production of
popular music can be called industrial only in its promotion and distribution,
whereas the act of producing a song-hit still remains in a handicraft stage. The
production of popular music is still highly-centralised in its economic
organisation, but still "individualistic" in its social mode of production. The
division of labour among the composer, harmonizer, and arranger is not
industrial but rather pretends industrialisation in order to look more up-to-date,
whereas it has actually adapted industrial methods for the technique of its
promotion. It would not increase the costs of production if the various
composers of hit tunes did not follow certain standard patterns. Therefore we
must look for other reasons for structural standardisation - very different reasons
from those which account for the standardisation of motor cars and breakfast
foods. (Adorno, 1990, p. 306)
Beyond any other criticism, the fundamental problem with this conception
of the production of popular music as 'handicraft' rather than 'industrial' is that it
pivots on song-writing rather than record-making. In large part, Adorno's essay is 'of
its time'; which is not to condemn him for a failure to be clairvoyant; but there are
significant differences between the 'Tin Pan Alley' practices of Adorno's day and the
record manufacturing popular music industry that developed with the rise of 'Rock
and Roll'. In their most fundamental form, these 'differences' can be traced to the
implications of the separation of writer and the performer. While it remained the case
that song-writers wrote songs for others to sing it was possible to make the case that
song-writers existed 'outside' industrial production in the way that Adorno does; but
even then only if we do not look too closely at the notion that 'industrialisation' in the
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Music Industry can be equated only with 'promotion' and 'distribution'. As soon as we
ask what is being promoted and distributed, and we arrive at the answer 'records',
then we immediately enter the field of manufacture and, as comments in the first
chapter sought to display, manufacture is capitalist; and pop acts need to contend
with capitalist practices in the record manufacturing process. We still need to begin
to identify what these practices are and, in a sense, Adorno's essay deflects from that
identification.
Because Adorno's concern is with composers and with composition, he
presents what was, even for the early-Forties, a distorted picture of the Music
Industry. Certainly, vocalists needed songs; but crucially, band-leaders and their
singers were being drawn, inexorably, into the logic of record production, a logic that
pivots on the single recognition that a market for records must continually be fed.
Clearly, all of this will need more systematic attention but there is a major difference
between singers who constantly perform live and singers who make records for sale;
put simply, a touring act (whether solo vaudeville performer or 'Swing' orchestra)
could repeat the same set on a nightly basis for a considerable period without the
need for new 'material'; simply because they could 'tour' that set, nightly, from city to
city; from venue to venue within a city; or, as club residents, perform to a changing
nightly audience. Under these conditions, the 'conditions' that faced Adorno on his
arrival in the USA, his picture of the song-writer as individual who wrote in his or
her own time; organised their own production conditions; paid their own overheads;
and bore all the risk of their commitment to this kind of work, could be said to still
exist (although already much else had happened, and was happening, in popular
music-making that was not encompassed by this experience). 'Song-writers', in this
version of events, wrote in isolation from record companies. Their interface with the
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industry existed through a dependence on the 'song pluggers' that publishers
employed to take songs to band-leaders. Band-leaders would then arrange these
songs; their contracted singers would sing them; and record companies would
organise and pay for the recording session, disc manufacture and promotion and
distribution costs, in the way that Adorno indicates (but does not analyse).
Adorno presents a static picture of popular music production that captured
a particular period in its development - a period which saw the beginnings of a post-
depression recovery in the record market and the predominance of radio record
shows, together with, in this instance, the musical film, as dorms of amass
entertainment. Although live music continued to hold sway; what came to sustain
interest in touring acts was no longer simply their `live' reputation but the continuous
re-establishment of that reputation through 'hit' records; particularly with the growth
in prominence of vocalists (especially Frank Sinatra). Once records became
important in their own right, the need to systematise their commodification became
imperative; so changing relationships between composers, acts and record
companies.
I am aware that the above overly condenses profound upheavals in
popular music in the period in question, but, arguably the 'distortions' so caused are
Adorno's responsibility, in the sense that he makes no account of the changing
dynamic of popular music production in his portrayal of how popular music is made.
For Adorno, popular music was standardised and the 'machine' was continually fed
by 'imitators' who supplied a be-numbed mass with pre-digested pap. There is none
of the richness here of the rise of Blues, Bop, and, later, R&B; nor even any
acknowledgement that, when lyrical concerns were restricted either to love or
novelty, some composers (Cole Porter, Hoagy Carmichael) could still tower over
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others. This reinforces my earlier reluctance to consider the work of Adorno a
fountain-head for PMS, so dismissive was he of pop, in general. But my objection is
stronger than this: Adorno made his argument to serve a political purpose - the
identification of the condition of class relations in the wake of Fascism and rising US
hegemony - and this caused him to work at a very general level where the actual
practices of the music industry are concerned (his analysis of how pop works as
music is more insightful and specific but not less contentious - see Middleton, 1990).
Ultimately, he identified pop as a capitalist commodity because it was musically
standardised, and therefore passive and uncritical, unlike 'serious', artistic, music.
This meant that he did not need to specify pop as an industrial commodity in terms of
its production processes; in fact, he made its 'extra-industrial' origins an aspect of
pop's power - as the source of the legitimating 'pseudo-individualization' of pop; a
patina of individual human creativity (and therefore of spurious 'emotional truth') that
served to mask its similarity to standardised cars and standardised breakfast cereals.
Yet, by neither specifying how, even then, the record industry made choices about
which songs to record; and, further, by not specifying acts and their records, rather
than songs, as the true commodities of the Music Industry, the following criticisms
can be made of Adorno:
1. So general is his analysis, and so neatly does he side-step the need to
consider the manufacture and sale of records, that it is doubtful that his analysis of
popular music was accurate even at the time he wrote.
2. So time-bound and abstract is his portrayal of music industry practices
that his work is of very limited use in determining how the contemporary music
industry functions,
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Adorno's identification of 'standardisation' was too much 'of its time'. It reflects the
mass production capitalism summed-up in Henry Ford's maxim 'you can have any
colour you want so long as it's black'. Adorno would not have been impressed by the
continuous upheavals in pop styles in the decades since he wrote; the transit of pop to
Rock; the involutions of Rock as 'political'; Rock as an Art form; Rock as political
vehicle for making art; the transit from Rock to Dance as post-political hedonism; all
of this he would, no doubt, dismiss as a superficial effect of 'the constantly Yenewed
effort to sweep the market with new products' (Adorno, 1990, p. 311). But, by
missing the detail, Adomo misses the struggles these 'transits' represent; he misses,
not only the reasons why people elect for consuming (and making) pop rather than,
say, fireside rugs, as a mass pastime, but also the reasons why people support some
pop styles against others. The strength of Frith's work, which develops from an
engagement with Adorno, is that he can situate the uses made of pop in ways that tell
us much about why pop is consumed and why it goes on being made, and goes on
changing (see below). In this study, I am less concerned with 'why' pop is made than
with 'how' pop is made; because, it seems from the evidence of'failure' - as either the
failure to win a record deal or the failure to make successful records - that pop 'goes
on being made' at the expense of most pop acts. The day after an act is 'dropped" the
audience is still in one piece; the record company is in one piece; and the music
industry is intact; the act, though, is usually shattered.
Conclusion.
Because of the unsystematic way in which the study of the music industry
was mounted, we are forced to begin a study of how that industry is conceptualised
by comparing and contrasting texts separated not just by entire theoretical traditions
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(Marxism and Functionalism) but by three decades. To an attempt an amalgam of
those texts would, then, be bad practice indeed. Even so, the absence of the lived
experience of pop acts from these accounts is notable in both cases. Further, both
represent music industry organisations (specifically record companies) as ruthlessly
efficient - music is recognised as a cultural commodity but neither its consumption
nor, paradoxically, its production is particularly clearly explained: Adorno certainly
discusses pop as music but his hostility to it leads him to ignore the experience of
music-makers as record-makers simply because he feels their efforts to be without
merit; Hirsch, as we have seen, pays no attention whatever (except in the most
abstract sense) to music-makers. For Hirsch, pop consumption is no more than the
(temporary) satisfaction for the latest 'fad'. On this basis, he can assert
'overproduction' without considering why some records, and therefore acts, are taken
up, even as 'fads', while the vast majority are not - this is not entirely accurate, Hirsch
makes clear the need for business efficiency in a competitive world; but, again, the
impact of business practices on music-makers and their fates is never broached.
In sum, Adorno's hostility, and Hirsch's indifference, to popular music
made them unlikely guides to the complexities of making music with the aim of
attaining mass sales. Despite this, we are at least cautioned by these theorists to be
mindful of the centrality of commodification measures and practices in the realisation
of pop success - where the distaff is that these methods and practices must also be
implicated in the pervasiveness of large-scale failure.
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Chapter Three:
Simon Frith and The Sociology of Rock.
Introducing Frith.
Whether in Sociology or in Musicology, where the 'positive' study of pop is
concerned (as against mass culturalist condemnation or Functionalist indifference to
pop's aesthetic and cultural purchase), 'pioneers' have needed to lead the way. In the
British experience, the most significant pioneers have been Dave Laing and Simon
Frith, but while Laing's impressive The Sound of Our Time (1969) is largely
overlooked, the more comprehensive early work of Simon Frith, The Sociology o
Rock, has come to stand as the first major sympathetic academic analysis of pop. As
a pioneering work, The Sociology of Rock (henceforward S/R) retains it's
significance, but, understandably, this work bears, in part, the hallmarks of it's time
of writing, the mid-1970's, when the position of 'Rock', as the dominant style of pop
seemed unassailable; and when also Rock appeared to have transformed the methods
by which pop was made (apparently favouring the 'artist' rather than 'the organisation'
in the commodity making process). Even so, while Frith's purpose was to study the
phenomenon of Rock (rather than account for pop) he still needed to establish how
the music industry worked; in part to establish pop's socio-historic setting; in part to
help anatomise the specific ideological claims made by and for Rock. Further,
because of his commitment to the 'value' (p. 195) of the production and consumption
87
of Rock, Frith, as had Laing previously, felt the need to assert that value against
Adorno's denunciation of pop. Finally, as someone writing, specifically, a 'sociology'
of a musical phenomenon, Frith needed to situate the 'place' of Rock within social
relations. He achieved this by taking as his starting point the views of theorists of
'Youth Culture' whose work, collectively, formed the only substantial, sociological
source of research extant on the wider social use made of popular music and
therefore on pop's consumers and likely future producers. Taken together this distinct
combination of objects of address and the chosen method for that address, when
further combined with Frith's prodigious subsequent contribution to the nascent
'Popular Music Studies', established a de facto agenda for the study of pop which,
while this has never been prescriptive, is still one that demands address in any
estimation of music industry practices and music-making perspectives.
Before beginning a close examination of Frith's S/R (from the perspective of
this study - the search for the roots of the majority failure of signed pop acts), I need
to clarify that I do not consider that this single work stands for the total of Frith's
writing on pop. Again, this has been prodigious, but it has also been protean. In
advance of any closer analysis, what Frith brought to writing about the sociology of
pop music, in general, was a sense of academic rigour to a field in which written
reflection (mainly in the form ofjournalism) had expanded exponentially in the years
that immediately followed the identification of 'Rock' as a distinct stylistic, even
generic, outgrowth of pop. Rock ideology came with considerable ideological
baggage or, at least, was attributed enormous ideological importance by its
supporters. Throughout not just the S/R but all his work, Frith defends Rock (and
latterly pop) from its friends as well as from its detractors - where Rock ideologues
romanticised musicians and even individual record labels, Frith asked, and continues
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to ask, hard questions about the motivations, cultural place and artistic autonomy of
those acts and labels. In all his subsequent work, Frith has been consistent in his
determination to explore the (changing) power of pop to focus and articulate the
cultural concerns of its consumers. This has led him to contribute to the academic
study of pop on the widest range of topics - from sexuality to aesthetics.
In all of the above, however, it is arguable whether Frith has ever
substantially revised the depiction, contained within the pages of the S/R, of how pop
acts come to record companies and of what happens to them there. 'Sound Effects' re-
organises the structure of his argument, but contributes nothing that is substantially
different on this complex field. Other works discuss pop acts from the point of view
of their cultural roots (Frith and Home, 1987); their connections with local
government (Frith 1993); and their style (1990 a.). Where the music and record
industries are concerned, Frith has been keen to explore the impact of video and the
strictures and implications of copyright ownership - but his organising concern has
always been to analyse why people derive pleasurable meaning from music and, in
this way, why record-making remains a viable cultural industry. In contrast to this
study, Frith is interested in pop because its consumption is the guarantee of pop's
continued existence (in whatever stylistic form). This does not mean that Frith is
ignorant of how pop is produced (far from it, he constantly exhorts 'post modernists'
to consider the imperatives that inform production decisions and processes), but there
remains a sense in which how pop acts experience the production process is of less
concern to him than how consumers both inspire, and suffer, that production process.
This exploration of this tension or contradiction forms the field of the S/R.
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The Sociology of Rock.
As the book jacket introduction to the work observes,
Over the last 20 years Rock has become the`most pervasive form of popular
culture and the most prosperous part of the entertainment industry. But, despite
the millions of words that Rock has inspired, our understanding of it as a mass
medium remains sketchy. The Rock world's account of itself still rests on a
confusing concoction of myth, fantasy and commercial hype, and outside
commentators remain depressingly prone to ignorant sneers and instant
generalisations. The purpose of'The Sociology offZock' is to take Rock seriously
as a social phenomenon and to get its story right. (Frith, 1978)
For the purposes of this argument, the question is not so much does Frith get Rock's
story right? But rather, in the discovery of Rock's story, what does Frith tell us about
how Rock, and, with it, pop, is made under industrial conditions; and, further, what
might we learn of the protocols of the majority failure of signed pop acts from this
account?
The Sociology of Rock (S/R) is a seminal text; for the reasons stated above;
but its central importance to this study is apparent from an observation Frith makes
early in the analysis:
Records are the result of complex formal organisations .. the basis of any
sociological analysis of records must be an analysis of the record industry .. Pop
music is created with the record industry's pursuit of a large audience in mind ..
The record industry has developed its rules of production from its interpretation
of the youth market.. The ideology of Rock is riddled with untested assumptions
about youth culture. The Sociologists first task must be to strip away the
resulting accumulation of myths and false certainties. (Frith, 1978, p.10)
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If we set aside, for the moment, Frith's observations on the connection
between 'the rules of production' of the record industry and its 'untested assumptions
about youth culture' and concentrate instead on his declaration that, 'pop music is
created with the record industry's pursuit of a large audience in mind', then, firstly,
we need to realise that this is no statement of the obvious. Rather, at least as far as
Hirsch's argument is concerned, it is stating the reverse of his (and the colloquial)
understanding of what the record industry does, namely, to replicate recordings of
songs made, in the first instance, as 'art-objects' by people who want, first and
foremost, to 'express themselves' as musical artists. In this account, only latterly do
record companies become involved; the record industry does not 'create' but replicate.
To suggest the reverse, that record companies do the creating in order to make profits
is, seemingly, to concur with Adorno that any products so created are worthless
because they are not 'art'.
Ultimately, Frith transcends both the above positions, he views pop neither
solely as replicated art nor as entirely manufactured commercial fodder. However,
when Frith began to write these were the polar opposites in the Rock version of its
own distance from pop, Almost immediately, then, any examination of Rock music
draws us into an ideological tangle that consists of competing notions of popular
music as entertainment, and popular music as creative expression. This is the 'tangle'
that Frith attempts to sort out in the S/R and, in a sense, he has gone on trying to sort
it out ever since. What so distinguishes even this very earliest academic work is that
Frith could identify how entertainment could be anti-capitalist and how 'self-
expression' needed always to co-exist with the market-place - where both notions, if
not entirely antithetical to Rock orthodoxy, still represented a profound challenge to
that orthodoxy .
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Frith's main strength in the S/R is that he was willing to deal with the fact
that, where any form of popular music is concerned, including Rock, the material
reality was (and still is) that Rock acts had to sign to major record companies and sell
huge quantities of records in order to survive. On this basis, Frith's argument is a
continuous, well-argued, 'balancing act' that seeks primarily to reconstitute the
making (and particularly the consumption) of pop music as an activity that expresses
real needs rather than sedates those needs (as A'dorno claimed); while remaining
close to Hirsch's overview of the signing, recording, release process as one of
'filtering'. This is a 'tall order'. Frith's analysis is evidently Marxist, although it is
burdened neither by dogma nor neologisms; even so, in his desire to somehow
'neutralise' the negative, Adornian implications of records as commodities, he doesn't
quite pull off his 'balancing act'.
Frith fails, primarily (and ironically) because he understands so well that the
connections between production and consumption are the key to understanding why
popular music takes the ultimate forms it does. In brief, as is apparent from the
previously quoted extract from the S/R, Frith's analysis is driven by the recognition
that records are the combined result of the activities of 'complex formal organisations'
and the concentration of the activities of those organisations in the 'pursuit of a large
audience'. I will argue that, in developing this recognition, Frith downplays, and so
misrepresents, the industrial production of pop records (the source of the Mass
Culturalist critique) to foreground the 'Popular Cultural' (active rather than passive)
consequences of their consumption. Because he has a wider aim than exploring the
sociology of rock - he wants to rescue rock from Adorno - Frith tends to collapse the
experience of pop acts into the industrial process of making records. Arguably,
records are the result of more than complex formal organisations, they are the result
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of 'alliances' between pop acts and record companies. In this way, and the existence
of the record contract is at once elegant, and mute, testimony to it, records are the
result of the joint activities of two organisations (pop acts and record companies)
that, together, form an even more complex organisation than the one that Frith has in
mind .
With the last point, above, in view, it is still the case that what distinguishes
Frith from Hirsch and Adorno is the way he handles the recognition that 'records are
the result of complex formal organisations'. In Adorno's account, pop acts are simply
not present; there are only artisan song-writers who supply faceless singers who, in
turn, act as the mouth-pieces for drivel. Hirsch is not judgmental in his analysis (as
befits a 'Functionalist') but neither does he 'grasp the nettle' of his own recognition of
the need for formal organisations to produce cultural products. Frith does this; he
isn't afraid to confront the fact that pop acts are not autonomous artists who furnish
'art-objects' for 'replication'. Instead, he immediately sets about identifying the major
actors in the drama of record production; yet, along the way, he raises far more
questions about the activities he describes than he ever answers. In this way, Frith's
account of the music industry is a strength, but also a major weakness of the case
contained in the S/R.
When analysing the argument contained in the S/R we need to be aware, from
the outset, that Frith's central concern is `slippery' - it is records and how they are
made, certainly - but, overwhelmingly, it is 'Rock' music that concerns him. More
than this, it is the examination of the creation and social place of 'Rock' as an
ideology that will occupy the bulk of the text. This, as we will see, has important
repercussions for his treatment of the industrial production of popular musical
products.
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As we have noted, the S/R is, ultimately, what it declares itself to be, a study
of a style rather than a study of popular music as a whole. However, given the
absence of a single, systematic account of the history and nature of popular music to
which he could refer, Frith was forced to situate his stylistic study within his own
analysis of what pop music is; how it had evolved to that point; and what its
contemporary practice consisted of. As Frith notes in his preface,
my aim has been to provide an analysis that has general validity, that is not
confined to particular Rock styles or to particular Rock moments. (Frith, 1978,
p.8)
Because of his need to establish a general context to exploYe a pa^iculaY social and
musical phenomenon (the rise and cultural significance of Rock Music), the S/R
veers between general observations about pop music whose implications go
unpursued in order to gain the goal of explaining what gave Rock music, as a style,
the powerful ideological attraction it exerted in the late 1960's. Even though Rock
was a considerable force, it was never the whole of pop music, as Frith regularly
points out. In this way, because of its need to create a general framework for a
particular end, where the S/R often has its greatest bearing on a discussion about the
possible consequences of industrial practices for the fate of pop acts is in terms of
what is left under-developed in the course of the analysis it contains, rather than in
what the analysis reveals, detailed and comprehensive though this is.
Frith and Youth Culture.
In the light of his own objectives, then, ('the stripping away of the myths and
false certainties inherent in the record industry's interpretation of the youth market')
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Frith proceeds in the following way. In part one of the work he examines theories of
'youth culture'. He then tests their different conclusions against his own primary
research into the use and the consumption of popular music by 14 year olds in
Northern England. Briefly summarised, he argues that the existing sociological
accounts of the importance of music in youth cultures are variously inadequate.
'Adolescence Theories' are inadequate because 'leisure is not related to work in any
material setting':
the analysis is classless: all adolescents have the same needs and create the same
peer group systems, music therefore fulfills the same purpose for all of them.
(Frith, 1978, p.49)
On the other hand, in 'sub cultural' explanations (where these do attempt to
differentiate between groups of young people), music appears only as a 'symbol'
which 'expresses underlying leisure values' and, further, as a symbol that is
'completely subsumed in the much more general notion of style'. In both instances,
..sub-culturalists fail to make sense of (music) as an activity, one enjoyed by the
vast majority of non-deviant kids. (Frith, 1978, p.53)
This leads him to the conclusion that,
Observing sociologists are wrong to elevate the most visibly different leisure
styles above the less apparent sexual and occupational differences in leisure
activities. (Frith, 1978, p.53)
For Frith, what it is crucial to recognise about the youth market (the total of
young consumers of music - the people whose mass use of some music as leisure
makes that music popular) is that it contains,
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Different youth groups who use Rock in different ways: class, sex and
occupational differences have a determinate effect on the leisure choices that
young people can make. (Frith, 1978, p.70)
In a very real sense, this observation is the lynch-pin of the entire argument
contained in the S/R. Frith, I would argue, has two objectives in the work: the first is
the overt aim of laying bare the operation of Rock as an ideological construct. Central
to this task is the creation of a model that connects the reasons that inform musical
choice and the choice of a particular musical form as a leisure activity, with the role
that leisure plays, in general, in contemporary society. Frith accomplishes this
connection through the working out of an innovative, clearly-expressed and
recognisably Marxist argument which, as a Marxist argument must do, takes relations
of production and contradictions between these and the productive forces of society
as its defining points of reference. Inside this, he proceeds as above, dismissing the
various youth cultural theories of the importance of music for young people to
conclude that leisure possibilities - and with them the meaning that leisure choices
have for young people - are experienced differently by different groups in terms of
their different relationships to the productive process. He then adds in the further
defining differences of the sex, age and race of young consumers to provide a more
detailed picture; firstly, of why blanket generalisations about 'pernicious pop' are
inaccurate (cf. Adomo) and, secondly, of why and how it is that Rock music can
make (young) people feel differently about themselves and the world; how,
ideologically, it can challenge the social places assigned to young people and the
roles and beliefs and behaviour patterns that go with those 'places'.
96
This 'challenge' is then examined in the contexts of the historical and the
stylistic roots of Rock's ideological composition. However, what emerges in the
course of the unfolding of this, unspecified but, still recognisable, historical
materialist account of Rock as a musical-cultural complex is that Frith has a second
object or target - to show how and in what ways Rock is a site of popular cultural
struggle - and not some relatively unvariegated commodity fashioned for young
people by record companies. It is here that his dift'erences with Adorno and Hirsch
are at their sharpest. Rock is not (just) a fad or fashion; and neither is it an
industrially constructed palliative to pacify the masses. In however incoherent,
incomplete and compromised a way, Rock, as a musical form, is an attempt to
express needs and feelings that contradict the subordinate position of the majority (in
different ways, according to social location and the use made of Rock products)
enforced under the complex social power relations of capitalism. The audience
doesn't always get what it wants, or enjoy what it hears, but consuming pop music is
still a source of uncontrolled and uncontrollable pleasure and this is what gives it its
cultural power.
To consider this last point in greater detail, in congruence with the general
elements of Marxist theory (that conflict is the motor of events and that conflicts are
articulated in and through ideologies; which, in turn, are constructed out of social
beliefs practised as cultures that are inscribed by continuous conflict) Frith argues
Rock's importance as a consequence of its potential to disrupt the essentially
precarious relationship between leisure and work. This relationship is 'precarious' in
the sense that neither are fixed quantities but owe their contemporary form and
expression to the current status of the conflict between employers and workers;
between 'Capital' and 'Labour'. Rock has the potential to disrupt work-leisure
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relations because, as it is composed of leisure products informed by a distinct
ideology, it can, at its best, hold out the promise of a 'better life to come'. This
ideological imperative possesses the force to fuel inherent, structural dissatisfaction
with work-leisure relations on the part of (particularly young) workers (and would-be
workers) who have most to lose in the current configuration of capital's power over
labour. Clearly, capitalism does not want dissatisfaction with the profit system to
gain the momentum that might lead to challenge and confrontation across society.
There are two sides to a struggle and Frith seizes on Hirsch's deployment of the key
concepts of the 'filtering process' and media 'gate-keeping' to demonstrate how these
processes are, themselves, expressive of contradiction and conflict. On the one hand.,
the institutions that benefit from young people's love ofRock music need to maintain
that commitment; on the other, they need to constrain its disruptive potential, with
the result that an on-going struggle obtains (albeit in confused ways and with
considerable ebbing and flowing) between creators of Rock and purveyors of Rock,
with the conditions of the consumption of Rock as its arena. Whilst persuasive, this
view collapses pop acts and record companies into a general category of 'creators' of
Rock, in so doing completely missing the tensions that might exist between acts and
companies - 'tensions' that express themselves, eventually, as the failure of seven out
of eight signed acts.
To expand on this last point, above, Frith's argument does have considerable
intellectual force; but an important shift occurs within it which, if we identify it here,
will make us better placed to discuss its implications, more closely, below. At base,
in re-locating some of Hirsch's main points, some of Hirsch's 'bloodlessness' is
detectable in Frith's own argument in the way that he introduces us to real actors in
the cycle of production and consumption, but then fails to animate them. At different
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points in the S/R, Frith is determined to make his argument concrete rather than
abstract (his primary research on the musical tastes of fourteen-year olds is evidence
of this). When he eventually arrives at the discussion of who does what in the Music
Industry, Frith, again, considers the roles of individual music industry figures (A&R
people, Managers, and so on), but in his commitment to the need to demonstrate the
value of pop and the value of the study of pop (against the various Mass Culturalist
opponents of these related recognitions), his arguments tend to take place at the level
of social institutions which represent the 'high ground' commanded by Leavis and
Adorno, alike. Consequently, we lose sight completely of what it must be like to
want to make popular music; of the actual business of writing songs, rehearsing
material, playing live, making demos, and contacting music industry figures,
including record company representatives. The institutions may well be caught in the
contradictions of a life-or-death class struggle, we cannot say; all we can say is that
those institutions decimate aspirant pop acts. In his attempt at 'stripping away' the
record industry's 'myths and false certainties' Frith opens considerable, theoretical
distance from Hirsch's functionalism and from the romanticism of Rock journalists;
but, arguably, in doing this he moves too far from the actual experience of making
the music he is determined to 'value'.
Frith on Record-making.
That Frith covers considerable theoretical 'ground' in the course of his
analysis is, in many ways, as it should be; the S/R is, after all, a ground-breaking
study and it is very much a product of its time. The S/R is a product of a time when
Marxism was still being 'discovered' academically (largely out of the 'oppositionist'
upheavals of the 1960's - of which Rock itself was a part - that characterised the
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breakdown of the certainties and consensus of the post-war, and Cold War, years).
Marxist theory 'led the way' in, what proved to be, the emergence of Cultural Studies
in Britain. As a consequence, the S/R displays the great strengths but also some of
the weaknesses of this new, broad, interest in conflicts within and around popular
cultural products. What Frith's analysis gains from Marxism, and from the 'new' (less
economically deterministic) Marxism in particular, is, primarily, the explanatory
power, the conceptual 'sweep', offered, in general,'by Marxist theory. Secondly, the
work gains in and through the determination it displays to identify, not just the
sources of conflict which frame the pop and Rock experience, but the expression of
that conflict in ideological terms. This last 'gain' is made by Culturalist Marxism (in
the very broadest sense) in the way that it identifies ideology not simply as some by-
product of economic conflict (as more determinist Marxists portrayed it, when they
referred to it at all) but as a site of conflict itself. Frith clearly subscribes to this view
but, in his embrace of it, he also takes on board its weaknesses which, in his case,
(and strictly within the terms of his own argument) is a tendency to reverse the fault
of the economic determinists. This reversal, put crudely, is to neglect the
specification of the composition of the material context for conflict in order to
emphasise the importance of the forms of expression of conflict as forces in their
own right. In short, Frith is so concerned to show how conflict takes place in and
through the production and consumption of popular music in ideological terms (as
Rock's creators and consumers demand and celebrate 'licence' and the industry and its
allies strive to contain this expression while, simultaneously, keeping the economic
power of Rock alive) that he under-develops his own portrayal of the material
framework of record production - the very aspect of his work that marked its distance
from that of the majority of Rock commentators. In breaking with determinism, Frith
100
breaks too energetically, and, consequently, he displays a clear tendency to lead us
towards the music-maker's experience of making music, and towards the generalised
experience of 'failure', but to stop short of pursuing his exploration of the conditions
and consequences of the relationships he depicts.
So, to resume, the youth market is the product of a class-divided society and it
is also internally divided. If there is no unified market for popular music products,
and for Rock products as a variety of these, then there can be no single use made of
Rock (as Adolescence and Sub-Cultural theorists of youth imply that there is).
Further, if there is no single use made of pop then there cannot be a single, unified
understanding of what pop, itself, is. The understanding of pop - and particularly of
Rock, Frith would here argue - is then a matter for contention, contention, at the very
least, between record companies' definitions of Rock and fan's definitions of Rock,
and 'contended understandings' are, precisely, what ideologies are. In this way, the
forces that contend over the question of what Rock really is are not simply different
groups of consumers who interpret Rock differently while record companies
somehow neutrally supply them with 'ammunition'; instead, there is an over-arching
contention for definition, the one referred to above - the conflict between what the
record industry wants from Rock and what Rock (as a complex of creators and
consumers) wants from itself. As Frith argues,
There is another source of constraint on youth music... the leisure industry has a
determinate effect on the leisure choices that are available. Young people's
leisure is not just limited by their relation to production as workers, it is also
limited by their relation to production as consumers. To understand Rock, it is
not enough to describe what young people do with musical products when they
get them, we also have to describe how these musical products got there in the
first place. (Frith, 1978, p.71)
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It is in his treatment of the last process above, one central to this enquiry, that the
tensions and, arguably, the weaknesses of the S/R are most evident.
Frith's argument for the necessity of describing how 'musical products' get to
young people is entirely congruent with his recognition (with Hirsch) that 'records are
the result of complex formal organisations'. Even so, for all the information and
analytical insights it contains, Frith's account does little more than skim the surface
of record production. This follows from his use off' a broad description of how the
record industry operates as a stepping stone to his central concern with the ideology
of Rock and to what social forces contend in and through this ideology. In this way,
his treatment of the record industry as a means to this distinct end encourages the
shortfall in the exploration of music-making, referred to previously.
So detailed and multi-faceted is Frith's account of the record industry that it
will prove more productive to begin with his conclusions about its methods of
operation and to work backwards through the factors which lead him in their
particular direction. His conclusions are expressed in the following ways:
Records are the result of contributions from a variety of forms of labour. If the
basic inputs are musicians skills, record companies' capital, pieces of music, the
value of the finished product depends upon inputs from many other workers -
producers and engineers, labourers in the pressing plants, sleeve designers and
printers. Each contribution to record-making rests on its own organisation of
capital. (Frith, 1978, p.87)
And,
Records have a "special nature" .. as cultural commodities - demand for them is
not easily controllable. So far I have only covered one element in the "filtering
process" - the A&R department, through which the mass of potential recording
musicians passes to emerge as a trickle. Once through this net, a musician can be
almost certain that a record will emerge - that was the purpose of his contract -
but for the record company the point of record issue is the point where the
problems of over-production begin. The "filtering process" becomes most
102
apparent in the strategies which companies are compelled to adopt to realise the
exchange value of their products in the market. (Frith, 1978, p.87)
As we are aware, 'uncontrollable demand'; 'overproduction', 'the "filtering process" ',
are all taken directly from Hirsch; yet, while Frith couches his remarks in exactly the
terms of Hirsch's argument, ultimately, he places those concepts in a significantly
different setting. The key to the entire, combined sequence lies in the combination of
two of its observations: that records are made as the result of a 'filtering process' and
that this filtering process is evident in the strategies which companies are 'compelled
to adopt' where, critically, it is the compulsion to make profits, and the inescapability
of this logic, which informs all of the decision-making inside the record industry.
Even at this stage, we are cautioned, implicitly, not to treat popular music texts as
solely aesthetic creations - texts 'emerge' from the interaction of 'pieces of music'
with the complexity of record manufacture and marketing - but Frith leaves the
tensions embedded within this caution, together with its implications, almost
unexplored. He fails, therefore, to determine and specify how, and in what ways,
economically-driven production decisions (in the sense of industrial production
rather than the more familiar sense of record production) might impact on original,
creative raw material; and, with it, on the condition and fate of the acts whose
appearance, 'story' and music is undergoing transformation.
Frith's concluding chapter begins with the observation that has helped
contextualise this study:
The power of music comes .. from its popularity. Music becomes a mass culture
by entering a mass consciousness.. mass music is recorded music, records which
don't sell don't become popular, don't enter mass consciousness whatever their
particular artistic claims (and) their authenticity. (Frith, 1978, p.203)
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We should now be in a position to challenge this view. If record companies are
'compelled' to adopt 'strategies' to market records that emerge from a stringent, profit-
led, 'filtering process' and that these records 'construct' the popular ('records that don't
sell don't enter mass consciousness') then, clearly, there is much we need to ask about
this 'filtering process', these 'strategies, and the business of selling records so that
they 'enter mass consciousness'. In the case of the 'filtering process for example, we
need to ask the questions that neither Hirsch nor Frith does: how does it work? Who
does the filtering? On what terms and by what methods does 'filtering' take place?
And with what effects on, and results for, the pop acts who believe they have been
signed to become successes? Essentially, there is an atmosphere of neutrality, of the
clinical, about Frith's use of these terms; it is the 'sterility' identified in Hirsch's
presentation of the 'filtering process' that has gone untransformed in Frith's account.
Again, there is no human experience here; there is nothing of the 'fifty six thousand
rock acts extant at any moment', from chapter one of this study. Yet, if these Rock
acts each write only five new songs in a year, that makes Britain annually host to over
a quarter of a million new songs. We have already seen that (only) five thousand
singles are released every year and that only about one and a half thousand of these
enter the charts (mostly for a handful of weeks in the chart's lower reaches). Taken
together, these figures represent a 'filtering' of epic proportions and it is a messy,
profligate filtering. It is messy and wasteful because there is no clinicism involved;
instead, the 'filtering' begins with young people who not only have no experience of
'the world' (certainly of the world of global business networks) they have little time
for the world per se - not because they are uninterested in it, but because they are
interested in only one aspect of it, music-making. How their musical efforts then
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reach record companies and are there transformed into pop commodities depends, at
every stage of the 'filtering process', on the efforts of individuals they must trust but
whose efforts they cannot monitor. 'Strategies', the 'filtering process' are human
actions performed in the name of making music to make money for record
companies. We need, therefore, to recognise at the outset that 'strategies' can fail as
well as succeed and that a 'filtering process' can be inefficient as well as efficient. As
such we need to further appreciate how this recognition problematises the as yet
unexplored connections (if such connections exist, and Frith seems certain that they
do) between record company practices and the musical activities of pop acts; where
the record, the cultural commodity, the popular musical text, is the result of these
interactions. If the unsigned pop act is a 'proto-pop act' then its material must be
'proto-pop music'; each composition is only a proto-text, a 'piece of music' that has
not yet passed through the 'filtering process' to 'emerge' as a record; and the record
emerges as a result of decisions taken by non-musicians about the work of musicians,
almost always definitively where its success or failure is concerned
Frith on 'Intermediaries'.
Frith begins the consideration of 'Making Records' with a study of recording
contracts. This is a telling place to start; for most acts, 'signing a deal' can be seen as
the culmination of an often lengthy and emotionally demanding process; when, in
fact, it is only 'the end of the beginning'. The contract's existence as a legal document
and the implications of this for the relationships embodied within it (particularly as
the codification of the record company's conditions of ownership of the pop act's
recorded work) is presented impressively in the S/R as a living framework for record
production rather than as some dry document far removed from the exciting world of
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making and releasing pop records. On this basis, Frith is able to reflect not simply on
what the conditions of ownership mean for acts - immediately and essentially that
companies and not acts have 'the final power to decide whether a song or sound is of
sufficient quality' - but he is able to bring into play the structures and relationships
which contracts invoke and demand in order that the terms of such ownership are
organised and enforced and their fruits delivered. Principal among these 'structures
and relationships' is the need for intermediaries to represent both the act and the
record company in negotiation and in the conduct of their business, in general. We
will need to return continuously to the dependency of pop acts on intermediary
figures throughout this study - these are the actors whose actions combine to make
music for money - yet, once he has identified who the most important of these are
(managers and the A&R department of the record company, respectively) and has
commented, briefly, on what their main roles and functions consist of, Frith then
moves quickly onto the further aspects of record production in its broadest sense and
to the delivery of recorded musical products to, and in, the market-place. Arguably,
though, it is too soon to move on; the transformation of acts and their compositions is
underway. As earlier remarks have indicated (during the discussion on Hirsch's work)
acts compose music outside the record company; once under the latter's control, the
pressures and demands inherent in the act's relationship with the record company can
go on impacting on the transformation of the composition into the recorded and
released text (and on themselves as an intrinsic part of the total of the commodity on
offer); Frith declares as much. He has declared as much but he does not explore his
declaration; we can explore this declaration if only through its omissions.
The immediate implication of the recognition that much of the recording
relationship depends on the activities (and therefore on the perspectives, beliefs and
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methods) of intermediaries is, clearly, that an act never deals directly with a record
company - with the result that how that act understands its relationship with the
record company; what its expectations of the record company are; and how it acts on
the basis of those understandings and expectations, will always be informed by
impressionism and imprecision. As Cohen has shown, when pop acts form they are
usually made up of young people with little experience of business and with an
understanding of the record industry formed out of exactly the 'myths and false
certainties' that Frith is endeavouring to 'strip away'. Arguably, (and ahead of primary
research) most of the intermediary figures they come into contact with on an
immediate, local level (nascent managers, local promoters, roadies, sound engineers,
DJ's, local music journalists and the like) will also have no direct experience of the
global record industry, but these local representatives of the music industry are likely
to have also bought into those myths and will help reinforce rather than dispel them.
It is especially for this reason that I have tried to maintain a distinction between the
'music industry' and the 'record industry', thus far.
From their inception, then, pop acts become reliant on others over whom they
have no direct control and about whose activities they have little or no direct
knowledge. As (usually) a group of people struggling towards a goal, the act itself
will have its own internal dynamic. Further, once allied with a manager or
management company, a new dynamic and new struggles over material and identity
will ensue, and these 'struggles' will be inflected by and through the additional
relationships the act and its manager will be forced to negotiate as the act begins to
record, to perform, and to court record companies. In this way, acts develop
dependencies, long before record contracts are signed and they extend far beyond the
doors of the offices of the record companies that draw up those highly-prized
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documents. In the S/R, Frith hints at the 'cast list' in this 'drama' but neither
introduces us to its members nor invites us to the performance; instead, he uses them
as a spring-board to his principle concern - Rock as a site of popular cultural struggle.
In this way, we are led to the fringes of what it must mean to make music that, of
necessity, must become an industrial product, a commodity, but we are then diverted
from any closer encounter with this 'collaborative' and transformative process and left
with little insight (beyond Hirschian 'over-production') into why it results in the
failure of so many signed pop acts.
In the above way, Frith demonstrates that pop acts are drawn into the
commodification process by their own desire to become successful, to make 'hit'
records and displays how their attempts to enter this process involve them signing
contracts with major record companies. He shows us that these activities are almost
always mediated by individuals and agencies that form an interface between the acts
as 'raw talent' or 'raw material' and the record industry that transforms this into pop
commodities. Further, as we have noted above, he demonstrates (by implication) that
these individuals simultaneously represent the act to the industry and the industry to
the act and, also, they also represent their own interest as efficient providers of such
inter-facial activities. Hirsch describes all these 'intermediaries' as 'talent scouts' and
somehow trusts that they would be always efficient by the (implied) operation of
'market forces' (only the efficient survive and prosper). The record industry is a
capitalist, profit-seeking industry. It dominates commodity production through its
ownership of capital. However, as Frith is at pains to show, it does not directly
dominate popular taste (which is as much a refusal of the strictures of domination as
it is an acceptance, through consumption). Further, the industry does not dominate
the imaginations of composers (as Adomo argued). Even so, when everyone wants
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success it is reasonable to argue that the beliefs, practices and rules of production (the
'culture') of those best placed to realise success must hold sway. Frith takes us to the
threshold of this culture - then leaves us there.
Frith on Record Companies.
Frith's depiction of the social relations of record production is undynamic; the
ways that record industry professionals set goals and targets is not considered.
Instead, there are relatively fixed 'record companies' that deal with an
undifferentiated 'mass of potential recording musicians'. What this fails to consider is
the range and quality of potential interactions between record companies, the
representatives of pop acts and the pop acts themselves. Because acts are compelled
to rely on intermediaries to negotiate for them, the act is always relatively
disempowered in its relations with a record company - put simply, there is no way
that an act can know the content of all the decisions taken in their name and on their
behalf, either by their manager with record company representatives, or between
those representatives themselves. Yet the act needs to know the content and the
implications of decisions because it is they who will suffer if 'careers' are not
successfully created. No decisions are trivial, as Frith writes,
companies don't just sign a group and leave them to get on with it .. talent (has to
be translated) into a saleable product. (Frith, 1978, pp.78-79)
In this way, all decisions are decisions of 'translation', or, for these purposes,
'transformation'. Under these conditions, and particularly within the strictures of the
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extreme time-boundedness of all recording and marketing activity (restrictions that
Hirsch concedes but never theorises), it is fair to suggest that what emerges as the
product is never fully within the control of the act. Frith recognises this in his
observation that 'a record.. as a sound, has a number of different authors'; but, having
made this hugely suggestive comment he does little with it; with the effect that the
issue of what, exactly, happens to a pop act and its compositions under these
complex conditions of 'translation', remains essentially untheorised. Again, his good
work stops short, a fact exemplified in his further specification of the variables that
make up that context, as he writes,
Singers provide the art, managers manipulate it into a saleable commodity and
record companies give it a vehicle to ride on. The basic recipe for Rock success
is sufficient talent, efficient management and an enterprising record company.
(Frith, 1978, pp.76-77)
In a sense, given how obscure the real processes of pop can be (despite the
mountains of pop journalism), Frith's identification of at least the broad groups of
variables that make up that process, together with an overview of their principal
interactions, did provide, in the earliest years of a coherent Popular Music Studies, a
much needed light inside the 'black box' of record-making. What helped dim this
light though is the fixity of his attention on the search for the ideology of Rock rather
than the life of Pop. Certainly, Frith was subsequently to cast his net wider still (as
the introductory observations on the scope of his published work indicate) but it is
the pursuit of Rock ideology that leads him, in the work, continuously to raise
questions that he subsequently fails to answer; where the failure to answer carries
with it the return implication that the further development of the argument may have
needed to be modified in the light of these unprovided answers. For example, when
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considering 'singers' (or the musicians, composers or acts) who 'provide the art' in the
pop-commodity equation sketched in the last quote above, he refers to their requiring
'the right attitudes and values' if success is to be achieved, but he never specifies what
these are, or, more importantly, how musicians' and composers' internalisation of
what they regard as the pre-requisites for commercial success might impact on their
perception of what their creativity and their artistry should consist of when hoping to
secure a recording contract. Similarly, Frith asserts high levels of failure amongst pop
acts without ever asking what it is that the fortunate ones do that is different from the
rest (if anything at all) and what it is they all do in relationship to how they create in
the hope of winning record company approval; where this goal defines their every
activity.
In his analysis, myriad questions go unasked of the interactions between the
act and the intermediaries who represent the act to the company and of the
intermediaries within the company who represent the commodified act to the market;
despite the fact that all interactions in the pursuit of pop success have their bearing on
what acts make records and on what records they make. For example, if we consider
the role of the manager in relationship to what the act does and how it understands
what it should do to further its life as a pop act, some of the questions Frith fails to
ask are: how did the manager come to manage the act? Did the manager's style and
opinions affect the behaviour of the act? How do managers define 'sufficient talent'?
How do managers understand and practice efficiency? What does 'manipulating an
act into a saleable commodity' mean and involve? How do acts know when a
manager is being negligent or is lying to them and what do they do about it when they
have schedules to obey? How does all this affect how acts as yet without managers
understand what 'good management' is? Similar, and equally inexhaustive, lists could
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be drawn up for the relations between acts, managers and record companies. Here,
the questions we need most to ask would be, firstly, what are the effects of record
company practice on how unsigned acts perceive creativity in commercial terms?
Secondly, what is the effect of the 'culture' of record company practice on how pop
acts conceive of themselves and their music? Thirdly, what is the effect on acts of
changes either in personnel or in corporate philosophy? Answers to these, and to the
many other unanswered questions suggested in the course of Frith's argument, may
have a greater resonance for our understanding of commodification in the music
industry than does the material he provides.
So great is the potential accumulation of unanswered gaes^ions in the SLR
that, far from it being praised for its comprehensiveness, the work could be charged
with a kind of busy superficiality, but this would be far too harsh a judgement. Even
so, it does indicate the extent of the distance between the S/R as a pioneering work in
the study of pop and the extent of the territory that the subject attempts to chart. A hit
record begins its life in the creative imagination of a pop composer or composers and
it becomes a hit because record companies not only manufacture pop records that
carry that composition but they transform some proto-pop acts; and some proto-pop
compositions into hit records. To characterise this composition-recording-release
process as a'chain' as Frith does (again after Hirsch) is to risk further confusion in an
already complex area of combined activities. This is a risk, partly because the
transformation process is so intense that, particularly within record companies,
sequentially separable activities occur simultaneously; but more so because its usage
fails to convey how dynamic are the interactions that pop acts experience and how
many are the possible outcomes of those interactions; with success the least likely
outcome.
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Frith on the Record Market.
Selling a record, as Frith argues, demands the putting together of a marketing
strategy. He constantly asserts the centrality of the market to Rock music but he does
very little with the assertion; yet if what happens in the market-place is vital to the
fate of Rock commodities (and vital also to Rock's place in popular cultural struggle)
then the process for entry into that market-place must be equally vital. As we noted in
chapter one, what a record company (or, properly, a record label) makes available to
a newly-signed act is its team (not all of whom will have been involved or even
consulted in the signing). This 'team', if this is not too crude an analogy, may be
Spurs or they may be Ossett Albion; when an act signs to a record label, they
automatically believe that the team is the former and are not disabused in any way,
who would do this? Even so, the playing skills of the team, or the lack of them,
quickly become apparent and in a variety of ways, all of which Frith ignores, yet all
of these bear on how well texts are realised and acts commodified and, even more
importantly, on how well they are sold.
Record companies are pleased when the acts they sign have a strong sense of
themselves and of where they might be heading in market terms. What this means is
that the entire commodification process is speeded up and is likely to be more
effective because of its internal coherence. Even so, in every department of the
record company, the act will encounter smaller, sub-teams who will want to retain a
monopoly of professional expertise. These teams, as is the nature of the industry, will
be made up of ambitious individuals who are carving out individual careers; as a
consequence, they can use their 'professionalism' in quite contradictory ways - both
for claiming their centrality in the production of success and in distancing themselves
113
from failure ('if only the act had listened to us') but the point is they do apply methods
of working informed by company goals as an essential feature of the 'rules of
production' of the record industry, which, again, Frith refers to but does not specify.
Similar deficiencies are encountered when Frith deals with the related aspects
of record production. For example, he introduces us to the A&R department that
signs an act and then helps to 'translate talent .. into a saleable product'. But we need
to ask what is lost, and what is gained, in this 'translation'? Once 'translated', this
talent passes on to the Marketing and Promotions departments so that the resultant
commodity can be sold in the market-place; but if the record becomes successful, do
we attribute this to its sound, alone; to the combination of the sound and the 'image'
of the act; or, alternatively, is record success (simply) a consequence of the efficiency
of these departments? If, as is likely, success is a product of all these factors working
together then we still need to know what proportions obtain and how the 'chemistry'
of interaction was initiated and controlled.
This last point is particularly important if we consider Frith's now familiar
dictum: 'Records which don't sell .. don't enter mass consciousness whatever their
particular artistic claims', of which dictum we are forced to ask whether or not an act
is only as good as its record company? We need to ask this because, as we have
noted, it is the record company's personnel and not the act, as such, that enters the
commercial fray; but if the Promotions department fails to 'get a record away' (to use
the argot of the record industry), that failure is perceived by the public as the failure
of the act rather than the organisational failure of any combination of intermediaries
either with the act or with each other. Further, and fundamentally, public failure then
negatively affects that act's 'profile' both outside and inside the music and record
industries. Not only might future sales be affected but the entire future of the act
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might be called into question. Under these conditions, the act's morale, its creativity
(and with it the chance of retrieving the situation), and, ultimately, its place in
historiographical accounts of popular music can all suffer - not by its own actions
(writing and playing pop music) but by those of others who make commodities of
pop acts and pop compositions.
These kinds of criticisms can be raised at greater length and in greater detail
at every turn of Frith's treatment of the recording and marketing processes. This is not
to say that he fails to recognise that these interactions exist (cf. his objections to Rock
acts as 'auteurs') but he does tend to ignore them or, what is more confusing, to refer
to them in the negative without ever displaying how their negativity is worked out in
practice. As a result, he weakens his own case that records have 'a number of
different authors' and that they rely on 'contributions from a variety of forms of
labour'. Not only does he not examine this controversial claim, he also separates the
success of the record as a sound from the success of a record as a product when,
arguably, both sound and product need to be successfully realised if the mass sales
critical to success are to be generated. This failure to dig deeper into the interactions
between the work and identity of individual pop acts and record industry practices, in
general, is, then, a central source of weakness in the case made in the S/R.
Confusions in Frith's Argument.
To sum up, Simon Frith made a considerable advance in the study of Popular
Music by attempting to demonstrate, in the face of elitist Mass Culturalist hostility,
why that study was of value. As an academic and a Rock journalist, Frith needed to
live a 'double life', so separate were the worlds of academic sociology and rock
criticism he inhabited. Perhaps because of this Frith, arguably, over-compensates in
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his determination to reconcile those two worlds: that is, to demonstrate to dock
critics that Sociology offered valid critical tools with which to criticise Rock; and to
demonstrate to Sociologists that Rock was a subject that was worthy of study. In both
instances, the need to validate Rock encouraged him to 'accentuate the positive'
aspects of Rock, if not entirely to 'eliminate the negative'. What this means in
practice, in terms of the construction of his argument, is that, in pursuit of the
defining goal of the S/R, the unstated but clear desire to establish Rock's place in
popular cultural struggle, Frith's overwhelming need is to identify, convincingly, the
positive impact that Rock consumers have on Rock production decisions (which can
only mean, in practice, on what to write, on who to sign, and on how to record). This
need, as the preceding argument should have made clear, arises from the evident
necessity to distance his argument from Mass Culturalism in all its forms and
especially from its powerful, defining idea that 'he who controls the market controls
the meaning'. Against this, Frith attempts to show that, as record company activity
follows rather than leads patterns of musical use (rather than orchestrating the passive
consumption of musical commodities, as in Adorno's account) this acknowledges the
power of music as entertainment. This was not to argue that music has an essential,
elemental power; but rather because to seek pleasure in any form of expression is to
refuse work. Adorno was hostile to this notion; to use popular music as entertainment
was not to refuse work but to re-locate its rhythms to non-working time. In order to
show how capitalism is confounded, time and again, by hedonistic youthful
innovation in the cultural sphere, Frith transfigures his signal recognition that music
makers depend on intermediary figures into a relocation of intermediaries as
'intermediary institutions' that hover above youthful pleasure at once profiting from
the supply of commodities for consumption and mindful that they must contain the
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power of work-refusal lest it lead to the over-throw of the commodity system, the
profit system itself. This is Marxist dialectics; it depicts, specifies, capitalism as a
dynamic system of struggle between contending forces; but it is suddenly very
unspecific about why some music becomes successful ('enters mass consciousness')
and why most music intended for success never achieves this goal.
Frith's pursuit of Rock's existence as evidence of popular cultural struggle
means that he has to display the essential vulnerability of the record industry in the
face of consumer demand: record companies would dearly love to control demand for
their products but they cannot; the 'needs' of consumers are 'independently expressed'
with the result that, 'musical results have followed rather than led youthful tastes and
choices'. Despite the persuasiveness of his case (a persuasiveness built of rigour and
close argument) this notion of 'vulnerability' sits uneasily with the cumulative picture
of the record industry that Frith constructs in the course of his analysis. Essentially,
in the development of his meta-argument, (of popular cultural struggle) Frith needs to
cast the record industry as a negative force against which the popular will is
exercised. In order to be cast as a negative force of sufficient strength to excite
popular struggle, the record industry needs to be shown, along the route of the
analysis, to be of considerable strength, with the result that, when the conceptual
tables are suddenly turned and the industry is re-presented as 'vulnerable', his overall
position is undermined.
Conclusions.
Frith's argument is a powerful one and a necessary one: if pop was not always
to be confined to the popular cultural trash-heap by academia then someone needed
to demonstrate that its study was valuable. Frith accomplished this in the S/R and he
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has gone on to become the most significant, individual figure in Popular Music
Studies. There is not the space here to discuss Laing's contribution to early PMS or to
what Frith took from Laing's analysis in The Sound of Our Time; neither is there
space to consider, in detail the subsequent development of Frith's views and of those
who developed parallel studies either in sociology or, equally importantly, in
musicology. For the purposes of this study, the S/R tells us far more about how pop
music is made than does either of its two main precursors; the work of Adorno and
Hirsch, respectively. The S/R shows us that, as a music industry and a record industry
are essential to the existence of popular music, then these must have their effects on
what music becomes popular; and on what, how and why music is made. Frith
refuses to draw 'pessimistic' conclusions from the industrial production of popular
music products and he introduces us to the major 'intermediaries' who mediate
between the act and the market-place. He shows us that pop is not made 'top down' as
Adorno argued but he cautions us not to treat popular music texts solely as aesthetic
creations. He is willing to confront the large-scale failure of pop acts and he makes
the crucial distinction that mass sales are the only guarantee that music made to be
popular is, in fact, popular music - and Frith does all of this while exploring an
aspect of the development of pop music; the emergence of Rock as a powerful
ideology amongst young people, and within society.
With all of the above in mind, it is still the case that the criticisms made of
Frith in the body of this analysis must stand. It is precisely because Frith represents
the making of popular musical commodities as a dynamic field of interaction
between pop acts and intermediaries that he can be criticised - simply because he
does comparatively little with this representation. There are real people in Frith's
account of record-making, but he leaves them without animation; consequently by
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leaving unanswered the questions that he fairly forces us to ask of the actions and
motivations of those individuals his good work stops short. In the short pamphlet
British Popular Music Research (1981), published four years after the S/R, Frith
acknowledges some of these short-comings,
'I was aware of its research inadequacies .. and I hoped that it would encourage
people .. to cover similar ground better' (Frith, 1981, p.13)
What is interesting about the overview he takes of the, then, contemporary
condition of research into popular music is that he laments the lack of 'empirical
research' but identifies the specific weaknesses of his own research in the S/R as,
firstly, his failure to anticipate how the music industry would cope with a recession
and, secondly, his failure to absorb the implications of rising youth unemployment
for his depiction of the connections between leisure and music. These shortfalls are
addressed in Sound Effects as are several others - most notably of all sexuality - but
somehow in this re-working of the S/R he still fails to explore in any greater depth
the key music-making and record-making relationships he identifies in the S/R,
although he does provide more examples of them in operation. Again, the subsequent
work of Frith is too protean to assess; however, his influence is particularly apparent
in the first major British study of record company practices - Producing Pop by Keith
Negus - to which we now turn.
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Chapter Four:
Keith Negus and Producing Pop.
Introduction.
If Frith, at least in his very earliest work, did not go far enough beyond
Hirsch's representation of the practices of record companies, Negus sets out not only
to debunk Hirsch's view but any account of popular music-making, and the record
industry's involvement in this, that is not alive to the way that all production
decisions are now inflected by the need to search for 'global' markets. He does this by
making a close study of how record companies work and of how 'day-to-day' decision
making at a local level connects, eventually, with global aims. In this way, Negus's
study is neither a cybernetic 'modelling' as was Hirsch's nor an extrapolation from
industry statistics as so many other accounts of the pop process are. In all of these
ways, Negus's work connects with the general thrust of this study - he is determined
to consider what it is that record company personnel (or 'cultural intermediaries') do
in their jobs on a daily basis that adds to, and so helps to transform, the raw material
of popular music into pop acts with hit records. What is even more germane about
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Producin,g Pop (P/P) is the way that Negus reaches beyond the creation of successful
products that emerge from a process of collaboration between acts and different
record industry personnel to show how 'conflict', as much as 'collaboration', and with
it the failure that conflict can induce, is a defining feature of record company activity
and experience (hence the book's sub-title, 'Culture and Conflict in the Popular Music
Industry'). In this sense, it is partly misleading to characterise Negus's recognition of
large-scale failure as a 'by-product' of his argument, although I will argue below that
he still fails either to connect his discussion of endemic conflict closely enough to
this recognition or truly to explore failure as a phenomenon of significance. Before
we consider his contribution to the understanding of the methods and practices of
major record companies, it is important to register some of the broad, structural
developments that occurred in the years between Hirsch's and Frith's studies of those
methods and practices and Negus's much more contemporary examination of them.
Negus and Frith.
Negus is very much part of the 'second generation' of writers within PMS.
With Moore and Cohen, Negus cites Frith's influence on his work and that influence
is apparent in the course of (P/P) in which Frith is easily the most prominent
secondary source. For all this, there are three major orders of difference between P/P
and the S/R (beyond the obvious difference that Negus makes a deliberate study of
record companies while Frith's primary focus is the rise and form of Rock Music).
(1). There are the differences that stem from economic and organisational
changes both within the organisation of the record industry and within pop itself in
the years between the publication of the S/R and P/P. These were hinted at in the
introduction to chapter two. Frith's research for the S/R was conducted substantially
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before the emergence of Punk Rock and the 'New Wave'. One of the key aspects of
Punk was the emergence of independent record companies, of which 'Rough Trade'
and 'Factory Records' proved the most durable. Even when they were relatively short-
lived, companies like 'Fast Product' and 'Postcard Records' seemed much more
responsive to the needs of audiences for emergent, often regionally-distinct, music
that was considerably different from that made by the dominant mainstream acts
signed to the majors. Ultimately, the independents could not compete economically
with the majors, (although the notion of an'independent' sector has persisted to this
day). What the majors could guarantee was national and international distribution,
promotion and marketing. The opportunity of maximising the chances of celebrity
and earnings was not lost on Punk acts and most of the earliest, and most prominent,
signed directly to major companies while others left as soon as major interest was
made apparent (Rough Trade lost a host of acts this way). Even so, the fact that the
independents could find new acts and sell records by them to a d^sttcLct, new cccasLet
that expressed contempt for the premier pop acts of the day was not lost on the major
companies. What they saw in the independents was exactly the ability to respond
rapidly to emergent tastes, something that companies that had grown complacent
with the Beatles-initiated pattern for market success (pop singles for pre-teens;
albums for teens and twenties) clearly needed to learn from or, what was more
immediate and convenient, buy into.
In the S/R, Frith's music industry was still the British industry pre-Punk.
When Frith published Sound Effects, he incorporated the Punk experience not so
much into his overview of how acts and companies together make pop records but
more into his analysis of 'youth' as a social construct. Negus focuses far more clearly
on the, by now, 'post-punk' record industry. This would still be dominated by the
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majors but, in a sense, these major companies had lost their own independence
despite (or perhaps because of) the considerable improvement in their fortunes
initiated by the successful launch of the Compact Disc. The introduction of the
Compact Disc allowed them to generate even more profit from 'catalogue' sales of the
work of acts that had long since paid off the costs of production of their records and
this profit was then re-invested to respond to the burgeoning need for video promos
that, in turn, ensured that consumers could be reached by the majors through
channels that independent labels found almost impossible to access. But, if the
independents could not economically supplant the majors, it was still the case, as
Negus argues, that the majors responded to the appearance of their vulnerability by
bringing a new sensibility to the record industry, one that expressed itself in new
working methods that were designed to replicate the flexibility and closeness to
consumer demands that the independents exhibited.
(2). A concomitant of the 'resurgence' of the majors (where 'resurgence'
slightly over-states the case) and the rise of video as a promotional tool was the way
that these conditions lead to a far greater presence of pop on television than had
previously been the case. The development of satellite and cable systems encouraged
the creation of a 'dedicated' and 'global' satellite music channel, MTV, and the
success of MTV, in turn, (and in the context of Reaganite and Thatcherite
'deregulation'/'free-market' economics and the take-overs and mergers this stimulated
( see Hutton, 1996) saw major record companies become swallowed by enormously
powerful, globally-active conglomerates. These conglomerates were not necessarily
solely media concerns; for example, Bertellsman's who bought, and merged, Arista
Records and RCA Records, formed a 'Music Group' that it now describes as 'A Unit
of BMG Entertainment', but its primary activity remained the production of
123
chemicals. Similarly, Sony purchased CBS Records but its 'core' business remained
electronic hardware manufacture; as does that of Phillips who continue to expand the
activities of 'Polygram' through acquisitions as significant as A&M Records and
Island Records. In the same period, EMI bought up Virgin Records and WEA merged
with Time Publishing to form 'Time-Warner'. Given the nature and scale of these
developments, it would be unlikely had they not had an effect on record company
activities and practices.
Again, Frith has analysed many of the developments in record industry
practice - notably the increasing importance of the ownership and exploitation of
copyright and also the rise (and the cultural analysis of the rise) of video. For Negus,
what is central is the combination of these, and related, changes into the phenomenon
of the 'globalisation' of Media industries, and with them, the record industry. This has
posed new demands for record industry personnel. Instead of signing artists who
make 'good' records (records with a 'hit' potential), they now need to be alive to the
fact that the parent company has the ability to ensure that newly-signed acts from the
record division can be broadcast live or on video on that conglomerate's T.V.
stations, supply the soundtrack or even star in films made by its studios, be
interviewed in its newspapers and magazines, broadcast on its Radio Stations and,
increasingly, be offered as a 'multimedia' 'experience' on its Web-site (Negus doesn't
analyse Digital Internet developments but his argument anticipates them). These
developments, taken together, he describes as 'Media Synergy' based on the long-
recognised phenomenon that the whole might be greater than the sum of its parts.
Where record companies are concerned, they have needed to respond to these new
demands by recognising that they can no longer sign simply 'Record Artists' but
artists who can become transformed into a 'Total Star Text', an individual or group
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that is comfortable with, and capable of generating, interest that is registered
simultaneously through different but related media and throughout'the world'.
As a primary consequence of these dramatic developments, Negus identifies a
key shift in relative power inside major record companies, one that has come to
favour the activities and judgements of the Marketing departments of major record
companies over those of the A&R departments (traditionally any record company's
dominant sector). In P/P, Negus weaves an elaborate and impressive argument
around this assertion. Through it he connects the tensions created by these upheavals
to impacts on pop acts who must now undergo a far more demanding process of
transformation or, perhaps, systematisation, that prepares them for a commodification
process that feeds a 'global' market through a large number of different points of
access; so many that a co-ordinated cross- or multi-media campaign is demanded.
Because of the new forms of conflict within record companies initiated by these
changes in the commodification process new acts are particularly vulnerable and may
become casualties either of their own conflicts with record company staff or of
conflicts between competing departments (predominantly A&R and Marketing) who
now hold competing views of what 'makes' a good act and what type of act is likely
to develop and sustain the kind of career that generates the huge profits that justify
their jobs. In either event, an act can fail to make it through the commodification
process successfully, because they will suffer the consequences of one, or both, of
these kinds of conflict.
(3). If there have been significant changes in the conditions of the production
of popular music since Frith's S/R, then, equally, there have been considerable
developments in theories of the Media since the mid-1970's (though, again, PMS has
been the 'poor relation' within this process). For example, and instructively, the S/R
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was published as part of a Sociological series, 'Communication and Society'
published by Constable. In a sense, this series was a harbinger of the huge upheavals
to come as Media Studies and Communication Studies (as well as 'Cultural Studies'
although this was already fairly well-defined) came swiftly to prominence within, and
beyond, Higher Education in the 1980's. In a sense, Negus is the first researcher to
apply a generalised Mass Communications argument to Pop; and, therefore, his is a
work of Media Theory rather than Sociology, as was Friths. This is important
because, arguably, Negus has more specialised concepts to draw on, and certainly
more research to support him than did Frith almost twenty years earlier. On this
basis, when considering Negus's work more closely we need to appreciate that not
only had the world of pop changed by the time Negus began his study, but how that
world might be theorised had also moved on.
In all the literature on popular music it is Negus's work that comes closest to
the concerns of this study; to the extent that his citation of the 'assessment' made by
record company staff that,
one in eight of the artists that they sign and record will achieve the level of
success required to recoup their initial investment and start to earn money for
both themselves and the company. (Negus, 1992, pp. 40-41 ]
helped sharpen its focus and create its momentum. Even so, while Negus's
argument overlaps with, reproduces and parallels many of my own concerns, his
analysis can be argued to be incomplete. It is through the identification of the nature
and extent of this lack of 'completion' that some final account of the existing
conception of record company practices and their connection with failure as the
majority fate of pop acts signed to major record labels can be mounted.
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The Primary Components of Negus's argument.
In his conclusions, Negus makes the following summary of his argument:
Recordings (are) commercially successful because audiences have actively
responded to them. .. The drive for economic success, and the need to construct
markets, immediately implicates the audience in the composition and
communication of popular music. Artists are commercially successful because
audiences have made them so. .. The imperative of commercial success requires
a market. but this market is not given, it is not simply "out there", it has to be
made. It is made in the process of artist development. .. the sounds, visions and
words of pop are decisively defined and produced in the process of artist
development (that) I have defined as a web of working practices, dialogues and
articulated relationships. (These inspire) 'habits of action' (Rorty) or 'orienting
practices' (Bourdieu) which different staff employ as they negotiate these
relationships. .. greater attention needs to be paid to the day-to-day work of
people in the industry itself, because .. it is here where tensions between artists,
consumers and corporations are mediated and find expression in a range of
working practices, ideological divisions and conflicts. And, it is these which
decisively shape the sounds and visions of contemporary pop music. (Negus,
1992, pp.153-154)
What concerns me is what Negus does with these insights; the combination of how
he derives them and how he translates and connects them as the practical activities of
music and record industry personnel to the making of successful pop records. In this I
want to isolate how and why it is that, by fore-grounding his belief that conflict as
well as collaboration informs record production processes, Negus falls short of
analysing what he, himself, recognises as a principal factor in the pop 'equation', that
most signed pop acts fail. Although no discrete analysis of all the constituent
elements of P/P is possible here, five key structural components can be identified in
Negus's argument (concepts that underpin the notions of 'Media Synergy', 'Total Star
Text', and so on). I intend to consider each in turn and then draw general conclusions
about how, so far, the relationship between pop acts and those who become involved
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in the attempt to make pop music is represented in the literature on pop; and, further,
what the connections might be between what industry personnel do in their working
lives that connects with what most pop acts experience in theirs, which is to fail to
achieve success.
1. Mediation and 'Cultural Intermediaries'.
In the discussion of Frith's S/R, the existence, necessity and methods of
intermediaries had to be 'teased out' of the main argument; Negus, i^ieriting as he
does the recent 'traditions' of Media and Mass Communication Studies has no need to
develop an argument about the music industry that, eventually, introduces the role of
the intermediary figure and institution; instead, he can assert their centrality from the
second paragraph of his study:
'My focus is on personnel within the music business, rather than the artists or
audiences, and my aim is to describe how a particular group of workers - who I
have characterized as 'cultural intermediaries' .. -actively contribute to the
sounds and images of pop'. (Negus, 1992, p. vi).
This paragraph incorporates an important disclaimer, namely that his focus is on
neither 'artists' nor 'audiences', but I want to argue that, by not taking into
consideration the part that acts play in the commodification process of the
transformation of, predominantly, their own compositions into records, much of
Negus's case is weakened - particularly when we consider that he insists that'cultural
intermediaries .. contribute to the sounds and images of pop'. The books title,
Producing Pop, tends to represent the work as a comprehensive account of how pop
is produced, and, despite the above disclaimers, Negus does tend to make his
description of the work that intermediaries do and the context in which they do it,
128
together with their view of the pop commodification process, stand for the whole of
record-making (or, at least, the whole of the non-playing aspects of it). On this basis,
Negus's account is a distorted one - it is distorted because he fails to follow the logic
of many of the insights into the relationship between 'cultural intermediaries' andpop
acts that his argument contains.
For example, and in concert with the work of McQuail and others, Negus
is keen to show that 'cultural intermediaries' are active in their mediation rather than
passive 'go-betweens' who simply replicate already finished 'art objects' for a mass
audience that waits patiently for the record companies to finish the work of
replication and to advertise the results. In many ways this conception does mark a
complete break with Hirsch's conception of how the record industry works; even so,
Hirsch describes 'talent scouts' (the nearest he gets to the concept of the 'cultural
intermediary') as 'pro-active'. Negus recognises this 'pro-activity' ('actively contribute
to..') but somehow fails to develop its logic; 'somehow fails' because he ignores,
ultimately, what cultural intermediaries mediate between - producers and consumers,
acts and audiences .
If we consider the last point above more closely then, the 'pro-activity' of
record industry personnel expresses itself in several distinct and decisive ways:
(a). Record company personnel choose those whom they wish to sign to
make records from an enormous pool of contenders. Negus uses Cohen to indicate
that this fact alone affects what acts do in their attempts to make music,
'Cohen ., is the only writer who has devoted detailed attention to the way in
which "unknown" musicians are attempting to shape what they do to suit the
demands of the recording industry, and the way in which the logic of "making it"
informs local music-making'. (Negus, 1992, p. 41)
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but he does absolutely nothing with this dramatic claim. What makes this claim
'dramatic' is that (and this comes uncomfortably close to Adorno's 'imitators') what
aspirant pop acts can be argued to do is to not make 'art objects' at all but simply
compose material, and conduct themselves in ways, that will attract record company
attention - these are never 'artists' who have an original, expressive desire that record
companies court in order to win the right to make replicas of their `art objects', they
are simply people who go 'fishing' for record company attention. If this is the case,
(and it is an aspect of the life of pop acts that this study will be concerned to
research), then what we immediately confront is the power imbalance that exists
between aspirant acts and record companies, and the issue of differentials in power
between intermediaries and acts is a dimension of popular music-making that Negus
never truly broaches.
(b). Once 'selected', the relevant 'cultural intermediaries' will attempt to
take the act through the experience of commodification in a relatively standardised
way - 'relatively' because, while commodification always consists of the same
elements (recording, press releases, sleeve art-work, and so on), different
intermediaries will have their own strategies for involving the act in all these
activities. Most of Negus's study is concerned with this recognition and its
consequences - that commodification involves the passage of act and material
through discrete stages; that different cultural intermediaries with different 'briefs' are
involved; and that, such have been the upheavals in the global media industry,
tensions and conflicts now exist between how these different intermediaries conceive
and conduct their jobs. All of this is very persuasive and something of this aspect of
the power of intermediaries (the power to define situations, the power to force acts to
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obey pre-determined understandings of 'how the business works') has already been
encountered in remarks about short-falls in Frith's account of the practices of
intermediaries. Where these 'short-falls' connect with Negus's account is, firstly, that,
while he recognises that the activities of record company personnel are informed by
different, and contrasting types of 'working knowledge' (or 'habits of action', or
'orienting practices') and that this contrast is the source of conflict in what needs to be
a collaborative process (again, hence P/P's sub-title), his over-looking the act's
experience of all this leads him to fail to consider that conflict has always been a
feature of the commodification process.
Essentially, there will always be a tension between the need for record
company personnel to meet schedules and stay within budgets and the fact that they
must integrate newly-signed acts into commodification on these terms. The pressures
that personnel are under are threefold: they must integrate the act into the existing
'state-of-play' within the company; they must induce them to comply, as smoothly as
possible, with their particular budgetary and temporal framework; and they must do
this in a way that fits with their own conception, and with the company's conception,
of how commodification should take place within that framework. This is demanding
and the potential for friction between personnel with routines of their own and goals
to meet, and acts with their own, unique conception of who they are and where they
are going, should be immediately apparent. By 'discovering' conflict in the new,
global context of record company activity, Negus fails to register that conflict is an
'industry constant' in the way that large-scale failure is. Because of this, he
disconnects the exploration of his own recognition of failure from his account of this
'novel' conflict; and when he makes the 're-connection', in the book's conclusions, he
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represents failures primarily as 'casualties' of conflict that are exceptional rather than
the norm (see below).
(c). If record industry personnel, as 'cultural intermediaries', are powerful
and pro-active, then acts must be powerless and re-active. Negus never makes this
comparison and never explores its implications. Instead, his interviews are all with
powerful individuals whom he allows to reflect at length about their experiences. As
a piece of research, P/P is seminal in that Negus, is the first PMS researcher to
conduct such extensive interviews with record industry personnel, but, by
determining to ignore the experience of acts, the account he derives from these kinds
of reflections can only ever add up to a partial account of 'what goes on' in the
commodification process. Unfortunately, Negus re-locates these partial accounts as
full accounts of record-making and further distortions flow from this. For example,
by concentrating on conflict between A&R and Marketing (see below) Negus
represents these departments as continually reacting to each other, whereas, in fact,
both departments are reacting to pop acts at different stages of the transformation of
their material (and themselves) into commodities. Further, this fails, entirely, to take
account of acts of solidarity between departments in disputes with pop acts.
We will need to consider organisation-employee relations at a later stage,
but, whatever the differences between employees within an organisation (and the
importance of the recognition that differences exist) A&R and Marketing personnel
are still employees of a company and they understand, and will attempt to achieve,
the goals and targets of that company. It is reasonable to argue, therefore, that they
are at least as likely to present a 'united front' to pop acts in times of conflict as they
are to conflict with each other.
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(d). Negus opposes Hirsch, and opposes more casual accounts of record
industry practice, when these represent 'overproduction' as a conscious industrial
strategy. We have seen that Hirsch makes a reasonable case for overproduction and
that Frith concurs with this view (translated into the colloquial, by Negus, as
'throwing mud against the wall'). This position has already been criticised because it
fails to account for success and failure in individual cases. Negus rejects it out of
hand. Under the conditions of 'media synergy' and the investment it demands, record
companies can no longer afford to be so wasteful (despite the persistence of the
'safety net' of massive sales by any one act as the key to continued solvency).
Presented in this way, a way that allows him to endorse what it is record industry
personnel say about what they do, Negus makes a strong argument - except that he
never ties his case against overproduction (it is too costly and cultural intermediaries
are too professional to need it) to his recognition that everyone in the record industry
works with the knowledge that only one in eight acts will succeed and that hits go on
'bank rolling' misses. Again, if he had considered the experience of acts, this
conceptual disjuncture might not have arisen - the only people in the record industry
who do not work on the 'one in eight' principle are pop acts and, often to a lesser
extent, their managers.
(e). If intermediaries are pro-active and also hold power, the further
consequence of their ability to define who will be commodified and how
commodification works is that they never deal directly with acts; rather, as has
already been argued (though not demonstrated) most negotiations between acts and
record companies take place through managers. In this way, Negus presents a
distorted, 'single tier' account of the mediational process. This is not to say that
managers are absent from his account, but, again, because his focus is on A&R and
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Marketing, he neglects the fact that managers will have their own culture of practice
and their own power in relation to acts. Further, how acts have interacted with their
managers - how they have developed their expectations and understanding of
commodification (of making records and making hits) 'sets them up' for that process.
This is the 'reality' of the act that record industry personnel need to deal with - acts
are not 'blank sheets' on which the record company draws its design for success;
rather, an act already has not only a conception of^itself but one, also, of what to
expect from record industry personnel. This is not to suggest that only the mast
compliant acts will prosper, far from it, only that commodification will run more or
less smoothly on the basis of how the act interfaces, through its management, with
the company. We now need to look more closely at Negus's analysis of the
organisation of that process.
2. Negus's view of A&R and Marketing.
Rather like Frith, because Negus has a 'goal' in view (one beyond his
immediate, descriptive concern at any one point), he needs to present relations and
experiences through particular 'filters'. In the case of A&R, he emphasises its
'demographic', the age and background of its staff. In Negus's account, A&R is
portrayed as a department dominated by men in their early forties whose first
experience of the music industry came either as Social Secretaries at College or
University or as (often unsuccessful) band members. Consequently, these people
share, and therefore help to reinforce throughout the industry, a 'culture of practice'
rooted in the assumptions of the Rock tradition (the ideology of Rock anatomised by
Frith). Negus shows how the slowness of A&R practices and values to adapt to new
conditions has contributed to the state of conflict within major record companies. On
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the other hand, Negus also needs to show that their's is a conscious ideology, in the
sense that they know why they do what they do, rather than pretend to any more
mysterious set of insights as a vain attempt to cloak their instrumentalism, and to
reconcile the tensions or contradictions that could be argued to exist between the
'artists' desire to make expressive 'art objects' and the companies' desire to make
effective commodities. In the literature on PMS, this point has been articulated most
recently by Stratton (1982a). As Negus puts it,
Stratton .. interpreted (the) use of non-rational criteria as an evasive and
mystifying tactic. This he suggested was part of the way in which A&R staff
attempt to "reconcile the contradictions" that arise around art and commerce
under capitalism. Stratton described record companies as confronting a conflict
between "the aesthetic and capitalism" and argued that A&R staff attempt both
to resolve and evade this conflict via a "subjectivist appeal to intuition". (Negus,
1992, p. 51).
Negus needs to deny this in order to be able to counterpose his
identification of two, quite deliberate ideologies at work in the commodification
process. In so doing he indicates that he is neither bound to argue the 'value' of Rock,
(as was Frith) nor deny pop value (as did Adorno). Despite this, and without wanting
to pursue the tangential demands of the 'Art versus Commerce' debate, it is still the
case that, however 'pro-active', intermediaries are not creators. Despite their
'contributions' in the commodification process, they are never initiators - there is a
tension they need to reconcile and it is one of legitimacy. The power of
intermediaries is apparent, however they try to mask it. What is at issue in their
relationship with acts is where that power is derived from, artistically (especially
when it is clear to everyone involved that the primary root of their power is
budgetary).
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Negus shows how the work of A&R personnel is three-phased: they sign
new acts, they 'introduce' them to the company, and they make records with them.
Superficially, it would seem that this is the entirety of the record industry process;
and, perhaps, at an earlier time it was, but as Negus rightly indicates, this is no longer
that 'earlier time'; the upheavals of the 1980's have brought with them the new
demands of 'media synergy' and the 'total star text'. Under these conditions, there is
no longer a single pop music market to be fed, but many markets to be created. While
A&R carry on in the 'old way' they come increasingly into conflict with the changed
realities facing the marketing departments in the media-rich and media-hungry
conditions of globalisation. Because they insist on older conceptions of what makes
an artist likely to enjoy a sustained career, they tend not so much to emphasise the
'wrong' qualities in their signing decisions but to attribute them inappropriately
(companies and acts want a long, productive life, A&R is too restrictive in its
conception of what makes that 'life'):
..potential artists are classified in terms of two clusters of distinctions. I shall
refer to these as the 'organic' and the 'synthetic' ideology of creativity. The
organic ideology of creativity is a naturalistic approach to artlsts... The seeds of
success are within the band. It is the record company's job to encourage and
direct; to 'nurture' this act. (Negus, 1992, pp. 54-55).
Although he does not follow this example through (despite his citation of
her as a 'total star text') Madonna is hardly a Rock act but she has proved vastly
popular and has sustained her career over a ten-year period. In the terms of Rock
ideology, Madonna would be a 'synthetic' pop act, good for a few 'hit' singles but
unlikely to display the durability of quintessentially 'Rock' acts like the Rolling
Stones, Bruce Springsteen, Pink Floyd, Dire Straits, U2 or R.E.M. While A&R
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continue to privilege 'organic' Rock values' over 'synthetic' pop ones, they will, Negus
argues, continue to come into conflict with the Marketing departments of the major
companies who are receptive to any artist who reaches them from any quarter and
who possess the kinds of combinable elements (music, image, and a 'story') that
might be translated, through apposite and sustained marketing campaigns, into the
mass selling acts that companies depend on for their existence. Because he can
identify these radically different conceptions and projects through interviews with
record industry personnel, Negus feels justified in breaking with the earlier, Rock-
based conceptions of ideologies of working practices that derive from the antinomies
of 'Art versus Commerce' that Stratton argues.
Taken together, and when contrasted as starkly as they are above - where
the 'demographic' of the A&R department with its related ideology of an unshakeable
commitment to the 'organic' over the 'synthetic contrasts sharply with the seemingly
more dynamic and contemporary instincts of Marketing, the likelihood that there will
be conflict between people who hold such unrelated views of what a common
business occupation should be about, is readily apparent. But Negus doesn't 'hold' his
remarks here; he can't because recordmaking is, after a)), a 'common business
project' and A&R and Marketing people have to, and do, work together. As he
struggles to account for this, for the evident fact that, however conflictual the beliefs
and practices of A&R and Marketing may be, these departments continue to
collaborate with each other and with pop 'artists' to make hit records, some of the
further weaknesses of Negus's case begin to become apparent.
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3. 'Artist Development' and its Contradictions.
Negus concentrates on the relationship between A&R and Marketing
almost to the exclusion of all else in the Music Industry. As he argues,
The relationship between artist and repertoire and marketing is at the core of the
music business. The work of these departments and the relationship between
them decisively shapes the way in which the sounds and images of pop are put
together. It is the meeting point of a number of tensions which can be found
refracted throughout the industry, and represents a wider set of orientations and
practices than formal departmental categories imply. (Negus, 1992, p.63)
This seems to me to miss the point that what is at the 'core of the music business' is at
least as much 'music' as it is 'business'. Frith shows convincingly that people take
pleasure in music and, because they do, an industry that delivers musical products to
them has developed to satisfy this enjoyment. Once established, we can examine the
relationship between industry and audience or market from avariety ofperspectives -
as Adorno does (creativity is corrupted by industrialisation); as Hirsch does (this
industrial method is wasteful); as Frith does (industrial control over production is
problematised by the uses made of their products by consumers); and as Negus does
(the industrial process is not plain-sailing, efficiency is marred by conflict). Negus's
case is not invalid because it does not consider the experience of musicians, but the
virtual absence of musicians from the account makes it less than definitive. He can
'safely' leave them out because the power of the industry, and these departments in
particular, is so impressive. Instructively, though, he represents that power in a
benign and muted way.
When discussing how A&R personnel view their role, Negus uses the
term to 'nurture' to describe what it is that record companies do with 'artists'. This is
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consistent with the ideological belief in the 'organic' nature of their role described
above, but because they cannot always conflict, and must (and do) work together,
Negus subtly shifts 'nurturing' to describe the entirety of commodification. He
achieves this by replacing 'nurturing' with 'artist development' at a key stage in his
argument; at that stage when he has to 'put back together' what he has treated
separately (and conflictually) - the combinatorial and collaborative procedures of
A&R and Marketing. This continual shifting between conflict and 'caring', rather than
necessarily reflecting real tensions in the record industry, causes very specific
tensions within his own analysis.
The term 'nurturing' is first used in the very first paragraph of his study
when he quotes an 'interim report to shareholders' issued by the Polygram group in
which Alan Levy, president of Polygram, observed that 'it is the initial discovery and
subsequent nurturing of the artists which is the critical phase'. As Negus writes,
In this book I am taking the "critical phase" which Levy identifies - the discovery
and development of recording artists - as my central theme, and using it as an
organising principle to provide a more general account of the recording industry
and production of pop music.(Negus, 1992, p. vi).
In a sense, and despite the earlier criticisms, the relationship between A&R and
Marketing is 'the core of the music industry' because between them, these two
departments bring acts into the commodification process and usher them through
whatever it takes to transform them and their compositions into saleable
commodities. Even so, there are numerous problems associated with Negus's address
to, and identification of, the 'critical phase' of artist development which, in the
context of comments already made, can be identified as follows:
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(a). Negus's use of the term 'recording industry' fluctuates throughout the
study. As previous remarks have indicated, he never draws a distinction between
record companies and other music industry agencies. This introduces a confusion to
the text that runs throughout its length. For Negus, it is only A&R and Marketing that
count, despite his important recognition that there is a 'web' of relationships that
connect acts with those departments that stretches to the furthest corners of music
industry activity. The problem here is that the only intermediaries identified as of any
importance by Negus are these specific personnel. When he comes, very briefly to
consider other, significant intermediaries - most pertinently managers - his attention
to the role they play in the early preparation of acts for the commodification process
that A&R and Marketing conduct is, at best, superficial. What, for example, are we to
make of the following remarks?
Many unsigned acts who approach record companies have a manager who is
little more than an enthusiastic, hustling friend. In such a case the manager is
often learning how the industry operates at the same time as the artists. One
partner in a management company who had achieved commercial success with a
number of artists could look back and with a smile reflect on some "horrendous
mistakes" that he had made on the way. Others however, may not recover from a
lack of knowledge or errors of judgement. In the following chapters it will
become clear that there are many points at which errors of judgement can be
made. (Negus, 1992, p. 42).
As the notes on Frith should have made clear, acts depend on intermediaries to
progress their career, but once dependencies have been established, the trajectory of
that career is a function of the quality of the initial dependencies so formed. It is all
very well for a successful manager to reflect 'with a smile' on his 'horrendous
mistakes' but who bore the brunt of those mistakes, and would they reflect with
similar affection on careers, and probably lives, that were ruined as this particular
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manager grew from an 'enthusiastic, hustling friend' into a contemporary man of
stature? Put differently, if 'cultural intermediaries' 'contribute to the sounds and
images of pop', then Negus needs to allow not only that an act will be likely to have
been working with intermediaries for a lengthy period before signing to a major
record company, but that an act will have a more intimate relationship with some
intermediaries than with others.
(b). Negus only returns to the term 'artist development' after much of his
analysis of A&R has been detailed. Instructively, he re-introduces the cancep^ aver,
first, showing how conflictual relations between A&R and Marketing have become.
Further, he takes the concept from its application in the US recording industry - an
industry whose activities are made more complex by the complexities of attempting
to co-ordinate sales campaigns, simultaneously, across a sub-continent. He records
this observation made in an interview with a'vice president of artist development at a
North American label',
We used to be called product managers. That used to be our exact title. Our new
president thinks that's an insensitive title, and I agree We are directors of artist
development. We're here to develop the artist's careers and sales potential. That's
why we've changed our titles, we're a little bit more sensitive. Product is kind of
distant, it's almost too cold. (Negus, 1992, p. 63)
Again, there is much that is glossed in this innocuous sounding series of
observations. Negus, after showing how distinct are the ideological conceptions of
their respective roles held by A&R and by Marketing, now seeks to unite what they
do as 'artist development'; but this quote (the only one that indicates why the term has
gained purchase) does his argument a disservice. It does this in the way that it reveals
how cosmetic the change in title is - nothing has changed materially in how the
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intermediaries perform their tasks or conceive their roles, instead, only their title has
changed not only to make those tasks and roles seem less 'cold' but, in fact, to
'sanitise' what intermediaries do. The fact that 'a vice president of artist development'
can make these observations returns us to Stratton's conception of the intermediary
attempting to conceal the tension between 'art' and 'commerce' by 'equalising' the
roles of acts and intermediaries within the commodification process. In this instance,
the intermediary legitimates his or her power in the transformation process by now
being able to 'reassure' an artist that any decisions they may take are reasonable
because they, too, are 'artists' of a kind.
The problem here, as elsewhere, is that Negus seems content not just to
allow staff to speak for themselves but to define what goes on in the
commodification process. In the absence of any account of 'how it was for them' from
pop acts who have undergone this process (and most of them fail to be transformed
into successful commodities) we are again left to ask, if these intermediaries are so
effective, why is it that they produce so many failed commodities? The very concept
of 'nurturing' needs to be confronted. `Nurturing' is benign, it is what parents and
carers do. As such, its use tends to put acts in the subordinate and dependent position
of children, new-born children. This characterisation has its strengths. Acts are raw
innocents when it comes to selling massive quantities of records of their
compositions. But throughout his analysis, the 'authoritarianism' of the 'parental'
record company comes through time after time. This is particularly evident in
Negus's account of recording.
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4. Making Recordings.
If 'nurturing' suggests 'care and attention', it also conveys a timeless,
unhurried quality - an extremely inapt term to use where record-making is concerned.
Further, 'Artist Development' has the same air of empathy and good-will about it, at
least superficially, but, if we disturb this appearance of calm and begin to question
the term more robustly then we are forced to ask at what point the intimacy it
suggests becomes intrusion; when 'mutuality' or 'collaboration' is initiated, on whose
terms is 'mutuality' defined; what aspects of an 'artist's' creativity are available for
collaborative effort, and what are not? Again, these are issues of power. In his
presentation of the actual business of recording sounds, Negus first presents this as
'the most explicitly collaborative process in the recording industry' (p. 80) but then
switches, two sentences later, to this version of the same event:
It is in the process of visual and musical production where artists and various
recording industry personnel experience some of the greatest autonomy and
liberty. It is in these areas where the control of entertainment corporations is
often restricted to a semi-detached monitoring operation. Limits are imposed by
imposing budget restrictions and retroactively modifying, mixing and editing the
songs and videos which have been produced. (Negus, 1992, p. 80).
There is great confusion here. The 'artist developers' seem to hover
outside the studio(s) while the 'artists' weave their magic within; but those outside
'hover' with the knowledge that they own what will emerge from the studio and that
their ownership will allow them to 'retroactively' modify, mix and edit the 'finished'
article into a form that they approve of. They can also call a halt whenever they want
to because they hold the purse strings. In these, vital, senses, the use of the terms
'mutuality' and 'collaboration' not only mask, they misrepresent how power is
143
distributed in record-making. Negus acknowledges as much (see below), but he does
not absorb the full implications of his acknowledgement of a process that is not one
of the calmly collaborative contemplation of artistic development but of time- and
budget-pressured commodification. As Negus notes,
..whether by design or default the final musical recording which appears on an
album will have had contributions from artist and repertoire staff, producers,
engineers, musicians and mixers, and will often have been composed in an ad-
hoc way with considerable trial and error, experimentation and modification in
the process. (Negus, 1992, pp. 92-93)
This is a radical statement when we contrast this conception of
'composition' with almost any conception of the same process presented in the work
of Musicologists and it also marks a considerable move away from the conception of
the 'Rock artist'; but this still has its deficiencies, not least that Negus uses this
conclusion as evidence of the 'artist development' phase in action without conceding
that the actions of intermediaries are, or at least, can be, intrusive and that no definite
limits to the scope of their intrusion are allowed for in any definition of their
relationship with pop acts.
Negus is torn between two recognitions: that the commodification of
popular music is collaborative and, simultaneously, that it is prone to conflict. It
would be unfair to observe that this observation is unexceptional because no
researcher in PMS has so far made this case. Even so, because Negus's approach to
his research was to concentrate his efforts on interviewing high-ranking record
industry personnel he allows them to set the agenda. On this basis, and quite
naturally, they want to legitimise what they do, they want to present their activities in
the most favourable light, and this Negus allows them to do; but in the absence of an
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account of the experiences of 'artists' or pop acts what we are confronted with is one
side of a continuously conflictual relationship left to stand for the whole of that
relationship. It is for this reason that Negus presents relations within the various
stages of the commodification process so blandly, and 'discovers' conflict only when
'the rules' are not followed; we recognise 'conflict' as almost a state of permanent
exceptionality - to the extent that his discussion of how conflict between acts and
intermediaries affects the former's chances of success occupies little over a page
towards the very end of his analysis and the only extended analysis of the market-
failure of acts comes in the form of extreme examples: 'the politics of releasing crap',
an interesting aside on 'political signings' (releasing records by acts that no-one has
confidence in to appease other, related and powerful, acts or managers)
Despite the relative paucity of analysis (and with no examples beyond the
last one above), Negus discusses the connection between conflict and market-failure
through the startling revelation that if acts fail to do what intermediaries want them to
do, the latter become 'demotivated'. As a consequence of 'demotivation', the artist
development stage of commodification is completed unsuccessfully and failure in the
market-place is the result. This recognition of the almost absolute power of
intermediaries over the fates of pop acts is of vital importance in understanding how
pop acts experience the commodification process, but because he listens only to the
intermediary's presentation of why they might become 'demotivated' he fails to
respond to his 'discovery' (as the limited discussion of the relationship testifies). He
fails to register 'demotivation' as a powerful 'weapon' in the 'armoury' of the
intermediary in the maintenance of control over commodification (ensuring
'standardisation' and inflecting it with a personalised conception of the process).
Instead, each aspect of commodification is presented as a fairly unproblematic stage
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in an ordered sequence (except when the contrasting definitions of that process
within the company are engaged). But, because this is never unproblematic and is
shaped by the play of contending forces not just within the company but between the
company, acts, and their managers, there are power struggles at work and these create
contradictions both in reality and in Negus's analysis. They can be identified in the
following ways:
(a). Who are the 'various recording industry personnel' that enjoy
'autonomy' and 'liberty' with 'artists' in the process of .. musical production'? Negus
identifies these as 'producers, engineers .. and mixers'. Without wanting to quote his
entire section on producers (and ignoring engineers, although the 'sound' of recorded
music really is down to their skill), it is fair to say that an act is unlikely to be given a
free hand in the selection of a producer and a studio (that is if we accept that they
want a producer in the first place). Further, it is not only the company that might have
its views on who the 'right' producer for the band may be, the act's manager will have
his or her opinion and the act will need to deal with the combination of pressures that
comes from both these sources. Whatever happens, a compromise is the most likely
outcome; and a compromise is always shaped by the relative power of the contending
parties. What this means is that 'artists' rarely record on their own terms.
(b). Once chosen, who does the producer represent - the interests of the
act; the interests of the company; or the interests of his or her own career? Again,
where is the 'autonomy' and the 'liberty' of an act under these conditions? Even if they
have won every argument thus far, they must still work with someone whose loyalties
are, at best, divided; and they must answer for the results of a collaboration that, if
they had been allowed to decide their own destinies, might not have arisen in the first
place. To add 'mixers' to the equation is, then, misguided. By his own argument,
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'mixers' (or, realistically, 're-mixers') are brought in by companies to alter the sound
presented to them by the act, the producer and the manager. (This, of course, is truer
of Rock acts than dance acts; and of Britain rather than the USA). The act then stands
or falls by a sound that it may not agree with or even like.
(c). Whatever the loyalties of the producer and the morale of the act after
conflicts over issues of production and recording have been resolved, what
compromises the 'autonomy' and 'liberty' of the act to the point, arguably, of their
non-existence, are the crucial, contextual conditions of budget, time-scale and
contractual 'final say'. Negus draws our attention to two of these conditions (but
makes almost nothing of them); I would argue that they help define the entire -fieid of
relations between pop acts and intermediaries and are impossible to ignore in any
account of popular music-making. Again, acts stand or fall by commodified versions
of their work, where these 'versions' will have been produced under conditions that,
at the very least, will not entirely been of their choosing. This recognition needs to be
factored into any account of popular music-making. By concentrating only on record
company personnel, Negus misses the conflict and tensions that lie at the heart of the
commodification process in a work that concerns itselfwith conflict and tension.
5. Contracts, Budgets and Prioritisation.
When discussing the relations between the A&R department and an act
recording its album Negus gives a quite contradictory account of the decision making
process that culminates in the finished work. He depicts the role of the A&R
representative, perhaps more explicitly than anyone so far in PMS, as one of
working,
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with a newly-signed act in transforming .. music into a commodity form suitable
for reproduction on discs and tapes and broadcasting across various media.
(Negus, 1992, p. 80).
He then identifies the two extremes in the performance of this role as either 'casual'
or 'interventionist' and 'autocratic' in order to present the majority as working
'between these extremes'. As Negus puts it,
Most A&R staff favour a facilitator role, acting as a catalyst by offering
encouragement and criticism, and linking the act with various parties who may
be able to assist in their musical development. (Negus, 1992, p. 80)
To illustrate this he quotes one A&R director who compares the role with that of a
'football manager', as someone who recognises talent and knows how to help 'develop
and bring it out'. Again, the role is represented reasonably, as benign and almost
avuncular - this football manager is an old school, unruffled and genial Joe Mercer,
not a driven and anxious character constantly checking results and looking over his
or her shoulder for the threat of redundancy. And yet the parallel between the record
industry and football management is not as prosaic as it might first appear. Perhaps
more than any other economic sector, the 'development' staff (to briefly concede
Negus's term) are more vulnerable than comparable staff in other commodity
producing industries for the reason that the commodities they produce stand or fall as
'successes' within a week of their launch. Most commodity manufacturers prepare the
marketing launch of a new product for a considerable period in advance, and they
employ market researchers at every stage of design and planning to go on checking
that a market will exist once production has been initiated. Even where other media
industries are concerned, the 'Daily Mirror' or 'Eastenders' does not have to prove
itself anew with each printing or broadcast, but every release, even by an established
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artist, is subject to enormous competition and the relevant company will make
judgements about its likely success or failure in little more time than it takes in the
case of new acts.
A&R and Marketing staff combine to commodify the music and
appearance of acts that, certainly at one time, would have been the choice of A&R
working alone. Negus makes a strong case for the arrival of acts at record companies
by routes other than those of A&R 'scouting', but A&R still have the job of
negotiating an act's progress through the cominod2ficatlon process. SuperFiclally, at
least, everyone involved in the process is committed to the notion that, this , of any,
signed act will sell large quantities of records. Negus builds a convincing case for the
justice of this observation. In turn, it forms much of his case against 'overproduction'
as a strategy (commodification costs too much, personnel are professionals not 'mud
slingers'). Even so, we know that it is impossible for every release by every company
to make the charts (there simply aren't the places) and, as most people buy records
that are already in the charts, a chart placing as soon as possible after release is vital
for the life of a record release. If a development team goes on failing to achieve chart
positions for their acts then their jobs are at risk. Given the number of commodities
that they release each week, it is unlikely that staff will draw up a new and innovative
marketing and promotional strategy for every item. This means, in turn, that, at the
very least, development teams, if they are successful, will attempt to systematise the
commodification process in order to sustain success; if unsuccessful, existing staff
will imitate the routines of others and will also adapt to the methods of incoming
staff who will bring with them the practices that have made their reputation. There is
then a curious and extreme dichotomy between the need to initiate and the need to
conserve at play within record companies; and always under extreme pressure. One
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'coping strategy' of this highly-pressured and dichotomised environment is not so
much to 'over produce', rather it is to 'over sign' - to initiate the commodification of a
number of commodities but to choose to concentrate marketing and promotional
resources on only a proportion of these on the basis of 'intelligence' garnered from the
market place. Here is not the place to discuss the methods of generation and the
quality of this 'intelligence' but that it's application guides decision making inside
record companies is recognised by Negus when he discusses the need for record
companies to prioritise their resources.
The point was made in the first chapter that record coYnpanies wffl fiave
many acts signed at the same time and that there wiii always be an inequaifty of
attention between acts because of the need to address the needs of acts who will be at
different stages of the recording and release process. If urgent situations arise, or a
'bottle-neck' occurs, then attention and resources are likely to be concentrated where,
in the company's opinion, they are needed most. Newly-signed acts might imagine a
consistency of attention from a record company (the 'nurturing' process) but the
reality may be far removed from this, and not only in exceptional circumstances.
A&R staff are particularly compromised by this because they act as 'intermediaries'
between the act and the company, they are, therefore aware of company decisions
with regard to prioritisation, they will even collaborate in them. This means that they
may be forced to work on projects that, if they are not already 'dead', are certainly
mortally sick because resources have been earmarked for other acts or because of
hostility or indifference from other sectors. Negus indicates much of this but fails to
display that the act is very unlikely to be made aware of these decisions, either by
A&R or manager (who would want to pass this information on?) and continues,
throughout his argument, to give the impression that somehow all this decision
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making is transparent and that acts are party to it all. But if acts were party to such
information then it is reasonable to suggest that they might fight these decisions, or
change their practices with regard to the company.
It is because they are 'commodities' that acts are not informed on decisions
of commodification, despite their need to assist in that process. What this means for
pop acts (and particularly for new signings) is that they are always reacting to
decisions that have been taken without their knowledge; they work, at best, on
incomplete understanding of what it is they are involved in. Their 'power' resides
only in the expectations that others have of them; once these are destroyed in some
way, the 'autonomy' that Negus attributes to them is quick to evaporate. It can
evaporate because a recording contract is exactly that, a contract to record, not to
release, market and promote. Negus shows that the contract establishes the
company's ownership of the product and he exemplifies what 'ownership' can mean
for a record when he discusses the likely reception of a record by a company -
Once the sessions in the studio are complete copies of a final mix will be
submitted to the record company. At this point there can be three possible
responses to what has been recorded. (Negus, 1992, p.91)
In enumerating these 'responses' Negus argues that the record company's
outright rejection of a record will be rare but that 'the most common response' is that
'certain changes are needed' and that 'these changes often involve minor
modifications and re-mixing'. As we have already noted, what passes him by is the
contradiction between his representation of the need for A&R to practice 'covert
surveillance' 'at the door' of the recording studio (behind which 'artists and producers
.. enjoy a large degree of liberty') and the company's total power over what is
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accepted as a record and over what is released and how it is promoted. Rather than
present the anxieties of A&R staff as continuous with his belief in their 'nurturing'
approach to record-making (the anxious father pacing outside the delivery room)
Negus would have done better to locate recording more firmly within
commodification - where 'covert surveillance' by A&R is a function of their need to
ensure that budgetary and time limits are adhered to. Again, Negus draws our
attention to these limits on the activities of 'artists' ('Limits are set by imposing
budget restrictions') but he doesn't factor them into the experience of acts under the
new and decisive pressures of making records for major labels.
Record-making, release and promotion can be likened to take-off and
landing schedules at international airports. A time-slot is identified for departure, the
necessary maintenance and boarding procedures are initiated and, once completed,
the air-craft is cleared for take-off. If, for whatever reason, there are delays which
prevent take-off then the aircraft must wait until another 'window' arises - and
departure delays can sour the mood of passengers and crew alike as well as make for
disruptions in schedules at the 'other end'. Where this analogy breaks down is that
complete cancellation (the withdrawal of service) is almost unheard of in the world
of air-travel, passengers know that, eventually, they will arrive at their destination.
Pop acts can't enjoy this security. 'Prioritisation', reinforced as this is by the right of
disposal over recorded products guaranteed by the legal ownership of the product,
ensures that the careers of pop acts may not only be subject to delay, they can be
cancelled with no redress. Negus discusses disruptions to the expected and
anticipated release or records in his conclusions but, as previous remarks have
indicated, he tends to treat these disruptions as comparatively rare and exceptional -
'failure', then, is re-located to failure in the market-place, which Negus doesn't
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discuss. Yet, one of the main components of his case is the reverse of this, that
markets (and, thereby, consumers) are 'made in the process of artist development'. If
only one in eight acts succeed then failure is not exceptional, it is overwhelmingly the
primary product of the record industry. Further, by this logic, failure is an outcome of
production rather than consumption and it can be traced to the phase of 'artist
development'. The final twist is, then, because intermediaries make acts responsible
for their own fates - in the sense that, unless they comply with the demands made of
them, acts can 'demotivate' intermediaries - acts, largely powerless though they are,
can be represented as the authors of their own downfall.
Conclusion.
Negus's analysis takes us directly inside the offices of record companies
and concentrates our attention on two, key departments within the record company -
A&R and Marketing. His work is to be praised for this and for offering such a
comprehensive account of changes to, and within, record companies since the mid-
1980's. For all this, several important flaws have been to argued to exist both in his
analysis and in his approach to his field: most notably, for the purposes of this study,
that Negus at once identifies the huge failure rate amongst signed acts, but then fails
to explain either why this failure rate should have come to exist or, truly, why it
persists - especially when he argues against 'overproduction' as defining feature of
record industry practice, and for the 'developmental' competence of the staff he
interviews. In some ways, then, despite the much narrower focus of his work, Negus
tends, as did Frith before him, to raise as many questions about record-making as he
answers. Before we can ask some of those unanswered questions here, we need to be
clearer about the method of their asking.
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Chapter Five rs
Further Questions of Method.
Introduction.
Popular music is big business, it is also culturally pervasive, yet we
continue to know comparatively little about how it is made. This study is organised
around the search for an answer to a single question - why do so many pop acts
signed to major record labels fall to make records that become hits? Pop fans very
often pride themselves on their knowledge of pop music - the pub 'pop quiz' has
become a staple of popular culture - but when we begin to look for hard information
on why so many acts come and go we are immediately faced with the fact that there
are very few sources on the realities of how acts are signed and records made. For
example, the music press exists as little more than a consumer guide to new releases,
but even the 'specialist', trade press fails to offers much more than puff pieces on
company 'progress' and inadequate statistical compilations of company performance.
So far, in the determination to understand why 'less than one percent of
acts' (Cohen) is signed by record companies and, then, why seven out of eight of
them fail to make money (Negus) we have sought answers in the main, academic
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studies of the music industry even though it was clear at the outset that these would
be found wanting - given that, in part, this study is motivated by the fact that these
works recognise the profligacy of the music industry without ever explaining it in any
detailed way. Even so, each study, in its way, addresses the fact that popular music is
the result of the combination of musical creativity and industrial capital and, to this
extent at least, draws our attention to the process of the production of popular music
as a likely place to research the roots of the failure to make successful commodities.
Of the theorists so far considered, only Negus explores the actual
practices of record companies. Of the others, Adorno pours scorn on them, Hirsch
abstracts them to the point of sterility, and Frith, while making numerous important
connections between capital, musicians and consumers, tends to treat those important
relationships comparatively sketchily. Negus's work stands almost alone in
identifying who does what, and why, inside a record company but, in the previous
chapter, his work was extensively criticised. It was criticised mainly because, in the
absence of an account of the place and experience (or range of potential experiences)
of pop acts in the commodification process, his portrayal of record company practices
can be argued to be dangerously one-sided. This acknowledged, it would be foolish
to be dismissive of Negus's work; record companies work with pop acts to make pop
records and we cannot hope to identify why so many pop acts fail, and fail in the
production process rather than in some 'fair-fight' in the market-place, without having
an overview of record company practices. Negus offers this overview and his work
will remain a point of reference in the attempt to make a more specific identification
of a method of inquiry into the experience of failed major signings. As an aid to the
development of such a specification, it would be useful to summarise what has been
learned of record-making from the literature so far considered.
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1. Hirsch, Frith and Negus all portray record company personnel as 'pro-
active' and Negus even argues that these 'cultural intermediaries' 'contribute to the
sounds and images of pop', but not one of the three truly addresses the logic of this
mediational 'pro-activity' - which can be reduced to the core recognition that
commodification is a transformative process. Whether they add to, subtract, or even
detract, from the pop act's raw material, intermediaries change it in some way.
Whether it is these 'changes' that lead to failure, or the ways that change is brought
about, is a matter for inquiry, here we need to recognise that commodification is
intrinsic to popular music and that process impacts on product.
2. The issues of who, exactly, the intermediaries are that work with pop
acts, and, also, how they work, featured significantly in the preceding exploration of
the work of Hirsch, Frith and Negus. All three theorists were criticised for their
treatment of the roles, practices and motivations of intermediaries - but for very
different reasons in each case. Again Hirsch's portrayal of the role of record company
personnel was seen as schematic at the very best, even so, we still gain from his
portrayal a sense of intermediary 'pro-activity'. Frith's portrayal improves on that of
Hirsch, but only just: Frith was criticised for raising far more questions about the
roles and practices of intermediaries than he answers. In a sense, the same criticism is
made of Negus, despite his determination that we should appreciate just how central
intermediaries are to the commodification process. If we consider what is common to
the criticisms made of these three writers then what emerges is the consistent
complaint that all three are too general in their comments because each effectively
ignores the fact that intermediaries work with pop acts and that to treat the activities
of intermediaries in isolation distorts the understanding of their role and methods so
created. We can break this criticism down into three constituent parts:
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(a). Not all intermediary figures that pop acts connect with are employed
by record companies, yet all intermediaries will argue their necessity on the basis of a
claim to understand how best to realise the act and its material as a successful
commodity. Acts need intermediaries but they have no immediate method by which
they can verify the expertise of those intermediaries or effectively monitor their
activities - acts are disempowered in their dealings with intermediaries, whoever they
are.
(b). All intermediaries develop working practices and they develop
methods of organising tasks and of justifying their methods of organisation. Negus
uses the expression 'habits of action' or 'orienting practices' to express this. I prefer to
describe the combination of what intermediaries do, and how they justify what they
do, as a 'culture of practice'. Observations in the first chapter referred to the
distinctiveness of record-making as cultural production in terms of the need to
progress matters through discussions that are imprecise and esoteric - all parties to
commodification must discuss sound and its potential and all such verbalisations are
both approximate (what does 'funky' really mean, for instance?) and speculative (no-
one can read the future so how does anyone truly know what a hit sound, or a hit act,
is?). In record-making there can be no reference to blue-prints, to measurements or to
colour charts as there can be, for example, in car manufacture - but neither can
participants refer to, and change, scripts or camera angles. On this basis, conflict is
endemic, not only for the reasons outlined in chapters one and four but because the
'culture of practice' of music industry intermediaries is an 'aggressive' one in that they
must always assert their necessity and their expertise as the basis on which they guide
acts through commodification; and assert, also, their 'right' to make creative decisions
within commodification. Further, they constantly 'gamble' with their reputations
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through the success or failure of the acts they work with. This can only contribute to
tension and supply kindling for conflict.
(c). Because they are 'pro-active', intermediaries will affect how acts
perceive other intermediary figures and agencies. Further, intermediaries tend to
negotiate with each other in the name ofacts and their material. In this way, Pop acts
are not party to all the decisions taken in their name. In a sense, then, acts are doubly-
disempowered - not only can they not defend their own 'sphere of competence'
(because they need to admit intermediaries to it), they cannot ever fully know what
intermediaries have decided in their name because they must rely on exactly those
people who have taken the decisions to report back to them.
3. Negus is the only one of the theorists considered so far to identify
conflict as a constituent feature of commodification. This is an important recognition
and some of the sources of that conflict have been referred to above. Again, it was
argued in the previous chapter that Negus's treatment of conflict is, ultimately, under-
developed but it is still the case that he connects conflict inside commodification to
the eventual failure of commodities. In pursuing this insight in the experience of pop
acts we will need to find out whether acts that fail experience more conflict than acts
that succeed or whether some acts have less resistance to conflict than do others.
At base, this study is informed by a combination of observations from
Frith and from Negus. Frith argues that 'records are the result of complex formal
organisations' and Negus argues that 'greater attention needs to be paid to the day-to-
day work of people in the industry itself. I indicated that Frith under-estimated the
complexity of the 'organisations' that make pop music and I hope to clarify this,
below; here I would endorse the remainder of Negus's observation:
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..it is here where tensions between artists, consumers and corporations are
mediated and find expression in a range of working practices, ideological
divisions and conflicts. And, it is these which decisively shape the sounds and
visions of contemporary pop music. (Negus, 1992, p.154)
Paths to a Method.
The point was made in the first chapter that all inquiries are driven by
methodological assumptions, whether stated or unstated. Some preliminary
observations were made there about the nature of this inquiry - that it is sociological
9
in character and that its preferred methodology is, broadly, qualitative in kind, but
what was also indicated was my belief that the adoption of any qualitative
methodology on my part is problematised by my having prior experience of what I
propose to study. Before examining this specific question of method in any greater
detail, the further point needs to be made that a methodological bias is apparent
throughout the preceding analysis of studies of record-making; this should be
conveyed by the choice of quotes from Frith and Negus that ends the preceding
section.
In endorsing Negus's determination to study the 'day-to-day work of
people in the industry', and after roundly criticising him for paying incomplete and
insufficient attention to those activities, it is apparent that I have implicitly endorsed
an interactionist perspective; more than this, I am concerned with how interactions,
within organisations, produce those organisations. Before considering this somewhat
cryptic claim any further it is worth examining some of the methodological problems
associated with this chosen field of inquiry.
As remarks in the first chapter argued, to ask a question and to
contextualise that 'asking' is to mobilise unstated assumptions through unexplicated
methodological practices. Simply to choose a research topic is to have already
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decided that the topic is interesting and that its study will be of value. No research
topic 'drops out of the sky', researchers elect to study a topic because they already
know something of the field and have located 'gaps' in existing research, anomalies in
existing arguments, or are driven to develop new analyses because either new
information is available or they believe they know how to generate new data. In
introducing this topic, I have already tried to make explicit my 'prejudices' or at least
acknowledge that I may have prejudged issues because ofmy experience ofmaking
pop records. Even so, it was the need I felt to research that experience that caused
this study to be mounted.
What brought experience and research together was that, when I became
aware that pop was now a legitimate area of interest in Higher Education and began
to read the existing literature, I could not recognise my own experience in that
literature. It seemed to me, therefore, that I had experienced a 'process' of making
records (I intuitively opted for that description, before the publication of Negus's P/P)
and that, while the existing literature on pop was very diverse, certain 'orthodoxies'
seemed present within it. Put crudely, musicological accounts of pop seemed entirely
unaware that what we hear as the work of a composer is the musical work after all
the pressures of the commodification process have been brought to bear on
composer(s) and the work; equally, various sociological accounts (but especially
Frith's S/R) seemed not to know how to connect outcomes (records) with process
(commodification) despite working from a recognition of the combination of the two.
My aim was to explore what I saw as a disjuncture between what I called,
'Process' and 'Orthodoxies'. I intended, initially, to study the very different
experiences of three signed acts: 'The Bible', 'Deacon Blue' and 'Meet Danny Wilson'.
All three acts had come to public attention at roughly the same time and they played a
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comparable style of music - the influence of the US act 'Steely Dan' was apparent in
the music of each act and Deacon Blue had taken their name from a Steely Dan song.
Further, I had access to one of these acts, The Bible. They, too, were managed by
Marcus Russell. I listened to their early material and discussed his proposal to
manage them; I attended some of their earliest gigs and I came to know the members
of the act reasonably well. At the time, of the three acts in question, The Bible were
likeliest to gain success (their single 'Graceland' wasa 'radio hit' but not yet a chart
entry). Meanwhile, Deacon Blue seemed to be attracting the least favourable press
attention of the three acts. Soon afterwards, and after signing a deal with Ensign
records that Russell described as 'mega-big', the making of the second Bible album
seemed to run into trouble. Producers came and went, band members left or were
sacked and the record was subject to very long delays. In the meantime, 'Meet Danny
Wilson' had a hit with 'Mary's Prayer', but neither followed this with another hit nor
managed to achieve a hit album. Deacon Blue, on the other hand, seemed the object
of a sustained and inventive marketing campaign and became one of the most
successful acts of the early-1990's. Ultimately, the second Bible album made no
impact on the charts and the band broke up during the preparation of its third album.
What caused me to change my research to the acts I will shortly introduce
was my increasing recognition that I could not set aside my own record-making
experience in the attempt to research the experience of others. Not only was my
access to at least one of the above acts a product of my position as a 'band member',
but my approach to the other two acts was 'allowed' by that status also - from a
familiarity with 'go-betweens' (I had access to CBS - Deacon Blue's label - because
the Managing Director of Arista had formerly been head of marketing there and he
could introduce me to staff; I could 'work on' access to Meet Danny Wilson by
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similar routes); to the legitimacy that the limited success that Latin Quarter had
achieved afforded me in discussions with other members of pop acts. I explore these
conditions below, here what is at issue is that I realised that what I would have been
taking to others was my own experience and what I really needed to do (and wanted
to do) was to 'piece together', and then theorise, that experience.
In broad terms, 'piecing together' the experience of a number of people
involved in the making, not just of objects but relationships, is the work of the
ethnographer. Once again, I 'imagined' that I was engaged in an ethnographic study
before I had come to consider what such studies demand and consist of. Over time, I
decided that, although connected with ethnography, much of what I was attempting
to do was not ethnographic, as such. Consequently, I have needed to 'search for a
method'. In this way, much of the early part of my research was not about answering
a question about popular music but of finding a way to ask a question. Even so, from
the beginning, I have remained mindful of the demands of ethnography, and of
'qualitative research' in general. Sara Cohen has argued the case for a greater
commitment to ethnography in PMS and has outlined its contours where researching
and explicating popular music-making is concerned. In 'Ethnography and popular
music studies' (1993) she makes an observation of considerable relevance to this
study and to the introductory remarks to this chapter in particular,
Whilst significant advances have been made in our understanding of issues
surrounding popular music production and consumption, it will be suggested that
particular emphases in popular music studies (e.g. upon music as commodity,
media, capital and technology), and a reliance upon theoretical models abstracted
from empirical data, and upon statistical, textual and journalistic sources, needs
to be balanced by a more ethnographic approach. Ideally, that approach should
focus upon social relationships, emphasising music as social practice and
process. It should also be comparative and holistic; historical and dialogical;
reflexive and policy-oriented. It should emphasise, among other things, the
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dynamic complexities of situations within which abstract concepts and models
are embedded, and which they often simplify and obscure. The social, cultural
and historical specificity of events, activities, relationships and discourses should
also be highlighted. (Cohen, 1993, p. 123).
Clearly, Cohen follows her own advice in Rock Music in Liverpool, the
book is informed by all of the considerations she outlines in her article. Further, it
contains a synopsis of the misfortunes of two signed acts, 'Just William' and 'The
Rhythm People' that encapsulates much of the approach of this study - by discussing
the reactions of the acts to the contracts they had signed and by indicating how
precarious was their status as signed acts (neither act made a hit record, neither
released an album). The major divergence between this study and the methods it
employs and Cohen's study and approach, is that hers was a 'text-book' exercise in
ethnography. As she describes it:
.. ethnography .. is the description and interpretation of a way of life (or
'culture'). It involves a micro-sociological focus upon beliefs, values, rituals and
general patterns of behaviour ... ideally (it) involves a lengthy period of intimate
study and residence with a particular group of people, knowledge of the spoken
language and the employment of a wide range of observational techniques,
including prolonged face-to-face contact with members of the local group, direct
participation in some of the group's activities, and a greater emphasis on
intensive work with informants than on the use of documentary and survey data.
Basic to the conduct of research, therefore, is the development of relationships
"in the field". (Cohen, 1993, p. 124)
Arguably this study seeks to fulfil many of the criteria Cohen is concerned
that PMS embrace. Music has been considered, thus far, as 'social practice and
process' and the 'dynamic complexities' and social, cultural and historical specificity
of events, activities, relationships and discourses' form an implied and often explicit
'touchstone' in the mounting of the research focus and in the critique of relevant
secondary texts. Similarly, it will come to involve 'a micro-sociological focus upon
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beliefs, values, rituals and general patterns of behaviour'. But, both in the choice of
the 'particular group(s)' to study and also in the method of study of those 'groups'
there can be no 'lengthy period of intimate study', nor can there be 'residence',
equally, there can be no 'prolonged face-to-face contact with members'. Again, I am
concerned to discover why signed acts fail to achieve success and I am searching the
production process (rather than making unresearchable cultural assumptions about
the consumption process) for clues to an understanding of what obstacles signed acts
experience in that process. Fundamentally, I am researching the experience of acts
'after the event', acts who have passed through the process; more than this, I am
researching my own experience of that process - neither of these procedures fulfils
the criteria identified, not only by Cohen, but within the general literature on
qualitative methodologies.
Cohen identifies a range of terms 'used to discuss research of an
ethnographic type': 'fieldwork', 'case study', 'micro-sociology', 'interpretive
procedure', 'symbolic interactionism', 'life or oral history', 'network analysis'. In a
sense, by asking people to recount their record-making experiences I am engaging in
the construction of 'life' or 'oral history'. In these exercises, I have to be aware of my
position as researcher and to make explicit my methods for generating data (making
contact, conducting interviews, and so on). When it comes to my own experience,
however, this procedure becomes more difficult; consequently, I believe it necessary
to establish how the criteria that 'validate' research and the data collected through it
are established in this case. Essentially, in all cases I am researching a process after
that process has been completed. This, in itself, is not unusual - all history is written
after the event - and perhaps I should concern myself with the methodologies of
'history' rather than ethnography as applied to popular music. The reasons I intend to
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remain with sociological and anthropological research methods and issues are, firstly,
that I am not working to or from statistical sources (beyond the recognition of the
high failure rate amongst signed acts); and, secondly, that qualitative methods are the
most suited to reveal, through micro-sociological procedures, how (as Cohen quotes)
institutions, social relationships, and economic practices .. are the subject of
multiple differentiated actualisations by individuals and groups within their
respective environment. (Greasier and Gibault, 1990, p. 389 in Cohen, 1993,
p.132).
What problematises this aim is the inclusion of information about myself
and my own experience of the 'actualisation' of the 'social relationships and economic
practices' of making pop music within the 'institution' of the record industry during
the 1980's. Before turning to consider this, I need first to consider why I should have
already made wider methodological assumptions about the centrality of the need to
consider record-making from the perspective that concentrates on interactions
between organisational actors and actors that enter organisational frameworks.
Organisations: Theories and Methods.
Reference has already been made in the first chapter to the bare 'facts' of my
membership of the pop act 'Latin Quarter' and to its history of making records. In the
'case histories' that follow (I choose this term rather than 'case studies' for reasons
explained below) I concentrate on the making of albums by the acts Respect and
Roadhouse. I then follow this with the case history of Latin Quarter's first album for a
major label, Mick and Caroline for Arista Records. Understandably, much of the
Latin Quarter case history deals with my part in the formation of Latin Quarter and I
do not want to pre-empt that discussion, here; even so, it is still necessary to record
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how disorienting was the experience of becoming involved in song-writing and then
with record-making.
I cannot cast my experience as typical because I do not know the
experiences of all those people who have made records but, from the moment my
involvement in music-making progressed to signing a deal with a major label and
making an album, I found the experience extremely demanding. The 'atmosphere'
was continuously intense, particularly with regard to meeting schedules. The analogy
of the major airport used in the previous chapter is central here: Latin Quarter had a
touring schedule fixed to promote Mick and Caroline. We all knew that the album
needed to be released to fit that schedule. At the same time, we knew that our
producer had his own future commitments and could not work with us beyond a
certain date and we also knew that Arista had albums by other acts waiting to be
released and promoted once ours had been 'cleared'. At the same time, we all needed
to complete the album in order to access the next recording and publishing advances
in order to have an income. Inside this extremely tense framework, relations between
the act and its manager, the manager and the record label and the record label and the
act were all conflictual for reasons that pivoted on, not just the sound that the act was
likely to emerge with from the studio, but also on estimations of the act's
contemporary and future 'market profile'.
One of the songs I wrote for the album was called 'Negotiating with a
loaded gun', where the theme of the song dealt with the experience of people who
face overwhelming odds. It occurred to me, in researching Latin Quarter, how much
this song expressed an unease I felt throughout the experience - but one that I stifled
and was buried under the sheer frenetic pace of making and releasing records. What
disturbed me most about the period at Arista was how alien the culture of the major
166
label was (we had been signed from a tiny independent label). I became aware very
quickly that, however friendly they attempted to be (in a peculiar and particular kind
of hyper-intense way), record company employees were like Janus, quite literally
'two-faced'. To us they had to show a face not just of caring and concern but also of
respect (we were 'the artists', after all); but to their superiors they had to give cold
appraisals of our current status and of their estimation of our future condition. In this,
respect for the artist was supplanted by calculation of the likely yield of the
commodity. I became aware also of how dependent we were on them, and on our
manager, Marcus Russell. This 'dependency' was made obvious by the fact that we
always seemed to be reacting to events rather than giving any progressive shape to
them - and also that there was so much to react to. At the same time, I felt the extent
to which my long-standing friendship with Russell was being undermined, not just by
the tensions that flowed from our dramatic re-positioning (him the manager, me 'the
managed') but from his evident immersion in, and seeming enjoyment of, this 'alien
culture'.
In Getting High: The Adventures of Oasis (1997), Paolo Hewitt reports
Russell's views on this period and on our relationship as friends. I will return to this
in the conclusions, but it was this process of emotional upheaval in a long-standing
friendship and my determination to analyse and understand it that led me to reflect, in
advance of this research, so closely on what was happening to, and in, Latin Quarter.
Again, what prompted this research was, in part, the fact that I did not find my
experience reflected in the literature on pop, but I have found that experience, if not
reflected, then clearly discernible, in studies of organisations. Organisational Theory
is the title given to what was once, broadly, industrial sociology. In this way, its roots
are almost as old as those of Sociology itself. Consequently, its development has
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tended to reflect general tendencies in the development of that parent discipline -
very loosely, broad Positivist and Anti-positivist disputes in the early century about
ontology, epistemology, methodology and methods (Durkheim and Weber); followed
by a lengthy period of dominance by Functionalism (Parsons); followed by the
creation of a comparative heterodoxy since the late-1960's (itself now challenged by
post-modernism).
The reason I raise the subject of Organisational Theory here is that I need
to make clear that I have not approached the construction of my case histories
through the lens of any branch of this theory - I did not take theory into the field, I
have found theory there. What I did take into the field was experience, and, through
reflection, what I learned was that, in order to make sense of that experience, I had
organised it in and through categories that are the 'stock-in-trade' of organisational
theorists - a concern with how organisational employees understand and practice their
jobs, a concern, therefore, with the relationship between 'structure' and 'action'; a
recognition that pop acts are organisations in their own right and a further recognition
that some form of alliance exists between organisations in record-making; a
commitment to the notion that commodities are shaped through the negotiation of a
shared understanding of the status of the commodity by all parties involved in
commodification (a staple of interpretive, interactionist, and social action theory);
and, finally, a belief that there is a differential access to 'resources' within the record-
making experience and that the power to define the acceptability or otherwise of a
finished commodity connects with access to, and deployment of, those resources.
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Proximity to 'The Field '.
Issues that relate to, and derive from, organisational theory must be
returned to in the concluding chapter, here I need to acknowledge that there must
inevitably be differences in the quality and quantity of data generated through the
case histories. In the Latin Quarter case, it is greater in both instances than it is in the
cases of Respect and Roadhouse. I tackle the issues raised by this difference below,
and in the two relevant chapters; but, from preceding remarks, it will be apparent
that, in general, the differences relate to the fact that I had far greater access, even
post hoc, to the individuals involved in making the Latin Quarter record than I did in
any other case. This raises a general methodological point - could any researcher
fulfil the goals of ethnographic research outlined by Cohen (goals with which I
entirely agree) where signed acts are concerned? As Cohen herself acknowledges, the
relationships she established with 'The Jactars' and 'Crikey its the Cromptons' were
made possible, in part, by how 'flattered' they felt by her 'attention'. Signed acts are
already in the position of being 'flattered' and access to them would be limited by a
host of, probably insurmountable, factors - how would a researcher tour with an act?
How likely would it be that a manager would allow such intimacy? Further, how
would a researcher access decision making surrounding the act when the act, itself, is
unlikely to enjoy such access? To an extent, Stokes surmounted some of these
problems in Star-Making Machinery (1976)but it would be unhelpful to divert to an
examination of his, insightful, text here; rather we need to recognise how this
particular study differs from Cohen's work. Rock Culture in Liverpool affords a
detailed 'glimpse' into the working practices (and the assumptions that informed
them) of two aspirant acts, this one is a study of a complete process, from beginning
to end. It differs, in this way, also from the work of Stokes, which made the study of
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the making of an album an end in itself rather than a guide to any larger issues. But,
whatever the validity of the recognition that we can only access explanations for
failure after it has occurred, this recognition, alone, does not legitimise my
researching my own experience.
If I had chosen to research in aspects of popular music away from a direct
exploration of how pop is made -'Frank Zappa and the Operatic Tradition', perhaps -
then my experience of making pop records would not be so problematic (although it
would still lead me to treat secondary resources with great care and to research
decisions about recording in ways different from much sociological and almost all
musicological practice). As it is, there is no single, fu1lyformed qualitative tradition
that allows someone to research his or her own experience as an intrinsic part of a
wider study. For example, Jacob (1987) identifies six 'traditions' in qualitative
research: Human Ethology, Ecological Psychology, Holistic Ethnography, Cognitive
Anthropology, the Ethnography of Communication, and Symbolic Interactionism.
Not one of these, in its entirety, allows me to undertake what I wish to undertake -
which is an evaluation of the combined processes of making a record that I have
helped to write and record as a contribution to a wider debate on the fortunes of pop
acts. Other writers offer different schema as their overview of the research methods
that can be collected under the heading of 'Qualitative Research'. For example
Burgess (1991) also indicates six non-quantitative traditions but he, confusingly,
refers to 'Qualitative Research' as an optional-descriptive rather than a generic
methodological term, one that he places alongside Ethnography, Fieldwork, Case
Study, Field Research and Interpretive Procedures.
The practice of identifying 'traditions' is a common feature of the 'how to
do qualitative research' texts, but whichever way I approached them I found that, not
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only did they offer me no assistance in my 'search for a method', they collectively
seemed to imply that I was automatically disbarred from conducting qualitative
research. They did this, despite often large-scale differences between other aspects of
the schema they presented (see below), by uniting to portray qualitative research as a
methodological 'journey' from the academy to the field. In the earliest phases of this
research, I internalised this and felt a tremendous compulsion to organise a similar
'journey' for myself and, in the process, lost what wasqunique about my own research
perspective; for, rather than pretend otherwise, as I have noted, my journey has been
from the field to the academy, and then back out. I will explore the more specific
aspects of the restrictions met in methodology texts and my attempt to transform
them below but, in general, we need to consider the special dilemma that the existing
'rules' of academic research represent for someone in my position. Put simply, other
researchers are (and have been) free to interview me about my experiences of making
pop music, I am part of 'the field', or of many 'fields'. How I answer their questions is
guided by my own sense-making or meaning-making processes developed through
my reflection on being a song-writer and record-maker. As soon as I ask myself a
similar order of questions, then methodological 'alann bells' begin to ring. If a
researcher writes about Beck she or he is assessed on the basis of their intellectual
rigour; if Beck writes about Beck it is 'autobiography' and must be used
circumspectly. I still need to examine how my history of record-making bears on my
position as researcher and on the methodological options this allows me; but I will
assert, here, that I do not become a sociologist by suppressing the song-writer in me.
The division of individual human understanding into sealed compartments is an
impossibility, and the work of establishing my position as a researcher has come to
be centrally informed by that belief.
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I recognise that my going 'back out' is problematised by my having
already been 'out there' and on an exercise that was not research but a real lived
experience in making popular music. Initially, what this meant for my position as
researcher was not so much that I felt I had 'all the answers' but that I had a very good
idea what'the answers' would be and where to look for them. Even before the making
of Mick and Caroline, I had experienced enough conflict as a song-writer to have had
forced on me the recognition that my music-making involved me in a complex web
of relationships (to paraphrase Negus) over which I had little or no control
(determining whether anyone has control will be a feature of this study). This was not
how I had envisaged 'life in the music business' from my dedicated consumption of
its myths. Instead, I had soaked up the popular cultural representation of that 'life' as
one of almost unlimited glamour and excitement. While I did, indeed, experience
glamour and excitement, I experienced an enormous amount more besides that was
conflictual and draining. As a consequence of these intense and contrasting
experiences, any earlier conception I might have held about how popular music is
made was erased. On this basis, I have to acknowledge that I come to the business of
researching the music industry with a perspective on that industry and its practices
that cannot be undone or set aside. Even so, as I argue in chapter one,
..if I cannot set these perceptions aside then I need to make them explicit. I come
to this research with prejudices (judgements already made), but even in this
attempt to organise a research project into and through those prejudices, I change
them. They are changed by being made to account for themselves; they will be
changed by being asked to bear the weight of fresh evidence.
To indicate that I carry around in my head 'prejudices' about the music industry is not
as much of a 'mea culpa' as it might appear to be. There is a curious 'atmosphere' that
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permeates the standard 'how to' texts on qualitative research (cf Burgess 1991,
Marshall and Rossman 1989, and many more). They all present the research process
in roughly similar ways - as connected, cumulative phases that involve design, data
collection, analysis and presentation of findings. This adherence to a 'system' is no
guarantee, of itself, that qualitative methods contribute to the 'scientific' aspect of
Sociology as a 'Social Science' and whether it does or not is not at issue here; what is
at issue, though, is directly connected to this study, it concerns the notion of
'objectivity' and how this connects to the deployment of qualitative methods. As Kirk
and Miller put it,
That qualitative research has not built cumulatively on other qualitative research
is due in large part to a lack of attention to issues of reliability. In order to make
their findings relevant to other findings of whatever sort, qualitative researchers
must accept the goal of objectivity, realize the strengths and weaknesses inherent
in the ethnographic tradition, and co-ordinate ethnographic decision making to
the four-phase structure of science. (Kirk and Miller, 1986, ).
It would be completely misleading to suggest that this is the definitive position on the
status of qualitative research as a social science. In another 'beginners guide', Pauly
says the reverse,
..the best a qualitative researcher can do is to marshall a metaphor, to argue that
reality has been managed, detained, coped with, slowed up, clarified, scaled
down, illuminated, intensified, or resurrected. Qualitative researchers typically
justify their performances by appeals to social and political principles other than
"science" . (Pauly, 1991, p.23)
Although diametrically opposed in their representation of what qualitative
methodology consists of and can 'do' both (and similar) accounts represent the
distance of the 'academy' from the 'field' as a cleansing separation, as if researchers
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are somehow not part of any world other than the academy and that, therefore, their
'objectivity' is somehow assured by their status; this is the 'curious atmosphere'
referred to above. Rather than ally myself, here, with one 'camp' or the other (as
represented by Kirk and Miller, at one extreme, and Pauly at the other), I intend to
argue that the 'objectivity versus subjectivity' debate is a red herring - it represents a
separation of the mind into a hierarchy of 'understandings', a separation that cannot
be sustained. This does not mean that I believe, now, that 'anything goes', that all
opinions are equally valid, and so on. Rather, the questions of research and research
methods are still paramount; but what distinguishes the considered case from mere
prejudice is not just 'evidence' but evidence of the gathering of evidence.
Interpretive Procedures and Auto/Biography.
The February 1993 issue of Sociology was a 'special' issue on 'Biography
and Autobiography in Sociology'. In the journal's editorial, an attempt was made to
draw a 'balance sheet' of sociology's use for, and understanding of, the role of
biography and autobiography in the discipline. It acknowledged that a handful of
theorists had broached the issues that surround such work (notably Bertaux 1981,
Plummer 1983 and Denzin 1989, 1990, see below) but, implicitly, represented their
individual contributions as comparatively isolated, although useful. The editorial
drew attention to the discipline's comparative lack of engagement with the production
and consumption of Auto/biographical texts and to the flaws in the treatment of the
latter that had already developed as a result of the absence of a systematic
engagement with them (for example, there is a an evident tension between those
theorists who treat the work of auto/biographers as sources of 'evidence' of the
material reality of the lives described; and those who would 'deconstruct' such works
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as narrative accounts of lives rather than as directly referential documents, as such).
The argument made for sociology's need to begin to engage with autobiography
pivots on the question of the production of knowledge. Substantially, sociological
methods and concepts turn on the 'production and analysis' of "lives" and "life events"
(through ethnography, interviews, oral history, and so on) while much of sociological
theory concentrates on the 'biographical practices' that surround such key sites as the
self and its place in the social world. But, while other disciplines have become caught
up in the 're-seeing and re-thinking in intellectual life' (the upheavals around ^?ost-
modernism') sociology has been slower to respond to the new ways of
conceptualising its own practice that this 're-thinking' demands. The 'other
disciplines' so referred to are, broadly, literary studies, cultural studies and women's
studies and, while it is the influence of post structuralism in these areas that, in part,
helped to 'open up' the discussion, it is to the impact of Feminist ideas about the place
of personal experience as 'field research' (my term) that most of the contributions to
the special issue are directed.
In order to establish a context in which to discuss the potential
contribution of feminist sociology to methodology in the area of autobiographical
resources and practices we need first to consider the various routes that a concern
with 'personal' accounts of social practices have taken in sociology. Plummer in
'Documents of Life' (1983) offers a thorough and committed account of the value of
researching 'life documents' (diaries, letters, oral history, photographs etc.) first
established in the sociology that developed at Chicago University in the earliest years
of this century. His argument is that Chicago offered a particularly rich combination
of philosophical and research interests that combined to create a commitment not just
to sociology but to a 'humanistic' sociology; one that legitimated a concentration on
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accounts of lived experience - either by researchers of social actors or by actors
themselves - as the basis for a sociology that rejected 'abstractions' and 'absolutes'. In
place of meta-theories, the early Chicago sociologists favoured a 'case study'
approach that helped make explicit why and how social individuals interacted in the
ways that they did. While, ultimately, this concern would crystallise into Symbolic
Interactionism, the importance of 'Life Documents' in sociological research faded
abruptly with the rise of Positivism (in its primary expression as 'Functionalism') and
remained obscured by Functionalism's even after the revival in Marxist Sociology
began to loosen Functionalism's hold over the discipline. So great was the eclipse
that, as Plummer records, 'the method is downright peripheral to the concerns of most
methodologists'; a peripherality he exemplifies by finding no reference to researching
'human documents' in any edition of the annual review publication 'Sociological
Methodology' since its inception. Similarly, there are only 'seven fleeting references'
in Burgess's 884 page 'Teaching Research Methodology to postgraduates'.
Plummer's book makes a strong case for a reversal of the above position
and argues the need for a revival in the study of 'life documents' with great passion.
Nonetheless, his is a work very much 'of its time'. Published in 1983, all the
references are to works published in the 70's and while Foucault, for example, is
mentioned, there is no Derrida, and therefore no sense of the 'turn to textuality', that
represented the 'motor' of post-modernism. Denzin, in 'Interpretive Biography',
published in 1989 benefits considerably from the later date of publication. He
presents an altogether more optimistic picture of a resurgence not simply in interest
in 'life documents' but an increasing legitimacy and sophistication in their use and, to
this extent, his contribution to the field belies the limited acknowledgement he
receives in 'Sociology'. Dentin, in fact, begins his study with reference to Plummer's
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work but then goes rapidly on to show the extent to which, in his terms, 'the method
has returned to the human disciplines' (Dentin, 1989, p.8); although, as he argues,
'some would say that it never left and that it is enjoying a "rebirth" in the late-1980's'
(ibid) . He then describes the extent of that 'rebirth' by indicating the extent of new
contributions to the field that gained pace throughout the 1980's - both in the form of
published studies and the setting up ofjournals and study groups.
In his turn, Dentin also provides a brief historical overview of the genesis
of interest in autobiographical material, in much the way that Plummer does, but here
he makes the mode of its survival during the years of 'eclipse' more accessible; citing,
as he does, the work of C. Wright Mills and Sartre as having kept alive and
developed the study of the individual, social actor. He then identifies Derrida as the
main well-spring for the contemporary resurgence in interest in lived experience for
the new approaches which the latter's theories of language offered for the study of
autobiographical texts; but he then eschews the path into the elaborations of post-
modernist exposition taken by so many post-structualists. Instead, in this work and in
the later 'Interpretive Interactionism'(1990), (his attempt to constitute 'the existential
interpretive approach' as a fully-fledged methodology) Dentin is more concerned to
sensitise the researcher to the social dimensions of the personal dramas faced by the
individual. In this, he is guided by a variety of different research traditions
(particularly Symbolic Interactionism and Ethnomethodology) but he also draws
marked attention to 'the feminist critique of positivism'. What is especially notable
for this discussion in Denzin's attention to developments in Feminist theory, is the
coincidence of his identification (and application) of key feminist methodological
practices with much of the argument in favour of a feminist sociology proposed in
the editorial to the special issue of 'Sociology', referred to above, and to the
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development of an argument for this perspective in the work of Liz Stanley, that
issue's editor and principal contributor. Both Denzin's work and Stanley's work
contain well-argued cases for the legitimacy of auto/biographical material as research
data, and I will be guided by their arguments; but this does not mean either that their
arguments are identical, or that they necessarily directly support the procedures that I
propose to undertake. Even so, the work of both theorists can be shown to have a
particular relevance for the aims and methods of this study. It is to an examination of
both their work and these aims and methods that I now turn.
Stanley on Auto/Biography.
Instructively, Stanley begins her article, 'On Autolbiography in Sociology' with a
condemnation of exactly the practice I have engaged in in the previous section - the
attempt to establish a contextual heritage of precursors for new developments in
theory. As she argues,
..such an apparent "history" is actually composed by histories, by competing
historiographies (written versions of the past, not slices of the past itself) which
systematically excise or silence or dismiss their alternatives. (Stanley, 1993,
p.41)
In place of this, her aim is to offer, 'two alternative histories, which focus .. on
methodological procedures and ontological problematics'. Stanley then proceeds to
provide not a replacement for the Plummer/Denzin version of the restoration of
sociological work in and on auto/biography but, as she puts it, 'parallel accounts ..
additions to a complex historiography'. At once, then, Stanley begins to apply the
sociological and methodological practice she elaborates in her work 'The
Auto/Biographical "I" '; namely, the practice of 'Intellectual Autobiography'.
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Stanley's conception of 'Intellectual Autobiography' is sketched out in her
article 'On Auto/biography in Sociology' and is then elaborated on, and exemplified
in, 'The Auto/biographical "I"'. Its main points are:
(1). That there are precursors for her position: separately, Robert Merton's
'Sociological Autobiography' and Feminist 'Reflexivity' (first practised as
'consciousness raising').
(2). Merton's work is vital in that his emphasis on autobiography as a text
allows such work to be seen, in Stanley's words, 'as a topic for investigation in its
own right, and not as a resource to tell us about something lying outside the text
itself, with the consequence that our attention is directed,
to the processes by which such texts are constructed as well as interpreted - to
the processes of writing autobiographical texts, and also to the processes of
reading them. (all emphases are Stanley's) (Stanley, 1993, p.43)
(3). Merton argues that 'sociological autobiography' consists of utilising,
sociological perspectives .. and analytical procedures to construct and interpret a
narrative text that purports to tell one's own history within the larger history of
one's times..(it) is .. the constructed personal text of the interplay between the
active agent and the social structure.. full-fledged sociological autobiographers
relate their intellectual development both to changing social and cognitive
micro-environments and to the encompassing macro-environments provided by
the larger society and culture. (Merton, 1988, pp. 19-20 in Stanley, 1993, p.43)
(4). Stanley considers this a 'revolutionising' of 'sociological attention to
autobiography' because it makes possible a method through which the writer can,
simultaneously, reflect in writing and on the writing process itself ('the
epistemological conditions of its own production'). She then argues that a very
similar process of 'reflexivity' was developed, independently, in and through
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'consciousness raising' in the women's movement; through which practice
'conventional dichotomies and binaries (were) refused' (the 'personal' and the
'political', for example). This, in turn, encouraged,
..a reflexive understanding of the relationship between individual practice and
social structure, not only relating selves to social collectivities, but also
recognising the part that selves play in constructing structures as well as being
mediated by them. "Reflexivity" here is located in treating one's self as subject
for intellectual inquiry, and it encapsulates the socialised, non-unitary and
changing self posited in feminist social thought. (Stanley, 1993, x,44)
(5). Stanley traces the feminist ideas that developed from women's
movement 'reflexivity' to their application in theory. As Dentin does elsewhere, she
identifies the work of Cook and Fonow as the site of the first major theorising of
'reflexivity' which, they argue (and she endorses) is central to feminist methodology;
alongside, notably,
..rejection of the claimed objective/subjective dichotomy (and) a concern with
researching and theorising experience. (Stanley, 1993, p.44)
(6). 'Intellectual Autobiography' is, then, the sociological, textual practice
of 'reflexivity' (she calls it an 'accountable reflexivity' in her book). This consists of
focusing on 'the processes by which evaluation, interpretations and conclusions have
been reached'; or, as she puts it in'The Autobiographical "I',
..focusing on factors involved in the genesis and development of the writer's
understanding and interpretation of the biographical subject or subjects. (Stanley,
1992, p.136)
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What needs to be appreciated about Stanley's position is her instrumental approach to
post-modernism. For example, she takes, especially from Derrida and post-
structuralism, the notion that,
social life is by definition theorised by those who live it.. for much of the time
what social life consists of is the construction, presentation and negotiation of
accounts or versions - everyday verbal "texts", rather than behavioural events
themselves. Social life is, then, theorised through and through and is concerned
with textual representation. (Stanley, 1992, p.93)
This allows her to erase generic differences between autobiogYaphy' and'b^ography'
and also the binary opposition of'subjectrvity/objectivity':
Life is "subjective" because we necessarily see and understand through our own
consciousness. This is certainly a social and not an individua] consciousness; but
it can never be an objective one, for by definition it derives from particular
"subjectivities".. An interest in the textual representation of particular lives
emphasises the highly problematic nature of realist views of autobiography,
emphasising the necessarily selective nature of memory, of evidence, of what is
included and excluded, and also the equally necessary role of the conventions of
narrative form and the concomitant infusion of autobiographical products with
fictive devices of various kinds. A concern with autobiography shows that "self'
is a fabrication, not necessarily a lie but a highly complex truth. (Stanley, 1992,
p.164)
On this basis, to live life is to generate texts; to write is to generate texts
through selective practices and narrative devices. Her rejection of much of post
modernist theorising is that it refuses to reflect on 'the conditions of its own
production', failing to recognise that the 'post modern' author does not 'die' in the way
that post modernism, itself, asserts that he or she should do. Who or what is 'dead' for
Stanley is the subject; the idea that a single, knowable figure can be revealed, or re-
constructed, through a work of literary 'archaeology'. Rather, from feminism (or from
her reading of it, feminism was never a monolith) she takes the idea that 'facts and
arguments are 'contingent' (her emphasis). In the same way that women continue to
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need to fight their definition by patriarchy as subordinate to men through a praxis that
emphasises understanding the extent to which gendered identity is a social construct
and working to change that identity through changing the social conditions of its
reproduction; so our understanding of lives, in general, and the accounts made of the
lives of others, demands to be guided by the question, 'who says?'. Whoever writes
about themselves, or about others, is a 'socially located' individual and their view will
be a partial one. This cannot be avoided and it demands to be acknowledged; but not
acknowledged and then 'set aside'. Rather, the author must make this
'acknowledgement' a continuous feature of their writing; they are 'accountable' for
their choices and the narrative devices they employ, therefore they must reflect on
these, make them 'open' to the reader. No author can 'fix' the meaning of the text, but
equally, no author should 'pretend' to this. Obviously, an 'open', 'reflexive' text will
still be the product of narrative devices, but if it is one that reflects on the conditions
of its production as a condition of its production then it encourages 'active readership'
and specifies the author as but one 'albeit privileged, voice among other voices'.
The Researcher and the Field.
Stanley's view of her role as biographer and as autobiographer is as an,
inquiring analytical sociological - here feminist sociological - agent who is
concerned in constructing rather than discovering social reality and sociological
knowledge. (Stanley, 1993, p.49)
This view is close to Denzin's 'Interpretive Interactionist'. In both cases, the emphasis
is placed, simultaneously, on not just trying to understand the world from the point of
view of the researched (a staple idea of much qualitative research) but on reflecting
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on how the researcher comes to that understanding, and what this means for how they
write their research findings. As Denzin puts it,
Interpretive research begins and ends with the biography and the self of the
researcher. The events and troubles that are written about are ones the writer has
already experienced or witnessed firsthand. As David Sundow argues, the
individuals perspective is definitionally critical for establishing the "what" and I
add the "how" of problematic social experience. (Dentin, 1990, p.12)
In the same way that Stanley argues from a theorisation of comparatively disparate
but 'coalesced' theoretical positions, so Dentin draws on much the same material.
Again, the emphasis is placed on the 'socialised individual', whose biography is the
product of interactional textual production in social encounters. Similarly, Dentin is
determined that the researcher acts as interpreter of the field for the field as much as
for the academy. His attempts to ensure that a researcher achieves this degree of
clarity and shared understanding are codified in strict methodological guidelines for
the conduct of 'Interpretive Interactionism'. Embedded in his methodological view
(and his nearest coincidence with Stanley) is his recognition that not only can
researchers not avoid issues of history, power, emotion and knowledge in their work;
their job is to make explicit their own place in an open discussion of the play of these
forces not just in the interactions they observe, and interpret, but in their own
responses to these interactions.
Whether as 'Interpretive Interactionism' or 'Existential Ethnography',
Denzin's description of his method echoes, and is echoed in, Stanley's 'Accountable
Reflexivity' and 'Intellectual Biography'. Rather like the Beaubourg (Georges
Pompidou) Centre in Paris, these methodologies wear their fundamental processes on
their surfaces and this, I feel, is the way that I should proceed in my own research.
Although able to draw on an interpretive heritage almost as long as Sociology's own,
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the specific practice of treating the researcher's own experience as data in its own
right is a very new one (for example, the 'Special Issue' of 'Sociology' appeared six
months after I began this research). On this basis, while I am guided by the sense I
have made of the work of, particularly Stanley and Dentin, what needs to be
established at the outset is that this type of research is still in its infancy. Strictly
speaking, I cannot use either Stanley's or Denzin's methods, at least not in their
entirety: Stanley's for obvious reasons, I am a man; I cannot be a feminist; Denzin's
because he restricts 'Interpretive Interactionism' to the explication of 'epiphanies' -
'life experiences that radically alter the meanings persons give to themselves and their
life projects' and, by these, he means the experience of deep, personal troubles.
Despite these necessary reservations, if we take the last quote from
Stanley, above, I feel that I am exactly 'an inquiring .. agent .. who is concerned in
constructing rather than discovering social reality and sociological knowledge'. The
research process itself has impelled me in the direction of 'Intellectual
Autobiography' ('finding a way to ask a question') and while I have no intention of
writing a full autobiography, clearly I will need to write the biography of an episode,
not just in my life but in the lives of many others. By furnishing my own account of
the making of Mick and Caroline I deploy 'analytical procedures to construct and
interpret a narrative' (Merton). By interviewing the key participants involved in
making Mick and Caroline I encourage them not simply to reflect on their
understanding of their own experience of making that record, but to give their
reflections verbal shape ('textualise' them). Through my questioning of them,
participants 'create' an account of the experience for my consumption. By selecting
from their accounts and textualising my interpretation of them through a selective,
narrative process, I make a new account; but this account, through the application of
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sociological perspectives and procedures, is one that I could not possibly have written
without bringing the latter to bear, through the conduct of a research project, on the
process of making a record. Further, by acting on my recognition that researching
involves my own reflection not just on what I did but on what I am doing, the
account I write is not merely a rehearsal of my 'prejudices'. What sense the reader
makes of my account is, then, the reader's own. My contribution to that reading is not
just that I have furnished the text but that I have attempted to make clear how the text
was constructed, so improving the chances of an 'active' reading of the text by
refusing devices that pretend to the discovery of a 'complete' account of making not
just Mick and Caroline but any of the records so discussed.
In the same way that I feel my approach is sympathetic to Stanley's,
despite some obvious caveats, I do not feel that I do violence to Denzin's conception
of the 'epiphany' by representing my experience of the music industry as a series of
transformative crises, of which the making of Mick and Caroline, itself, continued
through large numbers of quite fundamental conflicts. The same may be equally true
of the record-making experiences of others in this study. Certainly, as I indicated at
an earlier stage, the experience of making records (not just Mick and Caroline)
'erased' earlier conceptions of how I imagined the music industry operated, with the
result that I am now 'sensitised' to discussions about records and recording in ways
that I could not possibly have been had I not undergone the experiences I have.
These, quite clearly, are the terms he uses to identify appropriate cases for the
application of his methodology. In situating my position as researcher, in this way, it
is still the case that, although I will apply methods suggested by the work of Stanley,
Dentin, and others who have contributed to the development of Sociological or
Intellectual Auto/biography, I do not in any sense feel compelled to remain faithful to
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any one conception of this practice - I am not a'Denzinist' or a 'Stanleyist'. Rather, as
a researcher into Popular Music-making, it became apparent to me that new
methodological practices are demanded if record makers are to study (not just their
own) record-making. Because of this, I have come to recognise that I cannot research
musical-industrial practices without researching my own researching into those
practices. 'Sociological' or 'Intellectual Autobiography' offers a method through
which I can combine 'asking' and 'answering' question. As a 'new' method, I develop
it through application, rather than apply a finished method against whose precepts my
efforts might be assessed. Whether Intellectual Autobiography is so novel, or so
radically different from existing qualitative methods that it needs to be described as
some 'other' methodology entirely (as in 'post methodology'), is a debate that lies
beyond these remarks. I doubt that it does, at least in this case, because I need, now,
to proceed by routes that are well-established in qualitative methodology.
Conclusions.
This study has needed to take a considerable 'loop' in order to return to the
issue of considering the ways that pop acts experience making records for major
companies and any connections between this and the failure of those acts to make
records that became `hits'. Again, to determine to study music as 'social practice and
process' (Cohen) and record-making as the result of 'complex formal organisations'
(Frith) means being able to specify organisational 'practices' (Negus) and to identify
the groups and individuals involved in the interactions initiated in, and through, those
practices. In this way, some sense of how the product became the product should
begin to be developed. No-one can re-create, in its entirety, the sequence of
interactions, and the motivations for the contributions of individuals within those
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interactions, that led to the eventual outcome. Further, no-one involved in the process
of making a record has access to all decisions made in making that record. The best
we can hope for is to gain a new perspective on the record-making experience, not
just from the accounts of participants, but from how those accounts are put together.
Because I make an account of my own part in making a record I 'breach' some of the
standard procedures of qualitative methodology, however these are defined (this
'breach' and its possible consequences are the potential 'impediments' to the study
referred to previously). For this reason I have considered it necessary to adopt a
method that is reflexive in the hope that this reflexivity contributes to, rather than
obscures, our understanding of the sense-making experience and, thereby, the
practices of record makers.
I now propose to turn to the exploration of three 'case histories' of record-
making for major labels. My use of the term 'case history' is guided partly by the
recognition that I did not conduct a series of case studies - recording and analysing
actions as they occurred - but also by Denzin's application of the term, one that
attempts to reconstruct an 'epiphany' through the participant's own account of that
epiphanous incident. I have already argued why 'epiphany' is applicable to the
experience of making records that fail (it is probably also true of making records that
are hugely successful). Negus recognises how devastating failure can be for the acts
concerned. Certainly this was my experience and, similarly, both the individuals I
study here, and also the many other members of pop acts I have encountered over the
years, testified to the disruptive short and long-term effects of needing to adjust to the
failure of an act (and the collapse of a musical role and identity) that had probably
absorbed their entire attention for all the time between late childhood and the day
they lost their deal. This is not to say that all members of all pop acts give up music
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as soon as they lose their major deal - musicians don't forget how to write or play
over night. Rather, popular music makers aim to make music that is popular. As this
can only be achieved through sales of records, the alternatives facing acts after they
are 'dropped' are either to try to win a new deal, re-adjust to a much lower level
experience (playing in pub bands or on the, comparatively, lucrative, 'club' circuit),
remain in pop in an intermediary role, or to give up altogether. The 'aftermath' years
of once-signed pop acts would make a study in its own right. Here I concentrate on
the process that led to the dashing of hopes through a study of three acts, introduced
in the first section of the next chapter, that all experienced life on a major label with






Accounts now follow of the record-making experiences of three acts: Latin
Quarter, Respect and Roadhouse. I begin with Respect and Roadhouse. Both were
Sheffield-based acts who signed major deals with Chrysalis and Phonogram,
respectively. I came to include these acts in this study as a result of a realisation that
my experience of making an unsuccessful album was quite a common occurrence.
After beginning this research I moved to Sheffield. I began to teach song-writing and
quickly met people in the local music community. Sheffield, although a large city,
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does not have the same history of providing 'hit' acts as that enjoyed by Manchester
and Liverpool. Even so, its history includes Dave Berry and the Cruisers, Joe Cocker
and the Grease Band, Def Leppard, The Human League, ABC, Cabaret Voltaire and,
more recently, Pulp, Moloko, Baby Bird and Olive. As I got to know people in the
music community I came to know, and know of, numerous individuals who had been
members of signed acts that had never 'made it'. Failure is extremely isolating, and,
while it was not exactly comforting to know that other people had 'been there', it
helped give this research a clearer focus because it immediately suggested the
possibility that, whatever the differences between each individual experience, the
possibility arose that there might also exist important (and consistent) commonalities
between all our experiences. Even so, before exploring what 'consistencies' may or
may not exist, it is necessary to connect the more general issues of methodology
explored in the previous chapter with the specific nature of the generation of data in
these cases.
Put simply, I could not explore the experiences of Respect and Roadhouse in
anything like the detail I could bring to the Latin Quarter account. As a founder
member of Latin Quarter, some of the most intimate details of its history are known
to me, but, where the other two are concerned, I was able to build an impression of
the fates of these acts only in ways at once similar to, and distinct from, those of an
ethnographer. If we return to Cohen's account of the demands of ethnography then I
clearly met most of the criteria for ethnographic research she identifies: I developed
'relationships in the field'; I 'spoke the language' of other musicians and I had
considerable 'face-to-face' contact with them. Where my 'case histories' break with
Cohen's schema in their genesis is that none of the musicians with whom I interacted
ever considered me as an 'outside researcher'. I was either a friend, acquaintance or
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colleague - at least until I asked them whether they would take part in interviews with
me. This is not to argue that all my contact with all the musicians I have interacted
with has been in the form of covert research, but, equally, I have been able to
interrogate those encounters in ways most of my contacts would be surprised by.
As I observed in the previous chapter, when I began to read PMS literature, I
could not find my experience reflected in it. There was no account of the specificities
of failure, only partial accounts of the music industry or books like Garfield's
Expensive Habits that dealt with chicanery rather than simply with the experience of
pop music-making as an uncertain process. Once outside the intense confines of a
pop act and back in 'the real world' I began to find my experience reflected in that of
other musicians. Perhaps this should not have been as surprising as I find it but,
again, pop acts lead very intense existences in which time is no longer marked by
days and weeks, by the regularity of T.V. Soaps, or by the progress of a football
season through Saturdays and Wednesdays from late-Summer to late-Spring. Instead,
recording pop acts live by an entirely unique calendar that is marked by four
repeating time periods - recording, rehearsal, promotion, tour; recording, rehearsal,
promotion, tour. The demands of this schedule obliterate conventional time markers
and the convenient cultural periodisations we make as consumers of pop (The
'Merseyboom', 'Madchester') disappear from view inside the record industry. Once
this breaks down, as it so frequently does, then, again, failure is isolating and simply
to re-adjust to the patterns of daily time-keeping demands considerable attention, as
do matters of keeping body and soul together. As I began to focus on this research I
needed, partially, to reconstitute my relationships, both within Latin Quarter and its
wider field and beyond this to the fields of my other respondents, but I could never
'cleanse' them of their former incarnation. I could never achieve the distance that
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academic researchers take for granted because I did not begin from the academy. This
then led me to re-consider not only my position as researcher but also the
prescriptions of ethnography - ethnographers may not live in the world as gang
members or alcoholics but they still form views and reach conclusions about myriad
social relationships before ever they enter 'the field'. Cohen makes this point when
she observes,
strangeness, familiarity, otherness are shifting categories. A situation or friend
can be both strange and familiar concurrently or at different times and in
different contexts, and one can alter perspective, engaging with and distancing
oneself from relationships and activities around one. Cohen, 1993, p.125)
I believe I have achieved or attained the type of distance that Cohen describes
by making exactly the recognition she draws our attention to, but it remains the case
that the data generated through researching Respect and Roadhouse is of a different
order, scale and type from that generated by researching Latin Quarter. If what
follows appears unbalanced in both quality and quantity then these differences can be
made to work for, rather than detract from, this research. They can be made to do this
if we keep in mind the 'I' who caused this data to be generated.
At base, I construct case histories of record-making experiences through
unstructured interviews with key participants in the record-making process. As all of
the previous remarks have attempted to show, I do not conduct this research as a
model of qualitative research because of the singularities of my position as
researcher; but the question of 'position' goes further than this. So far, in making
these observations, I have drawn on a version of the 'I' that came to research but, as I
have argued, this was not the 'I' that was encountered by my informants. I gained
access to those informants either by already knowing them (in the case of making the
Latin Quarter record Mick and Caroline) or by being introduced to them as a member
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of Latin Quarter. That I came to the field as a friend, former colleague, or fellow
musician will have its consequences for how I conducted my interviews and for the
data produced through them (how I interpret that data will also be affected by my
experience of making records). Because I did not enter the field as a researcher, but
re-cast myself as a researcher at a later date, I produced data differently from a
researcher; further, because I entered different fields with a different status in each, I,
again, produced data differently in each case:
1. In the case of Latin Quarter, whether with former baud membecs ar w^A
management and record company personnel, I am likely to produce different data
from other researchers both because of my intimacy with the informants but also
because I am researching a shared experience. This does not mean that I am likely to
get closer to 'the truth'; rather, it means that, between us, in the act of discussion or
conversation, the informant and I will create a new 'account' of what went on; we will
negotiate our individual understandings to create a new version of the making of the
record that has a beginning, a middle and an end - but these will define an entirely
new narrative, one that the informant will feel more or less comfortable with (they
would not want to upset me through a confrontation). But, while they will tailor their
remarks to suit me; they will be unlikely to denigrate their own contribution in the
process under discussion. Further, and as a consequence of this, whatever version
they give me will not be the version in their heads; it will be a version made up with
and through me (in response to my responses; in response to their own anticipation of
my motives and responses): the version in their heads, even if I could access it,
would not be 'the truth' because no-one person owns the title to that.
2. Where Respect and Roadhouse (and other musicians I have interviewed)
are concerned, the data generated, the stories told, will be different from those
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provoked by a more orthodox researcher, but they will not be of the same order as the
data generated in the Latin Quarter case. In the instance of the former, my position of
researcher is affected by the 'credentials' that I bring to the relationship and to the
interview(s). These 'credentials' (writer of a top 20 hit record, membership of pop act
that signed major deals) immediately puts me on a different footing - I am a 'member
of the club' and, as such, a different discourse will be engaged that will produce,
again, versions of events different from those provoked by more orthodox
researchers. Even so, these 'versions' will not be closer to the 'reality' of making the
record in question; in some ways a respondent may feel less willing to defend the
experience, to be less considered and more vituperative, because of my 'sharing' a
similar experience. In all instances, an intimacy, on my part, with record industry
practices and the social processes of music-making will be assumed which could be
more or less productive than if the interview was with another type of stranger;
certainly, they will be differently productive. To acknowledge these aspects of my
position does not deny that I am far closer to the position of the orthodox researcher
once I step out of the Latin Quarter circle - the dimension of a directly shared
experience is entirely missing and, more importantly, I have no way of re-assembling
'the cast' in these particular dramas. Effectively, I am encouraging, and participating
in, the construction of the stories of single individuals who made records and I will
take from these 'personal recollections of events, their causes and effects' aspects of
their stories that connect (because they agree, disagree or contribute something
different) to my account of making Mick and Caroline. I will then compare and
contrast the stories so generated with specific reference to the processes that led to
the failure of the planned recording and to the interactions within the act and between
the act and intermediary figures that constituted that process.
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1 . Respect and The Kissing Game.
Respect was formed by Josie Robson and Malcolm Walmsley in Sheffield in early
1985. Within a short time, Richard Hartley rejoined them to re-establish a triumvirate
that had formed the core of two previous bands dating back to the early 1980's.
Initially, Walmsley and Hartley had approached Robson at the then well-known
Sheffield venue 'The Limit' to sing backing vocals for Sons and Lovers which
Robson described as 'less than a band and more of a project'. At this time, she was
lead vocalist for Tsi Tsa, her fourth local band in four years. Walmsley and Hartley
had also been members of at least one previous band so, by the time of the formation
of Respect, all three members had had a lengthy experience of making music at a
local level. In the case of Sons and Lovers, emphasis was placed more on recording
than on performance, Walmsley did all the writing in what Robson described as 'a
very stylised package' formed around the example of the close harmony styles of the
1940's. Walmsley and Hartley made several trips to London in an attempt to attract
publishing rather than record company interest, but made little headway. Eventually
their interest waned and the emphasis of Walmsley's work reverted to
performance.
'Performance' for the core of Respect came in the form of Skin, a nine-piece
soul and R&B band that played material written entirely by Walmsley. With Josie
Robson as lead vocalist, Walmsley on keyboards and Hartley on drums, Skin played
the local circuit for two years but attracted no record company interest. Such was the
volume of the band, and so long had she spent away from live work, that Josie
Robson developed nodes on her vocal cords. The strict regime of treatment she was
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forced to follow in order to repair the damage to her vocal cords led to the rapid
demise of Skin but opened the way for the rise of Respect. By this time she and
Walmsley were partners and their joint absence from performance encouraged a
closer (though still far from equal) writing relationship that, in turn, encouraged the
development of a fresh musical identity. As Robson put it,
Malcolm wrote 'The Girl Needs Respect'... What we did that was really exciting
was pitch everything about five notes lower than,it had been and my voice was
born ... There were women singing who were getting away with being ... much
bluesier so I think that gave us confidence to pitch my voice somewhere else ... it
was wonderful here was this blues stuff that ... linked ... to some of the more
soulful girl groups that I loved, to Malcolm's 40's writing, and yet it was with
electronics, it was kind of our Eurythmics days were born.
Within a short time, Richard Hartley had been played the new material and, while
there was no instrument for him to play, Respect felt 'incomplete without him'.
Although he would enjoy less creative input than in Sons and Lovers, Hartley's role
was described by Josie Robson in these terms, terms that will have a bearing on later
remarks:
I always felt he had impeccable taste. He generally tended to know which of the
songs would get a good response from record companies. I thought he was an
important mediating link from us to the outside world in a sense. Being very
much enclosed within ourselves we could never tell a good song from a bad song
(Robson, ibid)
And further,
With Richard coming back into ... the unit ... all those dreams started again and
we were very much clearer and it was easier to organise three people than nine
people. We had a four-track so we could now record at home instead of having
to shell out thousands and thousands of pounds ... It was ... back to the project.
(Robson, ibid)
1 All quotes from interviews with Josie Robson between July, 1994 and June, 1995.
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The original intention was to 'get a whole load of songs together and take control
again' but part of 'taking control' in pursuit of 'all those dreams' was to cede control to
a manager (in none of any of their previous bands had the Respect members been
managed). Josie Robson is particularly disparaging about Chris Cox, the man who
would manage Respect for the next few months (from mid- to late-1987), but she
allows that Cox acted as a catalyst for them in the sense that he introduced them to
the idea that they needed a producer to progress from what were effectively 'bedroom
demos'. Cox (a partner in a local studio) contacted Ian Levene, a young producer who
specialised in the then emerging field of 'dance re-mixes' and set up a Respect session
at Levene's home studio. As Robson explained,
We could see that not only did we need a manager but we needed a producer
because we could write them but we could do very little with them after that ...
we'd done 'The Chain' (a piece of electro-music, under Chris Cox's influence) as
well as we possibly could then Chris said, "but there's so much further you could
go with this" and Malcolm said, "You're right". It was the first time I'd heard him
say "yes, I might need some help on it" so it was quite astonishing. (Robson,
ibid)
In the event, the Ian Levene sessions fell through (storms had wrecked his studio),
but because the recognition had been made that a producer was required Malcolm
Walmsley then contacted the emerging producer Chris Heaton. Walmsley's
connection with Heaton was entirely coincidental, both had attended the same
wedding in London some months earlier. On hearing the material, Heaton was
immediately impressed and arranged through his partner, the studio manager at the
leading London studio Swanyard, to record two songs at the studio's expense (as a
speculative venture: all parties would be reimbursed, and more, in the event of the
tracks securing a record deal). This began a three and a half year association that
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proved entirely pivotal for Respect and would end only with the failure of the
Respect album.
In the first instance, Chris Heaton introduced Respect to a manager, Jack
Stephens. During the Swanyard sessions Chris Cox let down the band very badly on
the payment of backing singers and they parted company with him that weekend.
Stephens had been an A&R man for RCA and, as a result, knew the record industry
extremely well. At the time he managed Scarlet Fantastic who had had one hit single
on Arista Records (No Memory'). Heaton's enthusiasm for him, recommended
Stephens to the band. His assessment of them was (as Josie Robson recollected) 'I
think these two songs are top ten (but) I don't think you're there yet'. What not being
'there yet' meant was that the band did not have the style, presence and attitude to go
with the music they were creating; or, at least, this is how they interpreted his
remarks. What this meant was that Respect spent the next fifteen months working not
just on new material but on their presentation, individually and collectively.
Throughout this period they maintained close contact with Stephens who did nothing
directly to advance their careers until he decided that they were 'ready', at the
beginning of 1989, whereupon he announced that he had been 'priming' Peter
Robinson about Respect for some months and that he was now going to play him
some Respect demos. Robinson, by the time Stephen's played him the material, was
head of A&R at Chrysalis records. He had formerly been at RCA (where one of his
last acts was to sign Latin Quarter) and Stephens' route to him was clearly his
connection as a former colleague. Robinson liked the demos and also liked Respect
when he met them, to the extent that he immediately offered to sign them (in April,
1989). The deal took until September to complete, partly because as several tracks
had already been produced and recorded, the record company had to negotiate not
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only with a new act but with a producer and a studio who owned master tapes of
what would form a large part of their album
At last, by September 1989, Respect was signed to a major label, two years
after their first work at Swanyard and seven years after coming together through
Sons and Lovers. With so much recording already completed, Respect was able to
deliver its album quite quickly, by February 1990. Despite this, and despite having
had some tracks ready for a considerable period, there were substantial delays in
releasing the first Respect single. It was not until July that year that `Love Drives On`
was released and this received scant promotion - 'they took it out after a fortnight,
they said it wasn't selling'. In the interim there was, as Josie Robson puts it,
A lot of wrangles... we spent £3,000 on a photo session where we got two photos
because we wouldn't use any of the rest of them because they were
compromising us ... we fought with the record company ... Jack was excellent
because he had the nerve to fight with them ... He was so aggressive all the time,
"I'm not having this for my band", and so on .... We were unhappy about a lot of
things, we were quite a Bolshie band - about the singles, the sleeves. I was very
concerned that I didn't want to be marketed as a woman ... we were a group, a
band, we each had our role to play ... and Jack absolutely supported us in all of
that. He was important but I wonder whether we were right. (Robson, ibid)
Despite their manager's reassurances that first singles were very often simply
speculative affairs to fine-tune the marketing campaign, Respect were aware that
little campaign was in evidence, the press department said that it was impossible to
gain press coverage for them and radio plays for 'Love Drives On' had been few. Jack
Stephens' response to the growing crisis of confidence within Respect was to urge
them to form a live band while they waited for the release of the follow-up single
'What comes After Good-Bye?' This, Stephens thought, was the band's 'trump card'; a
duet between Josie Robson and Phil Oakey of the Human League, the track had been
added to the album at the last minute after, again, a chance meeting between
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Malcolm Walmsley and Phil Oakey at a Sheffield studio. The inclusion of what
seemed a sure-fire hit single on the album was clearly greatly to Respect's credit but
the promotion campaign for the single quickly collapsed when Phil Oakey made
those involved aware that he would only appear on two TV shows, 'Top of the Pops'
and 'Wogan' (then the top British TV 'chat show'). As it was, an appearance on
'Wogan' was secured and set for early January. Two hours before they were due to
board the train to London on the day of the show, Respect received a telephone call
from Chrysalis who told them that their 'Wogan' slot had been given to Milli Vanilli,
perhaps in a vain attempt to maintain the latter's 'profile' in the face of the revelations
that the two individuals who comprised the act had made little, if any , cont^ibut^on ^.o
their own records. Despite further reassurances that they would soon appear on a
subsequent programme, this appearance was not forthcoming and'What Comes After
Good-Bye?' also failed to make any impression on the British Charts.
The album, The Kissing Game, was set for release in April, 1991. During the
remainder of January and throughout February and March, Respect rehearsed their
live band at a Sheffield rehearsal studio. At the same time, Jack Stephens organised
'dance' re-mixes of selected tracks and had them promoted in London clubs; he also
secured press interviews and reviews in the influential monthly press, 'Q', 'Select' and
'Vox'. Then, on the Monday of the week of the album's release (album reviews had
already begun to appear), Peter Robinson was sacked as head of A&R at Chrysalis.
Respect travelled immediately to London to establish whether their relationship with
the company, and the imminent release of their album, had been jeopardised by his
sacking. As Josie Robson put it,
I don't even know who we spoke to, it was quite apparent within the first ten
seconds that we weren't welcome and there wasn't going to be a reprieve ... The
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only thing that sticks in my mind is leaving Chrysalis, we walked out of the
back-entrance which was very significant and there was a skip full of our CD's
and I thought, "we argued about this cover for months, they spent £100,000 on
this and they've thrown it in a skip, they've skipped my life". (Robson, ibid)
Although Jack Stephens' reaction to Respect's being dropped by Chrysalis was
combative (we don't need them, we're going to get a new deal' - as Robson reports it),
relations between him and Respect collapsed almost immediately over matters of
business that must lie outside this study. Within a month, Richard Hartley left
Respect and a few weeks later Josie Robson's relationship with Malcolm Walmsley
also collapsed. In a sense, all traces of musical and personal relationships that had
lasted for over a decade were wiped out within two months of Respect's sacking from
Chrysalis.
2. Roadhouse and Roadhouse.
Roadhouse was formed by two Sheffield guitarists, Richard Day and Pete Willis in
early 1987. Willis was already known as one of the two lead guitarists of Def
Leppard, one of the most successful Heavy Metal bands of all time. Willis had left
Def Leppard in the early 1980's, trailing stories of drink and drugs excesses (Steve
Clark, his co-guitarist in Def Leppard, died of similar excesses several years later).
When Day met Willis in late-1986, the latter had already been attempting a return to
record-making for some time. After a few exploratory rehearsals, Willis and Day
began to collaborate on writing and recording new material. The relationship almost
immediately became an intense one. Day gave up his 'day job' ('a very easy and well-
paid job ... with British Telecom') and moved into Willis's house where Willis had
installed an eight-track studio. At the same time, Willis was building a twenty-four
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track studio at Crow Edge, near Barnsley, and both men moved into the studio's
living accommodation on its completion.
What united both men, to the exclusion, almost, of all other considerations ('I
didn't care about external influences anymore.. .we came across as very arrogant and
strange to a lot of people..'Z), was a shared 'vision' - an 'arena Rock band' they called
'EastWest'. In interview, Day was very clear both about the intensity of his
relationship with Willis and about their own clarity, with regard not simply to the
music they intended to make but to the entire conception of Easffest as ,2 sazma, a
look and a 'story'. In the case of their creative, musical relationship, Day described it
in the following terms :
I had never done anything on that scale before ... When I met Pete it was like,
"OK this guy knows what he's talking about, he's been through the ropes, he's
done it before" and that's when I started really thinking about it in this serious
and almost deep manner .. it wasn't just something I did ... it was like I hadn't
just gone up a level, it had gone within me a lot more deep, I started to think
about it a lot more .. in that period in maybe the first six months of meeting Pete
and writing with him ... the learning curve was very steep, we went up together,
we taught each other things, it was a joyous experience (...) we had the luxury of
the time to write and record ... but you have to understand the magic of going
into things in that detail, it became almost euphoric. (Day interview, ibid)
As for EastWest, Day observed,
We had this vision and we decided to call it EastWest, it really did fire us up, in
your mind you see the big picture of what you are doing and once you see that
you can really push forward and go down it and you can choose people
accordingly. (Day, ibid)
2 A ll quotes from an interview with Richard Day on 15/8/94.
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The relevance of this observation is made more pertinent in this, much longer,
observation by Day on what he regarded as the particular demands of creating a
Heavy Metal band (although, arguably, his comments are of general relevance):
public perception is the most important thing and if you aren't aware of how the
potential record buying public is seeing you then you don't stand a chance ... if
you're only talking about love, and love in a very superficial sense, you're talking
about sex and riding in cars, getting high and things like that then by Christ you'd
better be able to make people believe it and that's the only reason that Guns and
Roses have been successful because they've made this absolutely false picture of
being drug addicts and alcoholics and bad lads ... you look at those guys, you can
draw caricatures of each of them, they're like a cartoon, larger than life
characters ... if only people could see that with a rock band, a serious rock band,
its all theatre, look at Kiss in their early days when they were wearing their make
up, why on Earth were they successful? They wrote very basic, catchy rock tunes
but they had this incredible image and when you went to see them it was "whoa,
its a show". With rock that's incredibly important - if anybody out there believes
it's all from the heart then I'm sorry, they haven't seen it because everybody, no
matter how mean the attitude, has a choreographed show, make sure that they
know how their fans are perceiving them and they keep that up. (Day, ibid)
In total, Willis and Day spent eighteen months working on material. In this
time, other players were drafted in on a temporary basis, but were then rejected,
sooner rather than later, with the exception of a singer. Eventually, a touring band
was recruited but only after the album was completed. So fraught was the process of
making this album that the live version of the 'vision' that Day and Willis had so
carefully cultivated fell apart within a few months of the album's release. In turn,
Willis and Day's close personal relationship ended and the two have not spoken
since. The extent of the failure of what was to become Roadhouse was, then,
absolute. Again, we need to explore the commodification of the act to understand
why.
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From EastWest to Roadhouse.
The collaboration between Day and Willis absorbed their time to the exclusion of all
else until Willis decided they had generated the kind of material he felt able to take,
not to record companies, in general, but back to Def Leppard's record company,
Phonogram. In this way, what became Roadhouse 'missed out' many of the steps
associated with what can be considered a 'conventional' path to the music industry -
writing material, demoing it cheaply, forming a live band, circularising demo tapes to
as many parties as possible, and so on. In this example, Willis simply returned to his
former 'hunting ground' - not just because he enjoyed some access to it but because,
for him, Phonogram was the record industry given their enormous success with Del
Leppard.
Day collaborated with this 'strategy' because, as we have seen, he believed
that Willis had enough experience to carry their vision forward - a vision that they
had kept inviolate from any external influence from the moment they decided to
collaborate. As it was, events moved very rapidly, but with a direction and
momentum that neither of the two core members of what was still EastWest had any
real bearing on. On this basis, despite their total control over the conception of the act
they did not match this with any effective purchase on the process of its realisation.
To understand why we need to look more closely at the 'Phonogram' they signed to:
Me and Pete went down to see Dave Bates when they were still on Old Bond
Street ... and we went in and saw Dave Bates and I was just like "this is what its
really about" .. He says, "yeah' I like it". So, great, where do we go from here?
We were very thrilled because he gave us some demo time at a place called
Woodcray and then we finished the tape off, re-mixed in Sheffield at Axis and
then we sent it him down and he said come down and see us. Before we knew
where we were we were in front of the managing director of Phonogram at the
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time, a Swedish guy, I forget his name, and that's it, "we want to sign you" ..The
initial contract was seven albums obviously with the option at every one but it
was a one album, firm contract and then after negotiations with various lawyers
we got the term down to six albums and if they'd taken up all the options, which
of course is hypothetical, the advances would have totalled £1.7 million and
that's what got bandied around all the press which I think did us a negative thing
but you can imagine what it felt like to me, it had taken me two and a half years
after leaving this comfy job ... as if from nowhere this thing had come ...
basically I was blown away but at the same time I was a bit scared. (Day, ibid)
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, Dave Bates was a high profile and high status
record company executive. He was the A&R person who had signed, amongst others,
Dire Straits, Tears For Fears and Def Leppard and had brought Phonogram huge
success. Bates had a reputation for autocracy (Day argued that the Tears For Fears
song 'Everybody Wants To Rule The World' was written with him in mind) and this
autocratic manner quickly came to register itself directly on Day and Willis.
I personally feel that Dave Bates just loved being master of puppets ... you'd go
down and see them, they'd spend shit loads of money on the hotels and
everything, "is there anything you need us for? No" and then the following
Monday it would be "get down here". ... he just used to like fucking you about.
(Day, ibid)
Clearly, there is much post hoc bitterness in this observation but all of Day's remarks
on the relationship with Phonogram devolve on the complexities of a relationship
within a single, powerful individual. It was a relationship that clearly dominated the
record-making experience and one that put the realisation of the EastWest 'vision'
under pressure from the start. What, then, added to that pressure, and in an important
way intensified the disintegration of Willis and Day's morale, was a wholly
unpredictable development. WEA Records established the `EastWest' record label
which demanded a name-change. This unsettled them further, as Day noted:
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our lawyers sent us a letter saying "look lads, you'd better change this name ...
WEA have set up EastWest Records". Now something as daft as that can really
knock your feet from under you, you've built an attitude and everything around
this name and then all of a sudden you've got to call yourself something else.
(Day, ibid)
The enforced name change (to Roadhouse) dismayed Willis and Day and
drained momentum from them. More draining still was the need to monitor, and
develop, the prosecution of their 'vision' while attending to the completion of the
album and the recruitment of the necessary members to complete the act and thus
mobilise that vision. In this need to collaborate with the record company on not just
the choice of tracks and their finished sound but also on the necessary promotional
and marketing materials, it became apparent to Day that these activities needed to be
made to happen, signing a substantial contract did not simply create a volition that
somehow'took care of itself. As Day observed,
We got signed then nothing happened, ... we thought we'd be running around like
blue-arse flies doing gig after gig, interview after interview, at the same time as
recording this album and we were doing nothing. (Day, ibid)
The reason for this confusion was that Roadhouse were managerless; at base,
Day and Willis had concentrated on music at the expense of all else. What this meant
was that they were left to sort out all the scheduling that goes with putting together an
act and their album as a complete entity, entirely alone. Consequently, confusion
reigned; band members came and went, there were disputes about payment and
royalty sharing, recording took place piecemeal and (in Day's terms) the all-important
work of creating a persona for the band that would 'make people believe' in
Roadhouse never got underway. Substantially, EastWest was a fiction on signing to
Phonogram. The record company understood this and trusted that Day and Willis
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would recruit the necessary members to support the promotion of the album. But so
'lost in music' were Day and Willis that recruitment was very fraught ('we were very
insistent and picky about what we wanted') and related matters were subordinated to
their determination to create exactly the music they wanted. This 'subordinacy' of
business, or commodification, matters was also, in Day's view, a function of his own
misplaced trust in the ability of Willis to understand and handle this side of their joint
affairs. As we have seen, he believed that Willis `knew what he was talking about'.
As he further elaborated,
What I did with Pete was I tended to think that he had all the answers which ...
went away pretty quickly as soon as the big picture became clear.. The thing is,
we all believed that Pete knew how to do it. Initially, Pete was saying "we don't
really need a manager". Now ... we didn't know any better, we thought "fair
enough, this is how it is" but it became glaringly obvious to me, at that point,
that, yes, you did, you needed somebody to give you some definite direction and
keep everybody together. Basically, for the set that we were you needed
somebody almost like a school-master ... we had no representation at all. Then
we timed it totally wrong. When it became glaringly obvious that we needed
management, it was too late, we'd already dropped too many big ones really.
(Day, ibid)
For Richard Day, 'dropping too many big ones' translated into the recognition that
they had 'let the record company get a hold'. From the beginning, Roadhouse ceded
all non-musical decision making to Dave Bates, they had no manager to oversee and
negotiate 'artist development'. By hoping that the vital issue of promoting and
marketing the vision that they guarded so jealously would somehow take care of
themselves, Roadhouse allowed Bates (if not necessarily encouraged or permitted
him) to accrue total control over the commodification of Roadhouse. As we have
already seen, Day felt that Bates manipulated them. For example, he insisted that they
work with an engineer, Chris Sheldon, in the final stages of recording, but his
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'manipulation' existed on a far greater scale than suggesting Day and Willis not work
entirely alone. Day recounts Bates's blocking their attempts to sign a management
deal with a company he disliked, dragging them down to London from Sheffield for
superficial meetings, and demanding an 'Executive Producer' credit on their album
when he at no time visited Willis's Crow Edge studio. Whatever the justice of these
complaints, Bates displayed a clear disdain for the album when they at last presented
it to Phonogram in December, 1990,
We recorded the album at Crow Edge lock, stock and barrel, then we transferred
the tapes down to London and we mixed them in Swanyard because that's where
Chris (Sheldon) liked to mix ... and then Dave Bates turned around after a month
and just said "no" and got the other people in. ... The guy who did a couple of the
re-mixes was ... Mike Shipley, he's a bloody good engineer ... I went to see Chris
Sheldon and he said, "you do realise that Bates has asked for it to be re-mixed?"
and I said, "no ... it's the first I've heard of it" (and he said that Mike Shipley was
doing it and that he'd worked with him before) and I said, "lets go and sit in on
the sessions" ... and that never happened. Dave Bates wouldn't even let Chris
near them ... we weren't even told when the re-mixes or where the re-mixes were
being done, we didn't know, we weren't there, we were presented with them. We
had no control over it. (Day, ibid)
In the above way, Roadhouse ended up with an album that they had no commitment
to (because they felt it was no longer their album) and yet it was one they needed to
promote in order to save their careers. More than this, Day and Willis as the founding
and principal members of the act, went from a position of total belief and control in
and over their 'vision' to one of no control at all over how they were presented to the
public, on what terms, and with what effort and direction that presentation was made.
Worse still, they had no control even over what sounds the public finally heard as
Roadhouse.
As it was, their contractual obligations to Phonogram were onerous
(Roadhouse was expected to sell 300,00 albums in Britain alone) and with no
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promotional 'ground' prepared and no management support for the logistics involved
in creating a market, they floundered and floundered badly. The album was
eventually released in January, 1992, a year after its first completion. Sales were
poor, the band had no accurate sales data but the record made no impression on the
charts and neither did any of their three singles. Roadhouse played live to no great
response (touring with Saxon was their most prominent outing) and, shortly after
having new demos rejected by Phonogram, they were dropped from the label in June,
1992. Within a few months the band had split; more importantly, five and a half
years after initiating a musical relationship that, in its years of experiment and




The Formation of Latin Quarter.
Introduction
The narrative and analytical perspective on Respect and Roadhouse is
something of a 'bird's eye view'. Where Respect are concerned, I got to know Josie
Robson over a three-year period. In that time I learned fragments of the Respect story
piecemeal. I also discussed Respect with Malcolm Walmsley and at least met
Richard Hartley. My experience of Richard Day was less extensive. Discussions with
him (prior to interview) tended to take place at gigs, at parties and in studios (I
worked with various Sheffield acts in different capacities throughout the period of
this research). As I began to know Sheffield better I began to gain an overview of its
recent musical history. I did this almost entirely through discussion with other
musicians but I was also helped by an essay on Sheffield's post-punk years by Tim
Strickland, by the brochure for a highly successful local museum exhibition on
Sheffield's musical past, and by a supplement on the more recent history of Sheffield
pop acts in its local newspaper, 'The Star'.
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What was notable about discussions with local acts was the combination of
ways through which they defined and located their identity: partly with reference to
their style of music and to other, well-known acts they felt close to, stylistically; but
also in the very broadest terms of 'good' and 'bad'; 'music' and 'business'. Further, they
would also place themselves in some narrative of their own genesis as musicians and
in relation to other, contemporary and near-contemporary Sheffield acts (members
shared with acts that had gone onto to 'make it'; gibs played on the same bill as local
successes, and so on). Much of this ground has been covered in Cohen's work and I
do not intend to furnish a Sheffield version of Rock Culture in Liverpool. The
relevance of these observations, here, is that, by the time I came to conduct my
interviews, I had developed a 'mental map' of pop music-making in Sheffield from
the mid-70's to the mid-90's. This meant that I could concentrate on the details of the
careers of Respect and Roadhouse without being side-tracked by the need for
explanation of local venues, personalities, studios, other acts, and so on. Most of this
is not apparent from the case histories, it is foundational and subterranean, but, more
than this, once an act is signed to a major label, it loses its immediate markers and is
faced with a need to re-locate within not just the physical space of a record company
(its plush London offices) but, crucially, in its temporal and its cultural space (a
crucial stage in the journey from 'the bedroom' to 'mass consciousness' - see chapter
one). This re-location, this 'up-rooting', is perhaps what challenges all pop acts on
signing a major deal.
By focusing more sharply on Latin Quarter, I lose the sense of geographical
and pop cultural 'place' that fuelled my study of Sheffield acts - this is far more an
account of an act that developed (and was challenged in and through) a very different
sense of identity and self-definition. But what is lost in some ways, should be gained
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in others: the more detailed our attempt to track the roots of failure to the
commodification process; the more dense the interconnections between the principals
can be seen to be. In the Latin Quarter case history there are more 'voices'. All of
them have been encouraged into expressing post hoc rationalisations of 'what went
wrong' and each account is negotiated with me, through me and, in the writing, by
me. None is a jigsaw piece' because there are as many jigsawed pictures as there are
informants, but the fact that each piece is dense and complex (because it derives
from, or attempts to express, a'whole picture') should convey, as it cannot convey in
the cases of Roadhouse and Respect, just how many agendas there are in record-
making and how much mental work goes into prosecuting often entirely different
versions of 'the way forward'. This represents a difference in quality as well as in
quantity and, consequently, I have elected to discuss Latin Quarter in two separate
chapters. Further, the Latin Quarter record that failed, Mick and Caroline, was a
second, rather than a first album. I do not consider that this invalidates the discussion
of Latin Quarter - Mick and Caroline was still a first album for a major label - but it
does mean, at the very least, that many important patterns of behaviour had been
established before Latin Quarter began to record this second album; and also that
expectations of it would be different because it was a 'follow up' to an album,
Modern Times, that had, curiously, been neither a success nor a failure.
Modern Times had been released by 'Rockin' Horse' Records, a newly-
established, independent label (discussed below). 'Rockin' Horse' was far too small to
compete in the national record market and the company was sold by its principal
founder during the sales campaign for Modern Times. This effectively killed the
album but it had generated enough interest in Latin Quarter for the act to be signed by
Arista Records (then a major in its own right, now part of BMG). Also, 'Rockin'
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Horse' had licensed the album to RCA Germany and it was in the process of selling
extremely well there when Latin Quarter joined Arista; this added a pressure that the
other acts in this study did not experience. Despite these dissimilarities, there is much
that remains directly comparable, particularly the fact that Latin Quarter ended with
an album much like Roadhouse's - one that the company had insisted on re-mixing,
and then not supporting when the re-mixes had been completed. This meant that the
act was forced to promote a record it disowned, anq that its record company that was
not prepared to sell, in order to try to maintain its career. A more substantial
comparison of the experiences of Respect, Roadhouse and Latin Quarter will be the
work of the concluding chapter; here we can record that, although unlike the former
two, Latin Quarter survived the experience, it did so only after leaving the label,
losing two members, souring relations with a manager who had been a long-time
friend and entering a downturn in fortunes that they were subsequently unable to
reverse. In order, then, to identify those 'patterns of behaviour' that contributed to this
impasse, we need to trace Latin Quarter back to its foundation.
The Song-Writers.
Latin Quarter was formed in late-1983. The circumstances of its formation
were unusual. The band was formed to perform material that was already written.
This material was the result of my collaboration with Steve Skaith. Again, unusually,
this had not begun as a deliberate collaboration as such but rather an 'accidental'
partnership that started as a sideline to Skaith's main song-writing activity,
concentrated around his work with Steve Jeffries. Both men were signed to
Chappell's Music. Skaith had begun to write in Liverpool. A friend, Eamon Kennedy,
an established advertising jingles writer with access to musicians and studio time,
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had asked him to write lyrics for already written melodies. Kennedy then 'demoed'
(made a demonstration tape of) these songs and encouraged Skaith to begin the
rounds of attempting to interest song publishers in this work. Through another
London-based friend and musician, Richard Wright, Skaith was put in touch with
Jeffries. Wright and Jeffries had met in Manchester where the former was a student at
the Royal College of Music. They had helped form the band 'Bicycle Thieves' that
included Howard Jones and on meeting again in London had helped establish 'The
Inversions'. Wright played guitar and Jeffries played keyboards in what, by 1982, had
become a significant act in the British 'jazz-funk' scene. At the same time, Jeffries
was involved in writing material for a vocal group, 'Soft Touch', that had been
established by his girl-friend, later wife, Mary Carew, with two friends, Carol Douet
and Yona Dunsford. It was on this material that he collaborated with Steve Skaith,
where Skaith provided the lyrics for Jeffries' melodies and arrangements and this
material, together with other joint compositions, won them their publishing contracts
with Chappells.
Even in this abbreviated form, a bare description of one individual's path into
the music industry can be seen to combine a variety of factors that connect only
tangentially with actual music - in this case, the existence of contacts who were able,
firstly, to provide Steve Skaith with well-realised demo tapes that, in turn, convinced
other contacts that people they knew, who were already working on projects, might
take him seriously, and so on. Admittedly, what Skaith was attempting to do (become
an independent song-writer) was unusual for its time, and it certainly bore no
connection with what was happening in pop music in general. For example, when
Skaith made his first music-related trip to London, in March 1981, post-punk rockers
were expressing themselves either as a series of raiding parties on 60's music in a
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search for fresh sources of energy (Dexy's Midnight Runners, The Jam, The Specials)
or they were pouring that intensity into the circuits of newly available cheap
synthesisers in search of a new club culture (Duran Duran, The Human League,
Depeche Mode). Nevertheless, gaining a publishing deal with Chappell's, who were
known at this time as the 'Rolls-Royce' of publishers and who, as Chappells-WEA,
have since grown larger still, is to be very much part of the music business.
I had been a friend of Skaith's for some time before the developments
described above unfolded. Their impact that all of this had on me was striking. As a
schoolboy, I had been in the stereotypical 'three friends who form a band' for several
years - but, crucially, not for any particular instrumental or vocal proficiency; I
played percussion in a folk-rock group, sang backing vocals and contributed
primarily by composing original material. My approach to composition was to sing
phrases that somehow resonated with me. In the act of singing a particular lyrical
phrase, I would simultaneously develop the lyrical and the melodic idea contained in
the original expression. I would do this purely vocally, and commit the lyric to paper
and the melody to memory. Then, in rehearsal, I would sing my latest song to my
fellow band members who would translate what I had sung to guitar and we would
arrange the song from there. This lasted for three years. In that time I built up a
considerable body of material that abruptly lost any outlet when the various band
members were dispersed by the ending of their time in school. I harboured the idea of
somehow allying myself with a composer, but lacked the initiative to use the music
press to find a collaborator. Equally, university led me away from popular music and
into the Far Left where this experience, in turn, caused me to condemn pop as yet
another aspect of 'Bourgeois Ideology'. Ironically, it was at this point that I met Steve
Skaith. Even so, for several years, we were both a considerable distance from any
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thought of collaborating as song-writers. His, to me, sudden transformation into a
fully-fledged song-writer revived in me the buried ambition to write pop songs. That
he responded so immediately and effectively to the first lyric I gave to him, seemed
to re-connect earlier, imaginative circuits and, within a very short period, his writing
partnership with me replaced his existing partnership with Steve Jeffries and this led,
also fairly rapidly, to the formation of Latin Quarter. This recorded, we need to re-
trace our steps and examine how Steve and I wrote, what we wrote, and why we
wrote it .
The first lyric I gave Steve Skaith, in August, 1981, was titled 'Pyramid
Label'. The method of its composition was identical to that of the material I had
composed over ten years earlier: the simultaneous occurrence of a lyrical idea
expressed in melodic terms; in this case, the phrase, 'I bought a record on the
Pyramid Label' sung as a snatch of an, as yet, unwritten song. Understandably, there
are no studies of composition by non-musicians; while, the general literature on
composition tends to ignore how creative ideas occur in the imagination in order to
concentrate on the structures of completed compositions. Despite this, it seems
inappropriate to restrict creativity to the 'ineffable' and to carry on the discussion
from the point of the finished and, crucially, usually published composition (where
this, then, will also mean ignoring all the factors that led to the publication of that
composition).
I have yet to encounter a satisfactory account of the part memory of 'heard'
sounds and imagination play in combining to create new music and further discussion
must lie outside this text, but I am impelled to report my song-writing in these terms.
It is my contention that my ability to compose complete pop songs in my imagination
is not a mysterious 'gift' - it is the product of a combination of factors in which, while
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the particular combination might be unique to me, many of the factors so combined
are general to all members of a society saturated in mediated communication. Put
simply, all of us absorb huge amounts of information, willingly and unwillingly, and
some of this information is musical information. On this basis, we might willingly
choose to play a favourite record, attend a concert, go to a discotheque, or tune into a
favourite DJ; but, equally, we might play music radio as a background to other
activities, sit in a pub and have unwanted music played throughout our stay, sit
through television programmes to which we have no great commitment but where
these will almost always use music in some way, have music played as a background
to our shopping or even when we are put on 'hold' by a business we may have
telephoned. The construction of musical 'taste' (as the term 'taste' suggests) is as
much sensual as it is cultural. Our culture makes available a certain range of music
and musical usage to us, but individual appetite, socially grounded though this is,
determines for us which music will have positive connotations, and which negative.
On this basis, our memory will store-up sounds in the way that it stores other
information, and we can draw on these sounds, and combine and re-combine them at
will.
Often people will hum to themselves familiar and usually (but not always)
favourite melodies. Arguably, equally often, humming, whistling and even sung
snatches of songs can encourage some form of embellishment, extemporisation or
improvisation. The combination of words with this music, a lyrical phrase on an
improvised musical phrase, can suggest not that a song might be made from this
coincidence of phrasing but that a song already exists in and through the existence of
the phrase itself and it is left to the creative imagination of the phrase-maker to
'reveal' that song. How 'absorption' further assists this process is an effect of generic
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reinforcement - we 'know' that a pop song consists usually of three verses, a chorus
and a bridge of some kind and we 'know' also that the various pop styles utilise these
standard ingredients in distinct, but not overly different, ways. Understood in this
way, the one bar, twelve syllable phrase, 'I bought a record on the Pyramid Label'
contained enough musical information for me to be able to estimate where, in an as
yet 'latent', song such a phrase was likely to be. Once so estimated, I needed to chart a
musical course that would take me to the end of the suggested song. This is not to
make an essentialist argument in which only one 'Pyramid Label' song could exist,
but only to recognise that the sung phrase would bear completion as a song titled
'Pyramid Label', of which an infinite number of variants could be generated from the
initial phrase. The further work was then to develop, lyrically, the resonance that the
sight of a 'record on the Pyramid Label' in my record collection had set up in my
imagination. As it transpired, I used references to early 'Ska' records to connect the
Rastafarian use of Old Testament concepts with contemporary conflict in 'The Bible
Lands'. Whether or not I succeeded in this is not the issue; what is, is that I completed
a song, an original composition, and I did it, again, not because I possessed a 'gift' for
song-writing but because I had a desire to write (born of the specific way in which I
had internalised the excitement of pop music from comparatively early childhood
through to late-adolescence, and even beyond) where this desire had the chance,
suddenly and unexpectedly, to become 'flesh' because of the coincidence of my
knowing someone who, at least from my remote vantage point, had recently 'entered
the music business'.
As I make this account of the writing process and my coming to a
collaboration, I am aware that it can be read, partially, as a standard, 'being in the
right place at the right time' version of the 'birth' of a song-writing partnership. My
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account of the song-writing process is unsupported by reference to any more
extensive literature on how compositional ideas are formed. In the first instance, I am
aware that I am attempting to suppress the idea of the predominant influence of
chance or fate for the reason that these terms are misused as part of ideological
constructs that always conveniently erase traces of industrial decision making from
popular products. Despite this, meetings between individuals who share common
perspectives and aspirations can be random and, rather than deny what is random we
should contextualise these factors in order to reduce our reliance on 'fate' as an
explanation. In the second instance, I can only report how I experienced song-writing
in a way that attempts to demystify it rather than represent it as a 'gift' or the result of
'inspiration' (in the fullest sense), and so on.
When I finally summoned the courage to give Steve a copy of the lyric I had
written (I was nervous that he would react badly, not just to the lyric itself but on the
grounds that I was somehow 'muscling in' on his publishing deal - which I was) I was
pleased that his reaction to it was so swift and affirmative - on returning to London
he made a crude demo of the song and posted a copy to me. His reason for
responding so quickly to the lyric was, in part, and in his own words, 'because I found
it so interesting' but there was more to his response than I appreciated at the time. In
an interview, he discussed his early music industry experience in the following way,
The irony is that Eamon was never interested in what I could do musically ... but,
because I'd been to university and done an English degree, when he came to
branch out from writing jingles and (needed) lyrics ... he approached one of his
best friends who'd actually done an English degree. 3
3 From an interview with Steve Skaith on 15 /4/94 .
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The same terms then applied in his writing partnership with Steve Jeffries, as
indicated previously. This meant that, on receiving a lyric from me, and one so
removed from the material he had written jointly with his existing partners ('mainly
love lyrics' ), he had the opportunity, at last, to compose.
Although unexpected and unbidden, that I should have written a lyric was not, in
itself, a surprise to Steve. We had played with the idea of collaborating on material at
an earlier date, under very different circumstances. This earlier attempt, far more for
its context than for any content (which barely existed) would come to bear on what
the Latin Quarter experience would consist of. The circumstances of this brief, early
collaboration were defined by the practice of the British Far Left and by the
organisation, 'Big Flame', in particular. As members of this organisation we were
caught up in every aspect of its activities. Despite a comparatively large literature on
British Marxism, very few studies attempt to convey the actuality of commitment and
how cloistered and saturating this can be for the individuals involved (what accounts
exist tend to be fictionalised and related to earlier epochs - as in the works of Doris
Lessing, Edward Upward and Clancy Sigal). Big Flame's politics can be defined,
loosely, as Neo-Libertarian: convinced that revolution in Britain was imminent but
aware that only a re-modelled Marxism developed out of a critique of Marxism's own
past would be sufficient to the demands of that revolution. The 'critique' which
needed to be mounted was one that re-investigated how power was exercised under
capitalism - where the identification of the state as the repository and guarantee of
ruling class power was felt to be insufficient and misleading. Instead, Marxists
needed to be aware of how oppressive power relations were reproduced not only
within the working class but within their own organisations (and therefore through
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their own political practice) essentially in terms of the reproduction of hierarchies of
power that reflected ethno-centric, patriarchal values. We carried this perspective
over into our later approach to the demands of the music industry and to the
practicalities of existing as a pop group. In the initial period, these politics also
informed our collaboration in an explicit way but what was not apparent was that
there was a far from complete 'fit' between our politics and our separate conceptions
of pop music and of how this might be pressed into the service of politics.
If we begin with the second part of the last point above then, in response to
my question, 'Why did you begin to write songs?', Steve's unhesitating reply was,
Chile solidarity ... The Chileans, there's no doubt about that. The first song I
wrote was called 'Santiago Boy' , the second one was 'Victor Jara' which was a
lyric by Adrian Mitchell which, I later found out, Arlo Guthrie had put music to
and recorded. It was definitely that, seeing all those Chileans in political
meetings suddenly up singing songs. (Skaith, ibid)
When we first discussed the possibility of 'political' pop songs (but not, then,
of writing them ourselves) I had no conception of the sources of Steve's inspiration
and, essentially, he had no access to my, far less coherent, conception of what such
songs should sound like. Instead, our common ground was the laborious work of
maintaining a tiny, revolutionary organisation where this, in terms of fund raising
(either directly for the organisation or, more usually, for campaigns that it supported)
involved holding 'socials', or fund-raising social events. These were held on many
occasions, by many different organisations and campaigns, throughout Liverpool, an
almost entirely 'hidden' experience of music-making and use. Typically, a social
would consist of a hired room, self-catered food for sale, a raffle, several speeches,
and live entertainment followed by a disco. The 'entertainment' normally consisted of
a handful of singers, either unaccompanied or accompanied only by acoustic guitar,
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who would draw on a relatively limited repertoire of what would now be called,
'Politically Correct' material - usually Woody Guthrie, perhaps early Bob Dylan,
Irish 'rebel' songs and industrial folk songs. Following this, dancing would begin and
'political correctness' would give way to the staple fodder of a disco that consisted of
the type of material familiar from early 70's University discos - old soul numbers and
chart hits. In all of this, the irony of dancing to the Rolling Stones' 'Brown Sugar',
which includes the lines, 'Scarred old slaver, he's, doing alright. Hear him whip the
women just around midnight', seemed lost on the regular audience at these events.
When we recognised the phenomenon described above, our first attempt to
'up-date' the existing, collective repertoire was conceived within the terms and
conditions of that repertoire, principally as 'agit-prop' songs, written for acoustic
guitar, on themes more contemporary than the judicial murder of Saccho and
Vanzetti and fighting in the Jarama Valley (moving though these were). When we
came to write songs together three years later some, but not all, of these perspectives
were still in place. Although we had both moved on from Big Flame and into the
Labour Party, our politics were still those of the Libertarian left (then probably more
prominent politically - in the figure of Ken Livingstone and in the policies of the
GLC - than at any time since the rise of the 1950's New Left ). Musically, our
conception of the need for, and likely form of, politicised pop music had also moved
on. But, crucially, this still bore no relation to existing expressions which, in the most
general sense, were those of a large part (but certainly not the whole) of the
developments that can be gathered under the general heading of 'Post Punk',
described previously. Instead, at a general level, our concept of music was what we
understood 'mainstream pop' to be: three minute chorus songs with strong hooks.
Viewed from a distance, this conception was congruent with our shared cultural
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(certainly, pop cultural) 'rootlessness'. As two people in their late-twenties, we could
no longer consider ourselves part of any youth sub-culture; although, arguably, our
continued existence as active members of the 'student generation' was a decisive sub-
cultural location (one that is under-researched). Certainly, this 'Leftist' culture gave
our song-writing its meaning and it was this that had to be re-located inside the music
industry (rather than any locally- or provincially-derived set of cultural assumptions
that might have informed the expectations of Respect and Roadhouse). The curious
factor where we were concerned was that this sense of rootlessness was submerged
under a strong sense of being powerfully connected to contemporary music-making
in the form of Steve's publishing deal. On this basis, from the as a song
writing partnership, we were 'in' music, but not 'of it.
In a sense, the preceding description of Steve's response to his receipt of
'Pyramid Label' as 'swift and affirmative' displays the danger of using the self as a
research site - the fact that he responded seemed swift; equally, the fact that he
responded, at all, seemed affirmative. It would not be useful to attempt to deny either
quality but a caution needs to be raised. What cannot be denied is that I received a
taped song within a month; that Steve enjoyed the exercise; that I then proceeded to
send him lyrics; and that he began to spend more and more time working on them (so
much so that, by the time of the emergence of 'Latin Quarter' I had given him 55
lyrics from which he had composed 29 songs). What the emotionally charged 'swift
and affirmative' speaks from and speaks to is the effect on me of the completed and
recorded song; which was, in a fundamental, if entirely unarticulated way, to confirm
that I could be or, in fact, already was, a songwriter. This, then, is what the earlier
reference to the 're-connection' of inner, imaginative circuits really means. The loss
of song-writing partners at the age of nineteen; the failure to fulfil the ambition of
223
'becoming a song-writer;the burying of a love for pop music under layers of Marxist
permafrost - all seemed vanquished by the 'success' of the 'Pyramid Label'
experiment; and in the flush of that success, both of us ignored the need to state our
terms for this newly-minted partnership. Instead, in our excitement, we operated from
the incoherent premise of the much earlier discussions about 'political pop music' and
allowed our participation in the same Labour Left milieu to conceal the fact that our
separate understandings of pop music were very different.
When I gave Steve Skaith the lyric to `Pyramid LabeY, I made no attempt to
sing him my version or to make any indication of musical approach in terms of
tempo, arrangement, instrumentation, and the like. It could be argued that, principally
because of the connectedness between poetic metre and musical rhythm, a lyric might
induce the composer to compose in a particular style (a dirge would be an
inappropriate setting for a limerick, for example). In the experience of collaborating
in this way for fifteen years, the possibility of a lyric's innate musicality has not been
borne out. Unsurprisingly, in this instance, the style of 'Pyramid Label' is Reggae. As
he commented, Steve took (his) 'cue from the lyric, from the references in the lyric'
but not from any metrical information, as such. In this instance, his composition
satisfied me, more than satisfied me ('swift', 'affirmative') and I kept on being
satisfied (apart from occasional hiccoughs) from then on. But being 'satisfied' with
the results of musical collaboration is not the same as sharing a unity of purpose and
a unified vision. What my pleasure and excitement in the first completed song
unleashed in me was a vision of pop music constructed in adolescence - an
adolescence that took place in the 1960's when pop music became central to British
popular culture. I had absolutely no knowledge of how the music industry functioned,
all I 'knew' was that great song-writers became great successes because they wrote
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'great' songs. This, in turn, cast industry figures as people who would 'recognise a
good song when they heard one' and supply the necessary logistical aid to record and
promote those songs, to everyone's mutual financial (and artistic) benefit. Seated
unhappily alongside this Disney-like optimism was the converse and equally
confused 'understanding' that record companies were somehow 'bad' organisations
that had no sensibility for 'art' and existed to corrupt talent and steal its money.
Both these last sets of ideas derived from the music press of the 60's and
early-70's and the two notions mark, almost exactly, the transition of the weekly
music press from a 'pop' press to a 'rock' press sometime during 1969 - when I first
began to write songs. That neither depiction of the relationship between song-writing
and record-making is an accurate one was lost on me in the earliest years of my
collaboration with Steve Skaith. Instead, and in complete consistency with my
practice of composing in the imagination rather than on an instrument, I located my
'songs' (they were only songs to me, they were lyrics to everyone else) in the interior
landscape of my fantasy conception of how pop 'worked'. So, for example, and with
reference to lyrics composed in the immediate wake of 'Pyramid Label', I envisaged
'Cold in the Clouds' as a Neil Young song'; 'Last Bus to Broadway' as a 'Dire Straits
ballad'; 'Wherever You Are' as a 'Merle Haggard country song', and so on. And
because he could neither explore this interior landscape nor hear this interior
soundscape, Steve composed, and practised music, within an entirely different set of
parameters. Even so, and even if we had been closer to the pop cultural 'tides' of the
day, his were still not parameters that were informed with any greater sense of how
the music industry really functioned. On this basis, we both had much to learn -
although crucially what and how we learned would be contingent on the roles
specified for us by our rapidly altering relationship to that 'unknown' industry.
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For the purposes of this study, this lengthy account of how two individuals
came to write music together is pursued to indicate how, if we study the
interconnections between those composing individuals more closely, the fact of a
composition (we can hear it, we respond to it in an individual manner) often masks
the conceptions that the composers bring to the composition - where, quite crucially,
these 'conceptions' are not simply conceptions of what a composition is 'about' but
whether it is likely to be commercially successful, or not. Further still, collaboration
can also mask the differences in the conception collaborators can hold on what the
route to that success should consist of - it masks the separate inadequacies of their
understanding of what the music industry, as a whole, and what record companies,
specifically, do to bring success about. Clearly, not all composition, even in pop, is
collaborative, but the business of being a member of a pop act certainly is
collaborative, because what will eventually be sold is the commodified entirety of the
act - its sound, its look and its story. If, then, as in the case of Latin Quarter, two
song-writers can be shown to have operated intimately and yet in ignorance both of
each other's conception of what was happening and might happen to their
compositions, then the potential confusion this can sow in a pop act can only be
exponentially multiplied as more and more people become involved in the
'development' of the act that plays the music; the act that wins the deal and makes the
record.
The need for Mediation, the form of Mediation.
If composing and making tapes of those compositions was the first step in the
unfolding of what would become Latin Quarter, the subsequent stages of their
transformation into released pop texts are entirely bound up with the actions of
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'intermediaries'. Put very simply, (and in precisely the terms that Respect and
Roadhouse recognised their own organisational insufficiencies), Steve and I could
not 'make it' alone. Latin Quarter 'rose' from my nervously giving Steve Skaith a lyric
in 1981 to a record contract for a fully-fledged band three years later, but there was
nothing either pre-destined or, and more importantly, pre-determined in much of this.
Rather, each encounter with an intermediary figure (with someone who argued that
they believed we could 'make it' and that they knew how to bring this about) set up its
own dynamic and these separate dynamics lent their growing energy to the overall
momentum of an entity that became 'Latin Quarter'. Much of this process of
combined dynamism was connected to the existence of a set of compositions and to
the productivity of a compositional partnership; enormous amounts of activity and
many layers of decision making were generated and carried out in the name of those
compositions but it would be wrong to consider this complex inter-locking of tasks
and decision making as being driven by those compositions, or that the compositions
themselves, in some reified manner, determined which activities should be pursued
and which decisions should be made. Certainly, the ranges of activities and decisions
taken were determined by the need to transform compositions into realised texts (or
proto-pop into pop) - to make records out of songs and sell them - but each connected
aspect in the process of this transformation (the actions of each 'intermediary') had its
own specificity. Each intermediary figure drew on his or her own field of expertise
and associated culture of practice and the actions they initiated generated their own
set of consequences. We will need to explore these observations in greater detail in
the concluding chapter; here it may be more productive to 'encounter' the
intermediaries that helped 'create' Latin Quarter in the way that Skaith and I did, and
then explore how these 'encounters' inflected who and what Latin Quarter was
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understood to be.
As earlier references indicated, Latin Quarter's first album, 'Modem Times'
appeared on the 'Rockin' Horse' label. 'Rockin' Horse' had been formed in early 1984
by Derek Block, a leading concert promoter, and Jeff Gilbert who, until being invited
to establish the new company, had been Marketing Director at CBS records. From the
outset, Jeff Gilbert's signing policy conflicted with Block's motivation in wanting to
establish a record label.
His concept of the company was totally different from mine. His ... was, 'Let's do
some T.V. albums. Get Johnny Mathis, re-record some old stuff, advertise it on
T.V. and make some money"... He'd been a promoter which is totally different
from being in the record business ... I wanted to sign new bands and see them be
successful because I thought that's what I was best at. So I managed to talk him
into saying "OK. you can have a budget for signing new bands" rather that get on
and develop these T.V. albums, which we never did. 4
Latin Quarter was Gilbert's first signing. He saw the band at the well-known
London music venue, 'The Mean Fiddler' in July, 1984, on the recommendation of
Andrew Pryor, at the time of writing Managing Director of the Parlophone label for
EMI, but then in temporary retirement from a similar position at Ariola records as
part of his convalescence from a major illness. Pryor had learned of Latin Quarter
from an acquaintance who, in turn, had met Marcus Russell, one half of Latin
Quarter's management team, and had been persuaded by Russell to make a small, but
important, investment in the band. Russell, with Sean Clarke, had assumed
managerial responsibility for Latin Quarter in the previous year - in fact, the band
was formed on his initiative. This initiative came as a consequence of his and
4 From an interview with Jeff Gilbert on 5/14/94.
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Clarke's determination to break into the music industry as managers. Their first foray
consisted of an attempt to place a cover version of the 1965 hit 'Eve of Destruction'
re-recorded by a local act from Harlow, where both men worked as teachers. Russell
and Clarke made a forceful team. They had managed to arrange meetings with A&R
departments at several major record labels which is, traditionally, a considerable
achievement. At exactly this time, April 1983, I played Russell the earliest
compilation of demos that Steve Skaith had recorded of the material we had written
together. The connection in this case was a strong one; Russell was my oldest school
friend and had joined Big Flame, as a result of my encouragement, several years
earlier. We had also enjoyed success as local club promoters in our late-teens,
presiding over the most successful Rock and Folk venue in South Wales for a short
but exciting period in 1970 - this had given us both a taste for 'the business' (but very
different conceptions of how it 'worked').
Though this sudden torrent of detail and names is perhaps reminiscent of the
introduction to a Russian novel, its volume has a value in that this passing from hand
to hand should again exemplify how contingent is the process of winning a record
contract. In the same way that Steve Skaith won his publishing deal two-and-a-half
years earlier, the currency in both cases was compositions, but neither example bears
out the gloss that 'talent will always out': essentially, the currency is bitten into in
each transaction and declared sound, but the route that this sequential exchange takes
owes as much to connections as it does to talent. Once more, this is not to argue that
the route is a chance one, at least, not entirely; this is not the accompanying myth of
'being in the right place at the right time'. There are too many 'places' involved, too
many points of exchange, for chance to be the determining factor. But, from the point
of view of how much of pop history is written (from a distance and after the event,
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like all history) researchers need to beware of separating text from context - in the
way that cliche does - and, on this basis, making either one or the other (or both, but
singly) the sole factor in the 'rise' of a pop act.
By the time Jeff Gilbert saw Latin Quarter, this was not an act derived
directly from 'Pyramid Label' and the subsequent compositions. Rather, in order to be
in a position to encourage Andrew Pryor to invite Jeff Gilbert to see Latin Quarter,
Marcus Russell, together with Clark, had dot simply established a neutral
management function that, somehow benignly, had helped two songwriters, thus far,
along the route towards success (which, notably, is how he represents his
involvement in the account furnished by Hewitt). Instead, distinct managerial
practices had been established under the conditions of which some types of decisions
were taken, and others ignored, and some methods of initiating actions were
employed, and others not admitted; where these, in turn, had already had 'musical'
results (they had affected how the original compositions now sounded). This is to
make no judgement of value or of competence at this stage, only to suggest that the
'Latin Quarter' who played the 'Mean Fiddler' was a 'Latin Quarter' inflected with, and
by, the accumulation of its interactions with the management team to that date; where
the areas so 'inflected' were crucial in terms not only of how the compositions that
formed the raison d'etre of the band were performed for an interested record company
but far more significantly in establishing that the act that played those compositions
was the act whose identity was synonymous with them.
The Role and Dynamics of Management .
When Marcus Russell listened to the demo tape I played him, he was so
enthused by it (and was already so enthused with the idea of being involved in the
230
record industry) that he offered to make efforts to interest record companies in my
and Steve Skaith's material. There was no real discussion about whether or not this
was a sensible course; it seemed 'logical' (our only other alternative was to try to
'place' the existing songs with other artists - already unlikely, given the nature of the
material) and it was an exciting prospect, especially for someone with my hazy idea
of how the music industry functioned. These attempts brought a quick return. In a
diary I kept at the time, I noted that London Records, Stiff Records, Arista, EMI and
MCA all 'kept the tape' - meaning that, following a meeting either with Russell or
Clarke, the record company indicated that they were interested esaug7h to keep tie
tape, and management details, for reference; and that Virgin Records, RCA and RAK
were 'interested'. In print, these responses may seem, if not exactly innocuous, then
certainly not dramatic, but this would be to miss the detailed sub-text of encounters
between uninvited potential suppliers and a global industry completely dependent on
fresh supplies of raw material (songs and acts) but unable to secure them in the way
that a steel manufacturer, for example, might buy up iron ore mines and limestone
quarries. As we have seen, it is the work of a record company's A&R department to
buy in supplies . In this activity they face twin problems that are intractable : firstly,
how to estimate what might be selling in two year's time (because, as a realistic,
assessment, that is how long the transformation process might take); and, secondly,
how to choose from the vast numbers of acts that exist at any one time. In terms of
the latter, A&R departments encourage a type of musical 'Social Darwinism' - if an
act has survived long enough and has been persistent enough to bring itself to the
attention of A&R then it at least has a certain toughness and persistence to
recommend itself to them. Further, Negus is right to suggest that it is not only the
A&R department that introduces acts to record companies (as the involvement of
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Andrew Pryor - incidentally one of Negus's respondents - in the Latin Quarter signing
attests to). Despite this, A&R continue to have the responsibility of initiating 'artist
development' within the company. But quite clearly, here, Russell had initiated 'artist
development' long before a deal was signed, by arguing the merits of an act that, at
this point, existed only in his head.
The only information that aspirant acts have to work on in the initial days and
weeks of contact with the music industry, is that 'MCA have kept the tape' or that
'Virgin is interested' (and little or nothing more). Apart from the enormous
excitement this guarded expression of interest provokes in act and management alike
(not to mention family and friends) - and an excited state is probably a poor state in
which to make decisions that have far reaching implications and effects - both
management and act are forced to work 'blind' from this point onwards. They are
forced to work blind precisely because of the guardedness of record labels which
mutes expressions of interest and understates the particular motivations behind that
interest (above and beyond conveying the general sense that they expect the act to be
successful and that this must have something to do with what compositions the act
sings and plays - they have only heard sounds at this point not truly considered
'image'). We can only speculate on the reasons for this guardedness but, arguably, its
causes are likely to stem from a combination of three considerations:
(a). At any one time, an A&R department might be at this preliminary stage
of contact with a comparatively large number of acts. While it will want to maintain
the commitment of all these acts, and not lose them to rivals, it will not want to give
the impression that a deal is likely at any moment, not for any altruistic reasons, but
because departmental staff know that their budget allows only a proportion of
contacted acts to be signed and that the level of involvement with acts, even at this
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early stage, can be quite considerable. By keeping an act 'warm', but at a distance,
they maintain the act's loyalty and commitment but they cut down on costs, workload
and emotional stress.
(b). If it is fairly certain that an act is likely to stand a chance of success, an
A&R department will do well not to stimulate outside interest in the band, (by
helping to attract press attention, for example), for fear of alerting rival labels to the
act's existence. If this happens, not only might they lose the act, but the act, or, more
specifically the act's manager, might be allowed the opportunity to demand a better
deal from them, in the knowledge that there is competition for the act's signature; the
latter then connects with the third consideration:
(c). As was argued in the second chapter, all A&R departments work within
budgetary limitations. When deals are struck, those deals, at least on paper, bind acts
for considerable periods of time. The standard contract normally commits an act to a
label for up to seven albums. What keeps costs down is firstly that the record label
will reserve the right to an 'Option' clause, meaning that they are not bound to make
those seven albums only that they must pay for the recording of the first album
(hence 'record' contract); it is then their prerogative, their option, to decide whether or
not they will attempt to sell that album and go on to make any other records of the
act's work from then to the seventh album. At each stage, the act will normally be
liable to an advance against anticipated royalties from sales. Traditionally, the act"s
management will 'commission' this advance (in Latin Quarter's case, Ignition
Management - Russell and Clarke's company - took twenty percent of the advance)
and both act and management will attempt to exist on this income while waiting for
those anticipated royalties to materialise. Further, the proportion of available
royalties that will accrue to the band is also not fixed and is the subject of negotiation
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- companies might make different offers for different recorded 'formats' and there
will be further clauses that relate to who pays for additional essentials like packaging,
promotion, playing live and so on. Taken together, considerable sums are almost
always involved, both in terms of initial outlay and in terms of who gets what, if and
when the records begin to sell. At the earliest stage of negotiation, then, in the form
of this early 'kept the tape' form of contact, an A&R department must indicate
interest without showing itself to be hugely enthusiastic (even if this is true) for the
reason that a manager, particularly a seasoned one, might demand advances, royalty
sharing deals and agreements on the many 'extras' that will favour the act (and,
therefore, the management company).
In the earliest stages of the evolution of Latin Quarter (from April, 1983
onwards), everyone involved was a beginner. The considerable interest which had
been expressed in our demo tape created a momentum of its own. Because of the
'guardedness' of A&R departments, described above, acts and managers are left to
'second guess' the record company or companies. Russell and Clarke began to lead
the guesswork and to develop strategies from it, and the actions they took soon began
to impact on the direction (and form) of the proto-pop that had provoked their initial
activity. On this basis, the strategy determined by management was based on the
premise that if record companies would admit them, listen to the music and respond
to it, then half the hard work of winning a record contract was already complete; and
that what else was needed was a live band that was creating a 'buzz' - developing a
reputation for memorable live performances that, additionally, might bring with it the
attention of the music press. On this basis, they tried to convince Steve Skaith that,
not only was this a sensible course, but that it was, in fact, the only effective one
available. Steve resisted this logic for as long as he could. As he told me, 'I had no
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real desire to perform, to get up in front of people, especially not as some kind of pop
star'.
In the event, he bowed to this pressure, pressure I intensified by my own
desire to progress from having the songs I had co-written signed to a publisher (the
fulfilment of the song-writing ambition) to their realisation as the core of a successful
pop group - thus re-connecting with the central and inexpressible excitement in pop
music created in me as early as Lonnie Donegan's 'Tom Dooley in 1958 and
intensified by the Beatles and the Rolling Stones thereafter. This is not a region of
logic but of elemental force, and one that had connected Russell and me (and later
connected Russell and Clarke) from an equally early date. As a minority of one,
Steve Skaith sought the advice of Richard Wright. He agreed to form the core of a
band but Russell and Clarke had already forged ahead. They booked a series of dates
in and around London for late-1983, to the last of which they intended to invite all
interested parties from record company A&R departments as well as the press and
other associated and relevant sectors of the music industry. They then returned to
Skaith and demanded to know why he and Wright were taking so long to assemble
musicians. Viewed from a distance, their frustration was understandable and, even,
justified - logic demanded the early formation of a band to capitalise on the
popularity of the demo tape; but this is a logic that over-rides musical considerations
and those vital considerations of who and what Latin Quarter were about. This was
Wright's objection,
It was too soon to form a band, I didn't mind doing a few dates, and helping to
get the musicians together, but there was no need to rush to form a band,
whoever we involved would need to understand, musically, what they were
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dealing with and it takes time to get those sorts of people together. 5
In the event, the initial dates were postponed, Skaith and Wright brought in Steve
Jeffries on key-boards and Carol Douet and Yona Dunsford (from Soft Touch) on
backing vocals, together with another friend, Dolly Hooker and, through contacts,
Wright found a bass player, Steve Greatham who, in turn, brought in a drummer,
Richie Stevens. Russell and Clarke then re-booked the dates and, in January, 1984,
Latin Quarter made its first live appearance. As it transpired, the strategy of inviting
record companies to the last of these six dates was modified as soon as it became
apparent to the management team that the live act would need considerable fine-
tuning before this could happen - there were problems with sound mixing, the
commitment and availability of musicians, performance values and so on.
The 'live' experience changed how the 'principals' (Russell, Clarke, Skaith,
Wright and myself) saw what was now called 'The Project'. Although the venues
were obscure, they had attracted the attention of the pirate station Radio Caroline.
One of Caroline's DJ's, Tom Anderson, began to play our demo tape on air. This was
a remarkable and unexpected development but it helped to convince us (but,
crucially, in different ways and for different reasons) that 'The Project' was on course.
Further, the compositions around which the act had been formed, at least those songs
played in that first live-set, had already undergone a major transformation (far ahead
of any hint of 'artist development' by a record company). Questions of
instrumentation and arrangement were being 'settled' long before any question of how
those compositions might best be recorded would ever be discussed - in fact, in the
5 From an interview with Richard Wright on 14/4/94.
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pursuit of the opportunity to record those compositions, much of the discussion about
how best to record them had already been closed down by their rehearsal and
performance as part of a 'live' set. From this point onwards, how certain songs might
sound as records was already 'fixed', not just in the imaginations of those who had
written the songs and those who had organised their performance, but also in material
reality - which is not to say that it was impossible ever to change them again, but only
to indicate that, once a song was rehearsed and established in the live-set (or
discarded), this version of a song tended to replace the demo version and act as a
template from which future versions might be generated; and, further, that these were
'living' templates in the sense that they consisted of the live performances, and
imaginative, musical contributions of individuals who were now 'in the band', this
meant, firstly, that parts could be changed only at the risk of upsetting a band
member and, secondly, that if a band member left for any reason, their part would
leave with them and any replacement player would bring their own signature to the
arrangement, regardless of how they tried to imitate the playing of whomever they
had been brought in to replace.
The Practice and Dynamics of Signing to an Independent Record Label.
This last condition (above) was eventually to have a significant impact on the making
of Mick and Caroline; as it was, the initial upheavals in personnel benefited the band.
After the first few live dates, Steve Greatham left for a Joan Armatrading World Tour
and Greg Harewood joined on bass. His background was similar to that of Jeffries
and Wright - playing jazz-funk with 'The Light of the World' and 'Central Line'.
Dolly Hooker also left and was not replaced and it was this comparatively settled
line-up that Jeff Gilbert saw at 'The Mean Fiddler'; enjoyed, and offered to sign.
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'Signing a deal', as the first chapter argued, is the great goal of all pop acts but, again,
it is only 'the end of the beginning'. Even so, as previous remarks have tried to
demonstrate, how an act gets to sign a deal produces what act signs a deal. If the live
performance of compositions 'fixes' songs for players and for immediate
'intermediaries' alike, they also fix them for the people who eventually sign the act.
But even more is 'fixed' for the latter - together with the songs what was fixed at 'The
Mean Fiddler' was an image of the act that JeffGilbert felt was worth investing in:
songs alone are not enough, the act must convince a label that, when its product is
taken to market, there will be buyers who will wish to consume not just their sound
but their totality (sound, look, story). What Latin Quarter appeared to have was a
winning combination of 'strong' material and a powerful image. The absence of a
'story', or at least one that a record company could understand (Marxist songwriters?)
was always an impediment and, in the absence of an articulation of its point of origin,
'Latin Quarter' was 'destabilised' as a consequence. We will need to explore this
further at a later point, here we need to recognise that the terms of signing Latin
Quarter were ones far removed from the earliest collaborations between Skaith and
me. As Jeff Gilbert expressed it several times on later occasions 'I thought I'd seen
the new Fleetwood Mac'. On this basis, Latin Quarter had its deal because it was
expected, by its record company to become a replacement Fleetwood Mac and not for
any of the (largely unspoken) reasons any of the principals had in their heads. In all
of this, the die cast by previous decisions was confirmed and incorporated, with this
new and powerful addition and its consequences, in a new form.
Two essential tendencies in the evolution of Latin Quarter and the path to
'Mick and Caroline' were present in the act's signing to Rockin' Horse:
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(1). Jeff Gilbert signed Latin Quarter because, in his words, 'they touched
me".
I remember saying to Steve, 'I think your music should be heard, I think you are
saying things that people should hear at this point in time'. That's the luxury of
having a little label. (Gilbert, ibid)
But Gilbert's having 'a little label' was the crux of the matter, for, in the sense of
running an entire label, he was a beginner, as well, and he began with Latin Quarter.
(2). Latin Quarter signed to Jeff Gilbert, to 'Rockin' Horse' Records because
they had no-one else to sign to . At bottom, the Ignition Management strategy of
becoming a high profile live act had failed. The interest the management team had
generated in the demo tapes during the Summer of 1983 had had to be kept alive for
almost a full year before there was a band ready to perform for interested record
companies. It is fair to argue that this delay was due largely to lack of foresight: in
suggesting in the very first contact with record labels that the demos were the work of
a band; and, when assembling a band, in underestimating the time and effort involved
in preparing the band to a level that would improve on the impression already created
by the material which had stimulated the interest of record labels in the first place.
In neither case can the strategic flaws, described above, be laid entirely at the
feet of Russell and Clarke. The only consistent note of caution throughout the
episode was struck by Richard Wright, everyone else gave their support either tacitly,
by not resisting overmuch (Steve Skaith), or wholeheartedly (me, band members,
other close supporters who, by this time, formed a kind of 'inner cabinet'). Even so,
all of this lengthy period was spent 'working blind' for the reasons outlined earlier;
yet, throughout the entire experience, the management team pretended to have sight.
For much of the time they conducted themselves very much like football coaches
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(Clarke coached a local soccer side, Russell became heavily involved in a local rugby
side - an interesting connection with both Frith's and Negus's use of sporting
metaphors to convey what intermediaries attempt to do). Their interactions,
particularly those with, the band, came to be little more than pep talks to keep up
morale while they continued to conduct a 'secret diplomacy', primarily with record
labels, but also with figures from the wide range of agencies involved in the life of a
pop act - publishers, promoters, publicists, designers, sound engineers road crew,
design consultants, and the rest. Ultimately, Russell learned to 'see' through
familiarising himself with the demands of 'working blind'. As he expressed it himself,
with reference to events even later than these,
You've got to bear in mind that I didn't know what I was doing. I was a reactive
manager ... I was spending nineteen and a half hours a day just reacting to the
force of the market, you don't even have five seconds to think about what's going
to happen in six weeks time because you're inexperienced. 6
Understood in this way, and however unimpeachable his motives, Russell's
'learning to see' came at the expense of Latin Quarter's contusions, fractures and near-
fatal injuries. Further, he was only transmitting to the act a limited version of what it
was that he was learning. In this way, 'collective decisions' (Latin Quarter held lots of
'band meetings' with Russell and Clarke) were taken on the basis of partial, and
sometimes mis-information. For example, signing with Rockin' Horse came after the
initial interest of the majors had waned as a result of being made to wait so long to
see the 'live' Latin Quarter (a year). When it came, the deal appeared to have saved
the day, but 'appeared' is the operative term.
The originating terms of Rockin' Horse as a record label were not
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encouraging. Firstly, despite his years of experience in the record industry, Jeff
Gilbert did not have direct experience of A&R nor of overall control of a record
label; secondly, although his relationship with Derek Block was a close one, both
men understood the function and purpose of the record label differently; and, thirdly,
while, in Gilbert's own words, 'we owned the company fifty-fifty', all the working
capital was Block's. For Latin Quarter, Rockin' Horse meant salvation, but signing
with them (in August, 1984) was not the fulfilment of the frantic expectations of the
previous fifteen months. After a year of expecting to sign a deal with a major record
label, Latin Quarter signed with an independent label that had no pedigree and, more
importantly, had been created on terms that were vastly different from those which
drove the, by this time well-established, independent record sector. Put simply,
Rockin' Horse was no 'Rough Trade' or 'Factory' or Uute','Post ,card', or `4AV. The
label had not been formed with Punk or post-Punk energy to achieve what Punk and
post-Punk tried to achieve - an outlet for successive New Waves' of British music
shunned by the major labels. Instead, an established, not to say 'Establishment'
promoter (of acts like Shirley Basset' and Tony Bennet) had decided to dabble in the
record industry, but still on familiar ground ('Get Johnny Mathis, re-record some old
stuff...'). That Gilbert was able to manoeuvre around this founding premise in order
to 'sign new bands and see them be successful', did not mean that he had found any
new sympathy with the philosophy of the independents. Instead, his conception of
what a record company should be about remained the one developed throughout his
years with CBS - to sign acts that would have a broad enough appeal to sell large
numbers of albums. This was good for Latin Quarter in the sense that someone from
6 From an interview with Marcus Russell on 6/4/94.
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a major, and mainstream, background could imagine their fulfilling that role (despite
the implied caveat that the signing was an indulgence made possible by running 'a
little label'). What was bad for Latin Quarter was that no-one recognised that the
band had 'fallen between two stools'; on the one hand Rockin' Horse did not have the
resources enjoyed by a major label to translate potential into sales; on the other, Latin
Quarter, as an act, would enjoy none of the kudos that came with being signed to an
'indie' label. Finally, the label signed the act to be a mainstream act, and no-one
involved truly took this on board.
What the Rockin' Horse experience amounted to was a collection of
comparative new-comers 'shadow boxing' the record industry for a year (which is as
long as the label lasted). Rockin' Horse had a staff of only four people, including
Gilbert. Two of the four were nineteen year-olds. One of these, Helen Lee, was
appointed as a one-person Press and Promotions department as a result of her
persistence in sending Gilbert hand-written, photo-copied fanzines from Liverpool.
This meant that Latin Quarter's press campaign was devised and conducted by
someone who had never lived in London and had no experience whatever of the
music industry or music press. In the meantime, Gilbert attended to Radio promotion
(with the help, when required, of an expensive, but effective, 'plugging' company,
'Ferret and Spanner') mainly through an informal list of contacts built up during his
CBS days. In this relaxed but largely unfocused atmosphere, the band produced an
album, 'Modem Times', that it 'lost' in the dissolution of 'Rockin' Horse'. Preparation




The Making of Mick and Caroline:
the Unmaking of Latin Quarter.
The Practice and Dynamics of Signing to a Major Record Label.
Latin Quarter signed to Rockin' Horse Records in late-August, 1984. Almost
exactly a year later, the company was sold to Arista Records. When I asked Jeff
Gilbert why Derek Block had sold Rockin' Horse so soon after starting the company,
he replied,
A question of money. He'd spent £320,000 ... We hadn't wasted it, it just takes
that much money to pay the wages of four staff, make two albums, sign two acts
and give them advances; it just takes that much money. And Arista came along
and said, 'We'd like to sign your label because we want those two acts and we'll
take Jeff as part of the deal'. Now, I would have said No' but I couldn't say no
because I didn't have enough money; it was Derek's decision whether he got his
money back and walked away, which he did. He got all the money back and then
he got a point on every Lisa Stansfield album, he made a lot of money ... I don't
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blame him, he'd found out that the record business wasn't what he thought it was.
(Gilbert, ibid)
Block's decision shows how insecure was Latin Quarter's tenure at Rockin'
Horse; but, again, the facts of the general insecurity of existence in the record
industry were not absorbed. Rather, the transfer was presented, by Ignition
Management, as a good move; as, in fact, the long-anticipated move to a major label,
instead of being the only practical course which existed under the circumstances
(there was nowhere else to go and Modern Times was still in the process of being
sold). The fact that the Rockin' Horse team and artist roster moved together to Arista
helped to preserve an illusion of continuity; but, in reality, continuity could not be
preserved.
The fact that the continuity of Latin Quarter's existence as a recording act had
been disrupted would not register until the completion of Mick and Caroline. That
this was the case is largely attributable to the nature of relations between the act and
its management whose role began to change under the new pressures associated with
life on a major label. We will need to return to Marcus Russell's account of these
changes at a later point, but we can record here that the changes were not simply
quantitative in kind. When Latin Quarter joined Arista it joined a company with a
large staff and a large number of acts. As remarks in chapter four indicated, we can
usefully compare a major label with a large, commercial airport: in order to ensure
that journeys begin on time (and that there are no collisions), each album is allotted a
take-off time, runway and flight path. To miss any of these can cause huge delays and
much confusion. Under these circumstances, management responsibilities were
forced to undergo a qualitative change - Latin Quarter was no longer a privileged and
protected entity (despite the Rockin' Horse re-location), there were new schedules to
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obey and far more departments to deal with in the preparatory period of recording
and release. Additionally, Modem Times had become a hit in Germany. The album
rapidly charted, reached number twelve and sold, eventually, over 140.000 copies.
This added to management's workload - a high level European tour needed to be
organised and a new set of scheduling pressures was added to the existing load.
Further, and at exactly this time, the single 'Radio Africa' became a hit in Britain.
Ultimately, this record was to fall victim to-'upheavals inside Arista (see below).
Before we consider this we need to appreciate that, from a management point of
view, it may have appeared desirable that the band simply agree to whatever
suggestions it made in response to the unremitting series of demands thrown up on
and by every 'front'; yet, what they faced, and what Marcus Russell increasingly faced
alone, was an act that, if not exactly impossible to manage, was constitutionally
difficult to direct.
We have seen that, even in the very earliest stages of its formation, there was
tension between the principal members of 'the Project' (Russell's frustration with
Skaith; Wright's frustration with Russell, to identify just two). These tensions never
abated; instead, not only did they grow but new and even more intractable ones grew
alongside them. As the pressure mounted, tensions generated by conflicts between
the need for management to set targets and the nature of the band's responses both to
the time-tables associated with those targets and frequently to the targets themselves
began to polarise band and management. Ultimately, all of these conflicts swirled
around the figure of Steve Skaith who, as de,facto leader of the band was restricted in
his ability to deal with the central tensions surrounding the band (and therefore his
own, joint, compositions) for a series of complex reasons. Among these we can
identify three deep-rooted impediments (although, understandably, not in any order
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of precedence) .
(1). The 'operating principle' of Latin Quarter's founding were the songs Steve
and I wrote together. These songs excited record companies; and, what became
Ignition Management (Russell's firm), determined that an active band be formed to
play those songs. In terms of the range of lyrics I sent him, Steve Skaith's inclination
was to write around those with a more obviously 'social' content (although Mick and
Caroline reflected this less clearly than did Modern Times). The notion that Latin
Quarter was a 'political' band, however, came to attach itself to the act rather than it
being a conscious decision of the act to promote itself in this way. What 'politics' did
inform Latin Quarter was the libertarianism of our joint pasts (Russell's included).
The two main effects of this were, firstly, to quickly initiate a non-sexist policy with
regard to the act's women singers (which led, ironically, to the 'new Fleetwood Mac'
tag); and, secondly, equally quickly, to initiate an unarticulated sense of 'democracy'
among the act's members. The further effect of this was to make decision-making a
slow process; it also generated an inchoate, but powerful, resistance to any
management or record company request or directive that appeared to compromise the
never-articulated 'integrity' of the band. This was particularly true of Skaith's own
resistance (consistent with his initial reluctance to form a band) to any action on his
part that might be construed as violating the principles of an active socialist (where
he felt particularly exposed to the scrutiny of his peers in the context of his ongoing
commitment both to the Labour Party and various political campaigns - notably the
Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign). Clashes with Russell and Clarke and also with Jeff
Gilbert are too numerous to recount, but the root of most, if not all, of these lay in
this soil. At base, Latin Quarter, in keeping with the Far Left heritage of its founders,
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was especially good at saying what it was opposed to, and indescribably bad at saying
what, in detail, it was for.
(2). Steve Skaith was further restricted by the intractability of tensions
surrounding individual musicians. Both management and record company were
united in their dislike of Richard Wright's role in the band. Wright, on the other hand,
was not only Skaith's oldest friend, he also valued Skaith's compositional abilities
and was concerned that developments within and surrounding the band consistently
compromised the musical needs of those compositions. On this basis, he offered a
consistent pole of resistance (and therefore a persistent source of discomfort) to both
management and record company. Given Steve Skaith's own resistance to much of
what came from these external sources, his loyalty to Richard Wright was
consistently reinforced. Even so, this tension could only have been distracting and
draining .
(3). There was further tension for Skaith throughout this period in that not
only was a personal relationship with Carol Douet foundering, but that she and
Martin Lascelles began to develop a new relationship. This meant that the rehearsals,
live performances and tours of the period were continuously highly-charged affairs
(about the only connection Latin Quarter ever had with Fleetwood Mac.). Again, this
can only have been demoralising and draining; it certainly was not a background
against which to articulate any counter positions and courses to those initiated by
management .
All of the above conditions fuelled the growing polarisation between Latin
Quarter and Ignition Management and Arista, but what added to the confusion (and
fuelled the tension) was that the lines of the demarcation of this polarisation were
never clear-cut and all the various permutations of diplomatic allegiance obtained at
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different times. Even so, what underscored these polarising tensions were three
further conditions: firstly, there was a growing resistance within the band to either
management or record company involvement in musical decision making. That much
of this 'involvement' had already been registered had gone unnoticed by all save
Richard Wright. As the tempo of events continued to quicken, and the volume of
decision making continued to expand, the band increasingly demarcated its sphere of
competence as that of its music, upsetting both management and record company's
sense that this area was, equally, in their respective fields of competence (the fraught
area of 'artist development'). Secondly, all of this was set against the inexorable
passage of time, hit records need to be consolidated and followed-up, Latin Quarter's
surprise breakthrough in Scandinavia, Germany and the Benelux countries
established its own momentum. Thirdly, Latin Quarter joined Arista just as Arista
was about to be merged with RCA Records, a merger that led to a large number of
redundancies (particularly amongst Arista staff) and, in effect, paralysed the newly-
emergent British arm ofBMG for a significant period.
As he became aware of this last condition, Russell became increasingly
dismayed, but he kept the information away from Latin Quarter (for fear of its
corrosive effect on morale). All of this added new strain to the relationship between
act and management as well creating high levels of tension between management and
record company. As Russell put it,
We were dealing with a very inexperienced record company. That record label
bought us because it had extra cash. Arista Records-Britain was then, and is to-
day, a loading bay for American-signed, Superstar product. ... They were still ...
responding to the British explosion in independent labels and independent music
which Punk Rock had initiated, which told them that their existing A&R
departments were inadequate so they responded by buying labels ... We were
sucked into an economic trend, it was nothing to do with what the music was
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like ...We ended up with a major label and had a hit very soon afterwards and
that major record company was totally inexperienced in how to deal with it....
There was a lot of shit going on at the time that you don't even know about
...Arista weren't even talking to RCA. All of a sudden there's this hit single in the
charts and RCA's distribution and sales forces were completely unprepared for it
... gossip said that Arista would close once the BMG take-over was complete,
there was a bad vibe and RCA London was looking out for itself. (Russell, ibid)
Understood in this way, what Latin Quarter had joined was not simply a major label
in transition but a major label in chaos, and chaos is no place in which to make
records. Understandably, and even while protected from full knowledge of that
chaos, the band picked up on the tensions in and around the Arista building - a
mansion in Cavendish Square that contained over seventy staff - plenty of space and
opportunity for rumour to reach band members. This helped, then, to polarise band
and record company, while, at the same time, the band became increasingly locked
into a polarisation with its own management, an entity that had its own problems
(increasing tensions between Russell and Clark, primarily over inequalities of work-
load) but one that afforded Marcus Russell an education in the practices of the record
industry that encouraged and reinforced the determination he had displayed from the
outset of 'The Project' to assert his competence in management affairs. His
determination was fed, arguably, by the high levels of adrenalin needed to contend
with the enormous pressure imposed by the demand to meet constantly appearing
deadlines and also with the relentlessly aggressive and ambitious people that inhabit
the international record industry.
The Record Lab el and the Search for a Producer.
The record that was to be titled Mick and Caroline went into full production at the
'Wool Hall' studios at Beckington (south of Bath) on the 6th of October, 1986. The
studio was the choice of the album's producer, Jason Corsaro. Corsaro was the
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majority choice of the band for producer but that choice was the product of fierce
controversy with both management and record company - where this controversy was
at once the product of the growing polarisation among these three key elements and
also its clearest articulation yet. To understand why, we need to trace the route of
each 'element' to the point of beginning to record Mick and Caroline.
No 'inquest' was held into the fate of Modern Times. The album was simply 'lost' in
the transfer to Arista. In the first instance, Rockin' Horse's lack of personnel and
'muscle' had meant a minimal campaign in Britain; although, freakishly, 'the single
'Radio Africa' had become something of a cause celebre for some DJ's and also for
Jonathan King who, at the time, had his own television programme, No Limits'. King
vowed that he would 'make 'Radio Africa' a hit' and played the record week after
week on national television. Unfortunately (ludicrously, even) not only did the
transfer to Arista happen at exactly this time (which meant that the record company
had no team in place to build on this promotional 'gift') but, as Jeff Gilbert put it,
Lots of people (at Arista) didn't like you. But that's the ... function of the music
business, you take one person's belief in an act and you have to fight the rest of
the world to make them believe in that act. (Gilbert, ibid)
And further,
The (Arista) sales force was amalgamated with RCA's sales force and RCA also
took over a lot of the support services like Business Affairs, Accounts etc. (A
large part of Arista's staff) .. were victims of rationalisation during the merger.
(Gilbert, ibid)
If we incorporate the need to win over large numbers of Arista staff to the side of
Latin Quarter into the time-scale of the release and promotion of Modern Times then
the album was doomed from the moment of the take-over. Modern Times had already
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been on release for six months, the physical effects of the transition soaked up at least
another three months of 'dead time', and then came the hurdle of winning over
doubters and the hostile in an atmosphere charged with redundancy and the threat of
redundancy. 'Radio Africa' suffered as well. It lasted four weeks in the Top Thirty:
even with a 'Top of the Pops' appearance, there was simply no-one to sell the record
in the market-place. Under these conditions, the management team 'put on a brave
face' and the disappointment of the loss of Modern Times was sublimated by a new,
but intense, concentration on producing the next album. From Gilbert's point of view,
he did what a head ofA&R is expected to do, he began to make records and he began
with Latin Quarter.
Sas Cooke, Gilbert's 'second-in-command' who had transferred with him to
Arista, began to set up meetings with producers. On the eighteenth of October the
band met Ken Scott, best known for his production of 'Honky Dory' and 'Ziggy
Stardust and the Spiders from Mars' for David Bowie and the two big-selling
Supertramp albums of the mid-Seventies, 'Crime of the Century' and 'Crisis, What
Crisis?', but no commitment was forthcoming from the band. Just over two weeks
later, the band met the Australian producer, Gary Bell but, again, no commitments
were made. Both meetings were polite affairs but, as Steve Skaith put it,
There was a resistance, I had a resistance to this record company thing -"Oh, you
need a producer, you have to have a producer because they know how to make
records and you don't ... "Their argument wasn't very well motivated given that
we'd just produced an album that everyone thought was great, but didn't sell. So
now (it was) 'let's go for the big one, spend a lot of money'. And that was coming
from everyone, from management as well. It was patronising and, from time to
time, I really resented it ... but I'm not saying my position was absolutely right.
(Skaith, ibid)
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Skaith's observation is central to the tension surrounding the issue of whether
or not to engage a producer, but his was a resistance (a resistance shared, in large
measure, by the rest of the band) that took place against a large-scale ignorance of
what had happened at Rockin' Horse and what was happening both at Arista and
between Arista and RCA. At base, acts have no real working knowledge either of
how their records are selling or of how records ark sold. Certainly, acts play a key
role in the promotional campaign (although the marketing campaign, the key site and
focus of 'artist development', is more fraught). They do so because it is glamorous
(lots of TV and radio appearances and foreign travel) and because they want to set(
records. But, in my experience, and in the experience of all the acts I have spoken to
over the years (and not just Respect and Roadhouse), there are never occasions when
the condition and the results of sales campaigns are discussed with acts. Thus, acts
are never party to the vital information they require in order to understand whether or
not their record is likely to be successful or is, in fact, already 'dead' as far as shops
are concerned. Rather than be included in briefings on sales procedures, marketing
strategies and on methods for monitoring these, acts are left in the position of
consumers, struggling to construct an impressionistic account of their 'status' and the
fortunes of their work gleaned from exactly those sources from which consumers
make their own judgements about acts - record review columns and the remarks of
radio DJ's before or after the scattered plays of their latest record. Arguably, acts who
have short-lived record careers never fully enter the world as 'producers' in as
complete a way as Negus suggests they do. Certainly, acts have better information
than do consumers, impressionism will not be fully sloughed off until the act has
become successful enough to demand - or have its manager demand - the kind of
hard information necessary to grade, not just the degree of immediate success, but
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prospects for the future. Pop acts need to be aware of how a company views them in
order to secure their position (cf Respect and Roadhouse's deficiencies here) but this
awareness can only be developed from exactly the information they have least access
to .
Because the act was not party to the extent of the stress and chaos 'behind the
scenes' at Arista, then its resistance to the need for a producer was, in fact,
'unreasonable' in the true sense that it was a position based far more on prejudice than
on calculation. Ultimately, the questions not just of who should produce but of
whether production needed to take place at all became Latin Quarter's battleground.
But, again, it was a battleground that the act had not chosen and one that it simply
could not reconnoitre for want of hard intelligence on the extent of the changes in
their own status and the status of all the intermediaries they had so far been
dependent upon. As Jeff Gilbert observed about his changed role (from head of an
independent to senior employee at a major):
I was playing the game... everybody from every territory around the world was
saying, 'Who's the producer of the next Latin Quarter album because it has got to
be better than the last one and you have to get a producer in because Clive Davis
won't even listen to it if it hasn't got a great producer producing it. So I was
playing the political, A&R game. (Gilbert, ibid)
As it was, large numbers of private discussions went on, but there was never a
meeting between all the parties concerned in which the issue of the extent of the
changes experienced in the move to Arista were aired. Rather, Sas Cooke continued
to circularise interested producers and the band, specifically the band's principal
members, Steve Skaith and Richard Wright, remained polite, but lukewarm to her
suggestions. Probably in no other industry could commitment to the need for major
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investment proceed so ineffectually - where the reasons for the disappointing
performance of the previous product are not analysed and no mechanism is set up to
conduct the planning stage of the follow-up. In a sense, everyone used the quickening
of the pace of events around Latin Quarter to postpone what promised to be a painful
confrontation.
In the first six months of 1986, that 'pace; was at its hottest. For example,
during the week of Latin Quarter's 'Top of the Pops' appearance, the band was
involved in rehearsing intensively for a thirty-one date European tour, beginning with
three British 'warm-up' dates and proceeding through Germany, Holland, Belgium,
France and Switzerland to culminate with the second top slot at the 'Farewell to the
GLC festival in London. When a band is this busy, and also successful - the German
dates were to promote a chart album - it makes sense not to confront them with, what
all the signals indicate, is a difficult subject. Despite this, suggestions for producer
continued to be made and a meeting was set up with Stewart Levine, producer of a
large number of American soul and blues album and about to become renowned as a
hit producer with the new Simply Red album. Again, no commitment to make an
album with an invited producer was made. For the record company, and for
management, this was a pivotal moment and much of the later polarisation took
position around this latest refusal.
Jeff Gilbert expressed his reaction to the issue of whether or not to engage
Stewart Levine in this way,
I feel that if the album had been made with Stewart Levine, who wanted to do it
and was blanked by the band, I thought we'd have probably made a better album.
(Gilbert, ibid)
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Gilbert's fairly cautious assessment (apart from the telling 'blanked by the band' to
which we will return) is expressed in far different terms by Marcus Russell,
We needed a producer ... Steve didn't want a producer. He felt he knew how to
make records. I didn't. ... I found myself in a position where I felt we needed
someone, we needed a third force, who had an empathy with songs and how a
record of them should sound ... and when Stewart Levine wanted to produce
Latin Quarter I thought, 'I can't believe how good this is'. Stewart Levine is
someone who makes records, he's brilliant, at the time he was particularly
brilliant. That day (when the band failed to takeup the offer) something changed
in me ... I thought, 'I know this business enough to know that you seize the
moment'. There was such a bad vibe given off in meetings, it was sick. And it
changed for Jeff. He said to me, "Marcus, we've got a serious problem. One of
the top producers in the world just walked out on this band. You've got to talk to
them" ... I'd defend the right of the band to decide their own producer, but inside
I couldn't understand the decision not to go with Stewart Levine ... We never had
the abilities within ourselves to make that record on our own. (Russell, ibid)
Understandably enough, the different band members remember the encounter
differently. For example, Martin Lascelles observed,
We had very good reasons for turning him down ... partly because he did have an
... attitude and that did put everyone off ... and he did start his string of hits
slightly after he would have been producing Latin Quarter. 7
Richard Wright refused to be quoted on the subject of the actual meeting with
Stewart Levine but made the general point that,
The producer's there to get the blame. It's like one guy, its invariably a guy,
doing several guy's jobs because the record company and the manager don't
understand all the specific responsibilities themselves. You hire a guy and you
pay him a lot of money so when it fucks up you can blame him and not the artist,
because you have to talk to them next week and you can easily sack the producer
... They pick these guys partly to have someone to blame when it goes wrong ...
7 From an interview with Martin Lascelles on 14/4/94 .
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They aren't really addressing the specific issues ... hence the need to hire and
fire. In the light of that, and conversely, real successful producers like Ken Scott
and Stewart Levine aren't in the habit of being auditioned by young bands,
interviewed and asked questions about their accomplishments. They are people
who are brought in, paid by the record company to do a job and get their arse
kicked if it's no good ... Stewart Levine must have said to himself (after meeting
the band in this way) "Do I want to do this? No!" (Wright, ibid)
Wright's observations cast the dispute in a different light; by specifying the
role of a producer as ' a catch-all ... an umbrella category... answerable to (every
aspect of the recording process)', he re-defines the producer's role as one of strategic
necessity for record company and management alike. Because, as Wright argues, the
producer is 'there to get the blame', the entire future of an act is, effectively,
contracted out to a single individual - but not necessarily solely for their musical
abilities, as Russell argues. Clearly, what recommends a producer is that person's
'track record' - the number of successful albums they have been associated with, but,
ironically, producer's failures are easier to overlook than those of the acts concerned.
For example, by 1984, Ken Scott had produced four huge selling records, but he had
also produced a dozen or more that had meant nothing at all. Rather like doctors,
producers bury their mistakes. This, alone, is not enough to justify scepticism about
the role of production, in general, and neither does it fully explain Latin Quarter's
obvious antipathy to producers in this period (to which we will need to return). Even
so, for the record company and for the management of Latin Quarter, it is clearly
producers who make records out of songs, but if producers recommend themselves
for reasons that are related to music, they also recommend themselves, in structural
terms, for reasons that can only be described as political (if we interpret Wright in
this way). Once a producer has been engaged, the head of A&R can go to the
managing director and argue that the situation is in hand; equally, a manager can feel
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satisfied that yet another stage in 'The Project' has been successfully negotiated and
any and all issues of the needs of individual songs as musical compositions can be
addressed with reference to the hit records associated with the producer. This, then,
can lead a manager to make an observation of this nature:
By that time I'd gained enough confidence in myself and my understanding of
music to make value judgements that the leading figures in the band weren't
good enough to make a record. They were great song-writers, great performers
but they didn't understand the difference between putting a song on tape and
making a great record out of it and I made that decision to collaborate with the
record company on finding a producer; because I honestly thought the band
weren't ... sussed enough to make a great record. (Russell, ibid.
Following the exit of Stewart Levine, the stage was then set for further confrontation.
Management and the Search for a Producer.
As the several quotes from Marcus Russell reveal, he felt strongly that Latin
Quarter's next album should be produced by someone with a track record, by a
successful, and, therefore probably, by a high profile producer. His frustration with
the rejection of Stewart Levine is stark. When this is added to his growing collection
of major problems - the condition of Arista, his deteriorating relationship with Clarke
- and placed in the context of his frustration with the various levels of resistance from
Latin Quarter as a whole, it is clear that the ingredients for major confrontation
between band and management were growing throughout the intense period that
culminated with the recording of Mick and Caroline. Before we consider what
brought matters to a head and the consequences of this for the new album, we must
return to the conditions of the growing polarisation between band, management and
record company .
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Latin Quarter's joining 'Rockin' Horse' was hailed as an achievement by band
and management alike (the achievement of 'the deal') and certainly all parties
encouraged each other in the belief that they were a 'team' who, together, would do
well. This notion of 'team-work' runs throughout the Latin Quarter experience as a
substantial undercurrent, exemplified in, and conditioned by, both Russell and
Clarke's frequent resort to sporting analogies and euphemisms when preparing the
band for collective work (playing live, meetings with industry figures, interviews,
even photo sessions). The earlier stated notion that continuity had been broken by the
move to Arista without its being apparent is traceable to the attempt made by the
principals to sustain this notion of team-work in the face of the facts : band and
management may have had to preserve the illusion of remaining a team, but the
relocation to a major label destroyed the conditions for the inclusion of Jeff Gilbert
(and through him the label) on that team . Under the terms of the new conditions
which were never effectively explored (obscured as they were by the pressure of
events and the ideology of the 'winning team') the mounting tide of confrontation led
each component of that team to retreat into increasingly determined assertions of
control over his own sphere of competence: Jeff Gilbert, as the intermediary between
the band and the rest of the record label (as head of A&R) kept up the pressure to
initiate an album without exploring the band's concerns about how that album should
be recorded. Marcus Russell, as the intermediary between not only the band and the
music industry, but the band and the market-place as a whole, held onto his
knowledge of the label's chaos (and all of his, and Latin Quarter's other problems) as
an expression of his determination to display his competence as a manager who could
guide a band to the making of a successful album. In the midst of this, the band, led
by Skaith (who was effectively incapable of leadership, preoccupied as he was by his
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personal distractions), held out for a set of conditions for making their album that
were never likely to be on offer.
In the case of the context of the making of Mick and Caroline, what,
decisively, confused the already complex and conflictual pattern described above;
and confused it to the point of its musical insolubility (in the sense that 'the album', as
a body of music, was never going to solve all the problems), was the fact that, as
remarks in the first chapter proposed, there are no clear boundaries to the 'spheres of
competence', so indicated. The role of intermediaries cannot be subsumed under the
title of an intermediary's function; as Richard Wright put it plainly and memorably in
one row, 'Look Marcus, just book the hotels and leave the music to us!' In the early
'winning team' days on 'Rockin' Horse' the music felt like the collective property of
all concerned. It was clearly what had brought everyone together, but when no instant
results were forthcoming, none of the principals sat down and analysed this lack of
immediate success (the 'team' was never truly a team). Instead, as frustration mounted
and structural conditions were changed almost beyond recognition, each element
'retreated' in the way described above, but they each retreated with a sense of their
original commitment to the music intact (seven players, a lyricist, a manager,
numerous record company personnel). Further, the intermediaries retreated with an
inflated sense of their competence in those compositions in the sense that their
separate understandings of the music industry afforded them a sense of the industrial
and market demands of the transformation of proto-pop into pop that was clearly not
possessed by the band - for reasons of its structural (and contrived) lack of access to
information about industrial and market practices. This relative information
monopoly enjoyed by both management and record label then reinforced the belief of
these intermediaries that they were fully competent in musical matters; which belief
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they exercised most notably in the field of record production, both in the choice of
record producer and control over the work of the producer. This is the true extent of
the 'political' role of the producer referred to previously: the intermediaries will
attribute all success, but also all failure, to the producer with the primary result that,
whatever the outcome, their own 'competence' is assured - either ' the producer
screwed up' or 'he was exactly the right person to produce this band (and I chose
him)'. In this way they evade all responsibility for the effects their actions may have
had on an act's preparation for recording - where this may stretch from how songs are
written, demoed and rehearsed to what songs are considered for inclusion on an
album with what players under what conditions .
By the eve of recording Mick and Caroline, the relationship between Latin
Quarter and its management team (now, effectively, reduced to Russell, alone) was
one infused with the highest tension. What brought matters to a head was the
auditioning and appointment of a new drummer in Russell's absence (he had taken
his first holiday for three years). The circumstances leading to the need for a new
drummer were themselves fraught. Following Richie Stevens' decision to leave in the
Winter of 1985 in order to pursue his own recording career, Dave Charles was
drafted in. Charles was a powerful, rock drummer (Stevens had been a reggae
drummer) and had been the mainstay of what had turned out to be a triumphant
European tour. His abrupt decision to leave - he literally walked out of a rehearsal -
caused the cancellation of Latin Quarter's British tour. Not only did this cause huge
administrative problems, (which Russell was forced to cope with virtually single-
handed), but it meant that Latin Quarter could not capitalise immediately on he
limited chart success of 'Radio Africa', a fact that affected Russell's morale more than
the band's, given his knowledge of Arista's glaring weaknesses. All of this led, not
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just to a series of rows, (Russell was completely opposed to the new drummer,
Darren Abraham, and made his dislike of Abraham's lighter touch clear on several
occasions) but to a palpable sense of entrenchment by the parties involved. In the
midst of this, Latin Quarter recorded 'America for Beginners' with Jason Corsaro.
'America for Beginners' had already appeared on Modern Times and was
regarded by band, management and record company alike as the central track on the
album, to the extent that Jeff Gilbert observed that this song was 'the reason I signed
the band'. In concert, and especially during the European tour, the song had
consistently received the warmest audience response. Everyone concerned had high
expectations of 'America for Beginners' for a complex set of reasons that, ultimately
(and obviously with hind-sight) devolved on the premature end of Rockin' Horse and
the loss of Modern Times. Here was a chance to re-record a favourite song and have
the 'muscle' of a major company behind Latin Quarter in the run-up to the release of
an, as yet unrecorded, second album, (this time on a major label). If we also
recognise just how tense all the principals were by this time (and exhausted after
three solid years of activity) then 'America for Beginners' took on an exaggerated
importance; not least, if it failed to make the charts, Latin Quarter would pass into
'cold storage' until a second album could be completed and new material released.
Jason Corsaro was recommended by Latin Quarter's American representative,
Tony Meilandt. Meilandt was the manager of Herbie Hancock and the Fine Young
Cannibals (his partner managed Simple Minds, UB 40 and The Smiths, all for the
USA) and had met Corsaro through Hancock's work with New York producer Bill
Lasswell. Corsaro's main job was as a house engineer at 'The Power Station', then
arguably the leading New York studio. Earlier in 1986, Corsaro had received two
'Grammy' nominations for his work on the Robert Palmer album that contained the
261
US number one,'Addicted to Love' and the Stevie Winwood album'Back in the High
Life' which also contained a US number one, 'Higher Love'. Immediately before
producing 'America for Beginners', Corsaro had been involved with the Fleetwood
Mac album, 'Tango in the Night', also a huge seller (though he was replaced by
Lindsay Buckingham at an early stage).
Taken together, then, Corsaro had an extremely impressive track record and,
from the band's point of view, the session with him was a huge success: Steve Skaith
referred to the recording as 'a really brilliant weekend'; Richard Wright called it, 'by
far our most successful recording session ever, artistically and in every respect,
absolutely brilliant, it sounded great'; Martin Lascelles commented, 'everyone was
enthused about working on "America for Beginners". That went very well. It was a
very painless record to make'. Yet, despite how well the act felt about the single, both
Marcus Russell and Jeff Gilbert were dismayed by the end result, to the extent that
they joined forces and demanded that the record be re-mixed, particularly in terms of
the relationship between the lead vocal and the rest of the track. Steve Skaith was
despatched to New York to supervise the re-mix at the (very expensive) Power
Station. It was there that he encountered Corsaro's cocaine usage. Taking cocaine
was, and still is, rife throughout the music industry, but especially in the American
industry. It is impossible here to digress into an examination of likely connections
between drug use and the listening skills of producers and engineers, but cocaine
does not make individuals easier to deal with. 'The re-mix' sounded little different
from the original but it was released and the record was not a hit. It was simply
swallowed up in the absorption of Rockin' Horse into Arista and Arista and RCA into
BMG.
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To discuss this last point above in more detail, it is clear from Jeff Gilbert's
remarks that not all of Arista's employees were convinced that Latin Quarter could be
a successful act. If we add to this the fact that there was a continuously high staff
turnover at Arista throughout the period (so newcomers would have nothing
'invested' in Latin Quarter), that RCA staff were now filling some of the vital roles
formerly performed by Arista personnel and that the former had no stake in Latin
Quarter's success whatever, then the likelihood that the emergent BMG would add its
'muscle' to the 'America for Beginners' release was slim to the point of non-existence.
In some senses, the release was a belated, and isolated, attempt by Jeff Gilbert to
achieve at Arista what he had failed to achieve at Rockin' Horse - the mass
marketing, in Britain, of Latin Quarter, and the release of his favourite track into the
bargain. He was supported in this by Marcus Russell, who, by now, was desperate for
some palpable Latin Quarter success that would give him the 'muscle' he needed to
develop the act's wavering 'profile' - both within Arista and in the much wider 'world'
market. In all of this, Latin Quarter just wanted another'hit'.
When 'America for Beginners' failed to sell, both Gilbert and Russell blamed
the record's sound and Corsaro's responsibility for (and with it the act's complicity in)
the creation of that sound. From this point onwards, whatever he did, Jason Corsaro
would make the 'wrong' record for Latin Quarter from Gilbert and Russell's point of
view, while from Latin Quarter's he would make the 'right' record because it was
'their' record - this despite Skaith's misgivings about Corsaro and cocaine and
Wright's general misgivings about the fitness of the existing combination of players
to realise the potential of the original compositions. As it was, the fact that Gilbert
and Russell had been 'proved right' by the failure of the single became a pyrrhic
victory for them because Latin Quarter then re-trenched and insisted that Corsaro
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produce Mick and Caroline. Ultimately, the episode was to sour already soured
relations and to further polarise band, management and record company. When, a
month later, the band chose Corsaro as the producer for the second album, lines of
engagement were drawn with the band (and now its producer) on one side of a
divide, and the band's manager and record company on the other side (though with
the additional confusion that management still maintained its professional distance
from the record company).
Recording Mick and Caroline.
The recording of the second Latin Quarter album got off to a bad start. After
recording the basic backing tracks, six days of 'live' playing, Jason Corsaro was
forced, by a family illness, to return to the USA. He did not return to Britain and the
Mick and Caroline sessions, for seven weeks. In that time, whatever leeway Latin
Quarter might stil l have enjoyed in terms of the demand (from Europe, and especially
from Germany) for a follow-up to Modern Times vanished completely.
There are two periods in which to tour Europe, early Spring and the Autumn.
Once recording has been completed, there then follow the different technical
processes of establishing the 'master copies' for the three principal sound carriers
(Compact Disc tape cassette and vinyl) from which release copies are generated.
While not a lengthy business in itself what adds to the delay in 'turnaround' (from
master tape to master copy) is a combination of factors which relate primarily to the
work schedules of the pressing plants; any album has to join a queue and its place in
that queue is further affected by the degree of readiness, or otherwise, of the album
art-work. Even when the album is physically ready for release, actual release will
depend on that album's place in the queue for 'take-off (to return to the 'airport'
264
analogy). Particularly in Western Europe, where Latin Quarter had conducted a
notably successful tour, the expectation (on the part of the relevant national 'branches'
of BMG) was that Latin Quarter would return to promote their second album in the
Spring of 1987. 'Clearance' had been established for this and it would have been
almost unthinkable to force that clearance to be rescinded. All this meant that when
Jason Corsaro returned to complete the recording of the new album, there was a
strictly limited time available. All recording had to be completed by mid-January. As
events transpired, Corsaro would be unavailable for further recording before even
this date - he was due to begin his next recording project before that time. As a result,
the over-dubbing and mixing process of Mick and Caroline was compressed into the
three week period before Christmas, 1986 followed by a further week in the new
year.
The recording of Mick and Caroline did not run to anyone's 'plan' - the act
were forced to rush recording and remained continuously defensive throughout the
shortened and intensified period of recording . When the songs were finally fixed onto
master tape and played to the record company, they were comprehensively rejected .
As Jeff Gilbert put it,
I remember coming down ... and because everybody had said, 'Don't come down
until we've finished the album' I felt that I was coming into a really alien
situation and I walked in and I knew I was going to be played the album and I
had to go, 'Yes, this is fantastic'. So my expectations had changed from what
they would have been normally, if I'd been around and coming down every week
... I felt really alienated ... and then I went into the studio and sat down and
listened to the album and everybody sort of disappeared around the building and
left me... I had to go in and tell Steve what I thought of the album and I had to
say, 'it doesn't particularly grab me. (Gilbert, ibid)
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Gilbert's rejection of the album, contained in the innocuous sounding, 'it
doesn't grab me', provoked a full scale crisis. What made the crisis more acute was
Russell and Clarke's dislike of the finished product. In their case they were quick to
apportion blame. As Russell put it,
Jason Corsaro was an engineer ... He's a guy who can EQ a guitar. He isn't
someone who instils a performance ... He isn't someone who rearranges a song.
He isn't someone who gets an atmosphere going. He's generally someone who
says, ' ...Whatever you're doing, I will make it sound great' Now, we needed
something more than that. (Russell, ibid)
Russell's mixture of hostility and despair was a more open version of Gilbert's shared
antipathy both to Corsaro and to his product . Gilbert informed Corsaro of the record
company's disappointment and gave him the opportunity to re-mix a , track to identify
whether or not he could 'repair the damage'. By their criteria, (criteria which were
never revealed to the band), Corsaro was then judged to have failed this task. Latin
Quarter rallied around Corsaro and his mixes because, whether they really liked it or
not, this was the version of the album that they had to endorse in order to retain their
own autonomy and integrity.
As a result, a frantic round of re-mixes was initiated . Peter Smith who had co-
produced the Sting album, The Dream of the Blue Turtles, re-mixed two tracks,
Nomzamo' and 'Remember', but even his re-mixing of Nomzamo' was rejected in
favour of a mix by Pete Hammond, who had co-produced Modern Times. Hammond
then re-mixed everything but 'Remember', Negotiating With a Loaded Gun'
(recorded by David Lord at a separate session earlier in the year) and 'The Men
Below' which was the only Corsaro mix to be used on the album. Clearly, what made
this re-mixing phase 'frantic' was the need to 'turn around' a completed album for
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Northern European release in February, 1987; but what also intensified the pressure
on everyone involved was the extreme polarisation that re-mixing sealed.
Consequently, all of the relationships with intermediary figures that had developed in
the previous four years were destroyed. Russell remained as manager for two more
years but his relationship with Latin Quarter never regained its intimacy. Instead, he
sought new acts and passed quickly from The Bible to The Smiths, The The,
Electronic and, eventually, to Oasis. Latin Quarter, in the meantime, insisted on a
'transfer' to RCA and left behind the Rockin' Horse 'team'. Carol Douet and Martin
Lascelles left and the band then divided into two further camps which saw Yona
Dunsford and Greg Harewood leave some time afterwards.
Mick and Caroline performed extremely badly. Arista had no enthusiasm for
the album, to the extent that Clive Davis vetoed its release in the USA and in so
doing not only checked Latin Quarter's early progress in this vital market but also
sent a signal to the rest of the company that the album was not worthy of promotion.
The independently negotiated deals in Northern Europe held but RCA Germany and
Electra in Sweden did less well with the album than they had done with Modern
Times (so the recorded sound had some effect on perceptions beyond the immediate
complex of intermediaries). That Latin Quarter continues to record to this day is
testimony to Skaith and Wright's tenacity rather than to any sign, anywhere, that a
market exists for Latin Quarter records. Effectively, Mick and Caroline 'killed off
Latin Quarter as a major pop act and it did so because all of those involved in its
production interacted in ways that made the record a site of contest for a definition of
'who knows best' rather than a collaborative enterprise whose effective resolution





It is instructive that this study begins with a quote from a Rock journalist . As
observations made in Chapter Seven reveal, my own formation as a song-writer was
influenced, not just by what I learned of the music industry from the writings of rock
journalists, but from the values associated with the ideology of Rock articulated in
and through their work. Frith anatomises that ideology in The Sociology of Rock in
his characteristically thorough and accomplished way but, as has been argued, he
does not explore what it means, either for the fate of musicians or for music itself,
that musicians begin their lives as consumers and, consequently, consume ideological
representations of how the music industry 'works' along with the products of that
industry. It would be tangential here to pursue this point any further, but, despite
Cohen's work, and perhaps this work also, we still know very little about the
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conceptions of 'what to expect' that aspirant musicians carry with them into the music
industry, and, therefore, equally little about how these conceptions inform their work.
Further, while the 'age of Rock' may be long past, and 'dance music' has been pop
culturally dominant for some time now, this does not mean that a new musical-
cultural sensibility amongst aspirant musicians will automatically have improved the
general understanding of the demands of making hit records. One aspect of Cohen's
study and, arguably, a similar aspect of the case histories in this one, demonstrates
how considerable, even overwhelming, is the ignorance that aspirant pop acts have
about how pop music is made as an industrial product, and of how success is
contingent on successful commodification. All of this needs to be explored below,
but we should now be in a position to connect the general observations about record-
making and its 'double life' as 'commodity-making' made in Chapter One, together
with the more specific observations of this duality made in the discussion of the
literature, with the accounts of the record-making experience of the three acts
presented in the case histories.
The observations made on the experience of signed pop acts in the first four
chapters can be seen to form a three-tiered argument
(1). At the level of contextualisation, some general observations were made,
mainly in Chapter One. These can be summarised as follows:
There are few makers of pop but many consumers. There is a paucity of information
on how consumers become producers. Pop music is defined by mass sales. Only
(major) record companies can achieve mass sales. Aspirant pop acts need to be
contracted to major companies to at least stand a chance of achieving mass sales
(and, therefore, of making truly popular music). In seven out of eight cases the
combination between the pop act and the major company ends in failure.
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(2). From this 'platform' a more contentious argument was developed:
All pop music begins in the human imagination but pop musicians need to work with
record companies in order to make records. Record companies wield considerable
power. To begin with, they decide which acts, of the huge number of contenders, will
make records. More than this, a record company (through its staff) will bring to the
relationship with the act its own conceptions of what it is about an act and its music
that is likely to attract mass sales. The 'relationship' between act and record company
is, then, doubly-problematised:
(a). Firstly, the record company will always have more power than an aspirant
act in any working relationship. Such a relationship can only begin once a contract
has been negotiated but, whatever that contract's stipulations, the act must always
obey the schedules and budgets established for it by the record company. The act is
forced into this structural subordinacy because the record company will always have
more 'projects' in 'development' than it will have staff to manage those projects; in
this way, aspirant acts are disadvantaged by their inability to attract, on their own
terms, sustained and exclusive record company attention.
(b). Secondly, the record contract can never successfully delimit the 'spheres
of competence' between act and record company. It is impossible to specify limits to
areas of competence because record companies must transform acts and their music
into commodities. To transform is to change: to 'change' implies to affect the entirety
of an object, condition or relationship (or, at least, to have access to that totality in
order that chosen aspects of it can be shaped, moulded or even replaced). Record
companies argue their competence to 'change' on the basis of past experience, but
'past experience' is not fully represented by the vast success of hit acts - it is also
defined by the failure of seven out of eight signed pop acts as an industrial average.
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What this can mean, at the very least, is that a struggle for definition between all
contracted parties will obtain over what it is about the act and its music that has a
potential for mass sales and, further, what might yet be necessary to change about the
act and its music in order to 'deliver' that potential. This struggle is, then, further
complicated by the fact that not only is its focus and mode of conduct the verbal
representation of musical sound but it is an anticipated future condition of that music
and ofthe act that makes it that drives the struggle.
(3). The third level of argument involved a discussion of PMS literature on
the operation of the music industry and of record companies and the issues that
flowed from that: pop acts need record companies to be pop acts, but most pop acts
signed to major labels fail to make records that become popular. The over-arching
difficulty when dealing with this literature is that no writer has studied large-scale
failure as a phenomenon in its own right; rather, the recognition that most acts fail
was seen to be a by-product of studies of pop music that had widely different focuses.
Despite this, it was still necessary to engage with the work of certain, key theorists
for the reason that their works provide an over-view of how commodification is
under-taken by record companies. Each writer was then argued to have both
contributed to, and deflected from, an understanding of the roots of large-scale pop
failure; its persistence and its pervasiveness. A summary of the contrasts and
comparisons between these four theorists introduced Chapter Five; here we need to
provide a synopsis of the points made there :
(i). All pop acts need intermediary figures to help them create mass selling records.
(ii). Acts begin relationships with intermediaries before they sign to major record
companies.
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(iii). All intermediary figures will argue their expertise in helping to create success
but acts will neither be able to verify these claims to expertise nor monitor the actions
carried out in their name.
(iv). All intermediaries are 'pro-active', and it is their actions (together with the pop
act's responses to those actions) that make up the transformative, commodification
process.
(v). In arguing their expertise as the justification for, and legitimation of, their right
to initiate changes in how the act and its music should be combined and represented
for public consumption, intermediaries create a 'culture of practice' which is
conflictual - they are prone to argue against the act and for their own understanding
of how commodification should proceed .
(vi). Intermediaries will work with each other in the name of the act; in this way an
act never has complete access to decisions taken in its name.
In essence, this study, therefore, seeks to determine why so many signed pop
acts fail to make records of their music that become popular. In Chapter Five, after
the discussion of what could be learned from the literature about the primary features
of pop commodification, the question was asked: is it the changes that acts and their
material are forced to experience that leads to failure or is this outcome the result of
the way in which that process of transformation is conducted? At a later stage, the
existence of conflict in commodification was discussed and the additional question
was asked whether failed acts experience more conflict than successful ones or are
simply less able to withstand the conflict that'comes with the territory'. If we take all
of the preceding points together and 'organise' them through these questions, then the
cumulative argument of the introductory chapters can be seen to distil into a
proposition: if the work of intermediaries is central to pop commodification and
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commodification is transformative and conflictual; and if this commodification fails
seven times out of eight, then the actions of intermediaries are more likely to impact
negatively rather than positively on pop acts. We need to test this proposition against
the evidence presented in the case studies.
Comparing and Contrasting Respect and Roadhouse.
If, first, we work from the accounts of Respect and Roadhouse then four, key
differences in their experience of making records for major labels can be identified:
1. Roadhouse stemmed from the desire of a founding member to re-create a
successful recording career. This gave the act an access to the music industry (at least
to one major label) that Respect did not enjoy at their outset. In this way, Roadhouse
began with 'knowledge' of the industry that Respect also lacked.
2. Respect had experience of being managed by two individuals; Roadhouse
had no management.
3. Respect consisted of male and female members; Roadhouse was entirely
male.
4. Roadhouse was released, The Kissing Game was not.
The reason for drawing attention to the differences between Respect and Roadhouse
is to try to minimise the risk of making an amalgam of their cases. All pop acts who
fail will fail for their own specific combination of factors. What this study seeks to
discover is whether the factors that combine, uniquely in each case, are still general
or common factors in the experience of failure. Neither Respect nor Roadhouse
survived commodification but they must be shown to have had more in common than
this if any, more general, indication of why the large-scale failure of signed pop acts
is the majority experience of popular music production. Before examining the
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experience of these two acts more closely, we need to appreciate the significance of
one aspect of their commonality - their physical and temporal proximity to each
other.
Respect and Roadhouse were just two of a number of Sheffield acts that
'came and went' throughout the 1980's and into the 1990's. Neither act was known to
the other, such were their stylistic differences, but they came from the same, broad
cultural milieu - the world of one city's aspirant acts, and the rarefied, 'privileged'
world of the one percent that sign record deals. In the same way that Cohen came
across signed Liverpool acts that failed while researching The Jactars and Crikey its
the Cromptons, respondents informed me of numerous Sheffield acts that had been
through the process of signing major deals and then failing to 'make it'. For example,
Latin Quarter performed with the Sheffield act Vitamin Z on 'Razzamatazz' - a first
television appearance for both acts - but Vitamin Z disappeared without trace.
Similarly, the Sheffield act Taylor-Firth and Sheridan spent a considerable period
(and budget) signed to CBS without releasing a record; while the better known
Comsat Angels had one small hit and then moved from label to label without
progressing, in much the way that Latin Quarter did. Similarly, the local Sheffield
newspaper, 'The Star' reported a number of notable Sheffield 'failures' in the
supplement referred to in Chapter Seven. The terms in which the root-cause of that
failure was discussed need to be returned to, below; the point here is that any one of
this much wider number of acts could also have formed case histories in this study -
once the search for failed major signings began, more and more of them turned up.
Respect and Roadhouse were not selected because they were extreme examples, but
because they were examples of a general phenomenon. Thus, despite the differences
in their experience, there is much that they have in common.
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Respect.
Where Respect is concerned, the 'route' from 'the bedroom' to the ante-room
of 'mass consciousness' was described entirely in terms of the momentum created by
their interactions with intermediary figures. Josie Robson described and implied how
much the musical 'projects' initiated by Malcolm Walmsley were very much driven
1
by his own creative vision. Sons and Lovers was 'a very stylised package' for which
Walmsley 'did all the writing'; Skin was a nine-piece band but again Walmsley did all
the writing; Respect was a 'far from equal' writing partnership. On this basis, she is
'astonished' when Walmsley agrees with Chris Cox's judgement of the early Respect
material and agrees to a collaboration with a producer. This is despite her recognition
that the act, itself, recognised that it suffered limitations - 'we could do very little
with (songs)' once they had been demoed.
What is interesting in this last observation, above, is the implication that the
'very little' more that Respect could do with its material (and with itself) was
strategic rather than musical. We will need to explore 'strategy' as an intrinsic factor
in the determination to progress; here we can observe that, at base, Respect could not
progress because (like so many aspirant acts) they lacked contact with (major) record
companies. Once a sympathetic individual appeared who at least had music industry
contacts, they reacted to him in ways that bore on the core of their existence as a pop
act - from the way they hoped to realise their music as a recorded product, to the way
they appeared as people (see below). Further, once they accepted that outsiders might
have an input (an unspecified and unqualified input) they can then be seen to have
been led from the actions of one intermediary figure to the actions of another - from
Cox to Levene; from accepting Levene's potential role to agreeing to Heaton's
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initiative; from accepting Heaton's suggestion for management to accepting,
seemingly entirely, that manager's judgement of them and strategy for them, to the
exclusion of any other course of action; and, finally, on the manager's advice and
insistence, to a reliance on a powerful, but lone, figure in the record company.
The 'story' of Respect then becomes one, not so much of exploitation and
manipulation by 'external' forces, but of continuous pragmatism as they react to the
consequences of interactions that they 'allowed' rather than consciously initiated.
These 'interactions' developed (through) a sequence of encounters that culminated in
the act signing a record contract and, more importantly, allying itself with a major
record company, on terms that it was neither clear about nor happy with. The fate of
Respect was not so much in the hands of others; rather, it remained in the hands of
the act but only in as much as the act could understand what was happening to it and
what was demanded of it, and could respond as effectively as possible to these
expectations and demands. At each encounter, they trusted in intermediary figures
whose fundamental message was always 'we know best'. This does not mean that
Respect was either a puppet or a victim of these intermediaries, but it does suggest
how intractable the logic, and the momentum, of these kinds of inter-relationships
can become .
In the above way - and remembering Negus's views on 'artist development' -
we can see how susceptible a pop act can be to the influence of a (quite arbitrary)
collection of 'outsiders', of go-betweens between the actuality of Respect and their
ambition of major success ('all those dreams started again'). All three members had
had almost a decade's experience of local music-making before Chris Cox's arrival in
their midst. Cox was simply the owner of a local artists' supply shop who happened
to be a partner in a local studio and had, consequently, spent some time with an up-
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and-coming record producer as a result. Seemingly, Cox's ability to talk about
Respect's music with enthusiasm, coupled with a little ready cash and the promise of
some studio time, was sufficient to register an immediate impact on an act that, by its
own admission, was 'very much enclosed within ourselves'. Despite eventually (and
quite quickly) letting them down, his connection to a producer with a small but
growing national reputation initiated the chain of events described above; where this
takes on a kind of 'snowball' of associations that witnesses the three members of the
act attempting to 'hold onto' their music as events gain momentum and, crucially,
direction around them.
Robson's description of life on Chrysalis is testimony to how little connection
Respect had with decisions made about them - why, for example, did it take five
months to complete the record contract, and why was there a five month delay
between the completion of the album and its release? Where 'artist development' is
concerned, they had already taken the advice of a complete stranger who had told
them 'there is so much further you could go with this' and they then listened to
another stranger who told them that their songs were 'top ten' but that they were not
'there yet'. Respect then spent a considerable period on self-development which,
when it came to the developmental role taken by the record company, proved to be a
source of considerable friction - there were 'a lot of wrangles'. Negus describes how
acts can 'de-motivate' a record company through negative or hostile attitudes. In
Respect's case, it was their manager who exhibited the aggression; their own
reluctance to comply with artist development was a consequence not just of their
trust in their manager and their faith in their own, extensive research into 'style,
presence and attitude' but also because they wanted to resist sexist marketing
practices - they remained faithful to their own understanding of Respect as a musical
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entity, while what Chrysalis wanted was a saleable product. Although she has no
evidence, the implication of Robson's remarks are that these conflicts, when coupled
with the manager's aggression, soured relations with the label long before they were
dropped.
The circumstances of Respect's being dropped by Chrysalis are graphic, not to
say savage, and the vignette of seeing a skip full of unreleased, expensively produced
CD's is Hollywoodesque. Unfortunately, it is also true. Ultimately, Respect was
finally undone by the act's dependence, through their manager, on a single figure in
the company - managing director, Peter Robinson. Yet nowhere in her account does
Robson discuss Respect's relationship with Robinson, nor is there evidence that
Stephens, the manager, attempted to draw the attention of any other company to the
act or, once signed, to create relationships with anyone other than Robinson inside
Chrysalis. Essentially, the chance meeting with producer Chris Heaton created a halo
effect' around his advice, and the 'bullish' personality of a comparatively successful
manager with an industry background was enough to convince Respect that they were
in'safe hands'. The determination to concentrate on music-making (and a willingness
to work on 'style') obviated any attempt to initiate contingency planning or to create a
critical distance between the act and intermediaries, in general. This meant, fatally,
that Respect was entirely in hands that were unsafe. On this basis, 'failure' (and for
Respect failure was total - no album was released) was a result of their complete
dependence on a combination of intermediaries who, when one was removed from
the equation, left them exposed to the hostility of the company. In Respect's case, this
was an hostility they had helped create but had never truly earned. In Negus's terms,
it is not enough that an act 'is nice to people', the 'artist development' team does need
to be motivated but they can be demotivated by forces other than the act.
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Roadhouse.
Given Respect's experience, it would be fair to assume, for the reasons
outlined previously, that Roadhouse was much better placed - no immediate
distractions from individuals not connected with the original band members and one
member's considerable experience of the music industry to draw from. But
Roadhouse failed and, again, failed quite comprehensively - although an album was
released, the extent to which Roadhouse was their work is debatable, given that the
master tapes were taken away from them and re-mixed by engineers employed
directly by Phonogram. Even if we accept that Roadhouse was their album, the
failure of the act was not entirely due to their own actions. Again, the founder
members concentrated on music to the exclusion of all other considerations. Where
matters of organisation were concerned, Richard Day felt the need for an
intermediary between the company and the band ('for the set-up that we were you
needed somebody almost like a school master'); but rather than prove a conclusive
argument for a manager, as such, what this shows is how powerful companies can be
in the absence of a manager - again a point that Negus does not consider.
In the case of Roadhouse, the company (represented almost solely by Dave
Bates) had almost autocratic control over their affairs. Because he trusted in the
experience of Pete Willis, Richard Day assumed that how things were, were how
things should be. He had no previous experience with which to compare his
circumstances; all he had was what he had 'learned' from consuming Heavy Rock.
Day seemed genuinely bewildered when recounting many of the demands that
Phonogram managing director Dave Bates made of Roadhouse, but whether his
analysis of them, and of the experience in general, is accurate or not is not the issue.
Rather, the issue would seem to be that he and Willis made an enormous investment
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of time and emotion in creating 'East West'. While it was no fault of Phonogram's
that the name became unusable, the fact that, far from providing a nurturing
environment that would have seen the musicians through the disappointment of the
name change (which, as Day shows convincingly, was central to their own sense of
self-identity as a distinct act - a key feature of artist development) they treated
Roadhouse in an unsympathetic way. It is for us to make sense of Richard Day's
making sense of his experience of being signed to a major label, but none of the
orderly and solicitous sequentiality depicted by Negus seems apparent in his case.
Again, contracts took time to sign, and, once signed, the actual process of record-
making became extremely fraught, despite the fact that most of the material had been
recorded before the contract was signed and the identity of the band (if not its
personnel) was established in the mind, and the practice, of the principals.
If we use time-scale as one way of taking a cross section through the
Roadhouse experience, then, apparently, Phonogram had no particular deadline to
work towards in their case (Day comments on the lack of activity beyond recording,
Josie Robson of Respect identified wrangles around exactly the issues of
photography and video making, all evidence of preparation for release). But, once
their 'flight' was called, the act needed to respond. Again, they concentrated their
efforts on completing their record, but this had already been compromised by the
imposition of Chris Sheldon as mixer (who, ironically, chose Swanyard as his studio
of choice). When Sheldon's mixes were rejected by Phonogram, the true effect of
Bates' demand for an 'Executive Producer' credit became apparent - he took
'executive action' and took charge of the master tapes that, legally, Phonogram
owned. The tapes were re-mixed and the album sequenced without Roadhouse's
involvement. The act was left to promote an album that, in every way, demanded to
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be released but which was neither supported by the company nor by the act itself.
Failure in this case became a self-fulfilling prophesy.
The seeds of the collapse of Roadhouse can be argued to have been present in
the combination of Pete Willis's lack of expertise in music business practices (despite
his membership of Def Leppard) and, again, the act's concentration on music and
style in the absence of any attempt even to set up a buffer between them and the
company. If companies behaved as Negus's informants portrayed them - reasonably,
with the act's interests always melded with those of the company - then there would
be no need for a (managerial) 'buffer'. In this account, clearly there was. To try to
make the case for the company's attitude (for the autocracy of Dave Bates) then,
perhaps the sound which Roadhouse delivered disappointed him - but this does not
explain his reported behaviour in the lengthy period between signing and the
completion of the record. Equally, Roadhouse's problems would not necessarily have
been solved by a'school master', they would simply have been different problems. As
the Respect case should indicate, new intermediaries encourage new trajectories, and
acts are so inward looking that they imagine the only trajectory to be the one that
takes them to success .
Further Observations on Method.
(1). The Respondents.
Before discussing how the evidence of the first two case studies connects
with the proposition which concluded the previous section (that the actions of
intermediaries are more likely to impact negatively than positively on pop acts), it is
necessary to discuss this evidence as an 'outcome of method' for the bearing the
methods employed in organising and researching this study have for any conclusions
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it might generate. My position as researcher was explored in Chapter Five. Because
of the unusual nature of that position, the need was argued for the promotion of
'active reading' of this text through the agency of 'reflexivity'. Even from the brief
summation of the 'unravelling' of Respect and Roadhouse once they left their
respective 'bedrooms', the impact of intermediaries on their fortunes is quite stark but
this does not 'prove' anything, as such; rather, the experience of these two acts,
together with that of Latin Quarter, needs to be theorised rather than simply
'announced' before any degree of 'proof can be derived from these accounts. In order
that these 'accounts' or narratives be opened to theory, the method of their
construction needs to be examined.
My coming to know Richard Day and Josie Robson was discussed in the
introduction to Chapter Seven. The further point which needs to be made here is that
in no sense did either of these two respondents structure their accounts to satisfy any
announced purpose of mine. Rather, I encouraged them to 'tell me what happened'.
Clearly, in my responses to their points - whether consciously, in the form of
questions, or unconsciously, in the form of non-verbal behaviour - I may have helped
develop aspects of their 'telling' but what it is vital to recognise in both instances is
that the individuals concerned were 'hearing' their story for the first time. On this
basis, it was their similar enthusiasm to recount the events of the formation and
failure of their respective acts that propelled (and shaped) the narrative. To
understand why this was the case we need to reflect on the nature of 'failure' itself.
When Day and Robson agreed to discuss their experiences with me I was aware that I
was privileged to hear 'what happened' to Respect and Roadhouse - for the
fundamental reason that most people like to keep their failures hidden. Conversely,
there is no ready-made audience for musicians who have been through traumatic
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episodes. The 'myth' of pop is that of almost unbounded success. There is a limited
literature of failure in the business of making recorded music (cf Simon Garfield's
Expensive Habits, 1986) and part of the show business lore that pop ideology has re-
invented for itself remains that 'stars' are consumed by success; as John Lahr puts it,
Each newly minted "superstar" is a reminder of the conspicuous waste of talent -
the dark side of American abundance - where,exploited and exhausted by the
voracious media, careers are "gloriously" made and "spectacularly" lost. The
public relishes each fall of a star as a sacrifice that brings renewed fertility in the
shape of someone yet richer and more glamorous. (Lahr, 1984, p.223)
But this is not a literature of aspirants who 'fail to make it'. The colloquial
understanding of this type of failure is represented effectively in an 'explanation' for
the failure of 'promising' local acts offered by the Sheffield 'Star'
Of course not everyone has their dream realised and the journey along the road
to fame and fortune often ends in a flat tyre on the pop 'n' roll hard shoulder.
While Sheffield has had its fair share of success stories, for every star there are
dozens who fall by the wayside ... Put it down to natural selection or just dashed
bad luck. (Oi, 3, 1997 p.4)
The colloquial understanding of Natural Selection' as 'only the strong survive'
is challenged by the more likely explanation for the survival of species in their ability
to adapt. Even so, the notion of 'toughness' is an attractive one and I had similar
recourse to this 'explanation', in chapter one, with regard to what acts are likely to
attract A&R attention. But 'natural selection' suggests an external determination for
the fate of a pop act - fortuitously they 'had what it takes to survive'; and 'fortune' is
then offered as the complementary 'explanation' - the winners have 'good luck', the
losers have 'bad luck'. Where the failure of pop acts is concerned the reality of failure
can already be seen to be far removed from these colloquial explanations - but when
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it comes to discussing such episodes, musicians find themselves in a double-bind:
firstly, it is difficult to piece together exactly what did happen to cause the collapse
because musicians tend to have limited access to decisions made about them; and,
secondly, whether a musician wants to discuss their story or not, there is unlikely to
be a ready-made audience for the story - to put it crudely, everyone loves a `winner'
and, by the same token, no-one wants to hear a 'hard luck' story.
(2). Language and Concepts.
Viewed particularly from the last point above, the connection between my
involvement in Latin Quarter and the motivation behind this study should be quite
apparent, but before we can examine the 'evidence' of the Latin Quarter case history
in any more detail (and, through this, make some final remarks on the connections
between commodification and the large-scale failure of pop acts) we need to take
note of a further dimension of the method of analysis of the case histories of Respect
and Roadhouse.
The point was made in Chapter One, and then explored in much greater detail
in Chapter Five, that I cannot 'cleanse' myself, methodologically, of my experience of
making records. The further point was made that, inevitably, the Latin Quarter case
history would differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively from those of Respect and
Roadhouse. Again, not only is there a danger of making an amalgam of these three
case histories, there is a greater danger of obliterating the qualitative differences
between them. One way of reconciling the difference in their quality, and of avoiding
an uncritical amalgamation of distinct experiences, is to consider what light the
shaping of the three accounts can cast on the central concern of this study.
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To 'shape' an account is to construct a narrative. To 'construct' involves a
process of selection, in this case, of words and phrases, to make diverse reports of
experience cohere. In attempting to make a coherent account of what 'happened' to
Respect and Roadhouse I make use of a number of key terms, terms that recur
throughout this study: 'momentum', 'dynamic', 'logic', 'trajectory', 'strategy' and,
fundamentally, 'process'. Once more, as the discussion in Chapter Five conveyed, I
first analysed my experience of major label failure through what I identified as a
counter-opposition between 'process' and 'orthodoxy'. A process can be understood as
a series of actions that are made towards the creation of an object or the attainment of
a goal - towards a changed state. A chemical process, for example, changes its
constituents, through their reaction on each other, to make a new compound of some
kind. The danger of using scientific metaphors is that their are redolent of
determinism, they are 'non-human'; further, unlike in life, identical reactions will
continuously recur under the same conditions. It is not my intention to represent the
record-making/pop-commodity-making 'process' as something either mechanically
repetitive or pre-determined; despite this, I can only report that, after the making and
subsequent failure of Mick and Caroline I felt that I had been through a process that
had produced its own result. I then sought explanation for this sensation, and
explication of this process, in PMS literature and found nothing that was immediately
satisfactory. I then termed those works, collectively, as an 'orthodoxy' that either
misrepresented, or failed entirely to connect with, the 'process' I had experienced and,
so, mounted this study.
The terms identified and listed above are all ones concerned either with
movement - its operation (dynamic), direction (trajectory) force (momentum, logic) -
or with the attempt to plan or guide movement (strategy). In the discussion of
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Respect and Roadhouse, I interpret the observations made, separately, by Day and by
Robson in and through these terms, but while the terms are mine, the objects and
relationships they describe are those of the respondents. Both Day and Robson
clearly experienced processes - they changed demos into recordings; their changed
their local status from aspirant act to signed act; they changed the focus of their
activities from Sheffield to London, and much more. Further, the 'movement'
involved in the process they became caught up in changed both acts - it finished them
- and, in both cases, the co-principals within the act can be seen to be, not so much
the victims of events they had no control over, but, rather, casualties of their own
lack of preparation for the certainty that 'events', and changing, transformative events,
would take place in the name of Respect, Roadhouse and their musics.
It is the above sense of an individual's awareness that 'change' has begun to
occur, accompanied by a nagging, almost paralysing inability to identify its points of
origin and growth and respond to them, that connects so forcefully with my own
experience in Latin Quarter. As an act, Latin Quarter experienced changes, entire
transformations, on all fronts. For example, the relationship between Steve Skaith
and myself was changed - not only did we have to define why this 'Latin Quarter'
existed in the way that it did, but we also had to define a business relationship
between each other and between each other and the rest of the act because it is song-
writers who earn most money in a pop act. Latin Quarter needed also to behave as a
conscious, collective entity in its dealings both with its manager, who had his own
agenda for the act, and with the record company, who also had their agenda for Latin
Quarter. In the midst of this, I could not rely on the intimacy and support of my
friendship with Marcus Russell because that friendship had been changed by the new
roles we had taken on. More subtly, but no less profoundly, our very manner of
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speech in attempting to articulate our concerns, and to gain some control over events,
was changed by the need to adopt a language common to all three component parts of
the process of making Mick and Caroline - the act and its members (singly and in
combination); the manager and his employees; and the record company and its staff.
Clearly, there are parallels between Latin Quarter's experience and that of
Respect and Roadhouse. In keeping with the research position explored in Chapter
Five, the only way of comparing and contrasting their experiences, and of examining
the conclusions drawn from a study of the literature in relationship to them, is to
proceed in the manner identified above: what Respect, Roadhouse and Latin Quarter
have in common in the immediate term is that I have constructed their stories. My
construction has been led by assumptions generated through the experience of
making records. Those assumptions are revealed through language choices and
through the concepts these inform and help express. The qualitative differences
between the case histories cannot be erased by this method, but they can be equalised
by making as open as possible the motivation behind the selection of terms through
which those experiences are discussed and, therefore, represented. Before beginning
this process, some further, preliminary remarks are required.
Comparing and Contrasting Respect and Roadhouse with Latin Quarter.
(1). Preliminary Observations.
The recognition that seven out of eight signed acts fail was made through
studying PMS literature, but as we already know, that literature does not concentrate
on large-scale failure as a phenomenon in its own right My primary reason for
confining my discussion of the literature to texts which focus explicitly on how
popular music is made as an industrial product is contingent on this - I have not
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considered other forms of cultural production because, even within PMS literature,
the experience of signed pop acts needs, largely, to be deduced from wider studies; to
explore studies of a different provenance again would seem, at the least, a distraction.
Even so, the discussion of PMS literature centres on the role and practice of
intermediary figures and institutions. This is the 'familiar' territory of mediation, of,
in fact, media studies. Mediation is an inescapable fact of cultural production;
crudely, it brings 'production' (in the sense of industrial organisation) to the
generation of cultural artefacts (understood, in this sense of 'culture', as products of
the imagination). Mediation, then, is not exceptional, but an argument about its
distinctiveness within the music industry has constantly 'broken the surface' of this
study .
In the first chapter the argument was advanced that the distinctiveness of
record-making as commodity production derives from the need of all parties to
discuss not only music, but music in a 'future state'. To an extent, this is an over-
generalisation - no-one sees a film or a TV Soap or can read a newspaper until each
of those artefacts has been edited. Despite this, images on a screen and words on a
page have a kind of tangibility that notes in the air lack. Mediation in popular music
takes place almost entirely through assertion, and all three parties to the
commodification of a pop act - the record company, the act's management, and the
act itself - come from different directions to this business of making assertions of
how music sounds now, and how it, and the act that makes it, will be received by the
audience at some future point. It is the need to face up to, and survive, this distinctive
condition of mediation in popular music-making that Respect, Roadhouse and Latin
Quarter have, or had, in common (and had in common with all pop acts). Further,
this 'condition' is one that is structured by conflict and the separate fates of the three
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acts are all marked by the experience of considerable conflict. Before examining
these experiences in any greater detail we need to consider this notion of 'structural
conflict' more closely.
We have seen that Negus draws attention to conflict within pop
commodification - there are conflicts between different record company departments
and there can be conflicts between acts and record companies over issues of 'artist
development'. Arguably, all conflicts that acts experience can be related to 'artist
development' but for more fundamental reasons than those identified by Negus. We
have already seen that power is inequally distributed in commodification - acts
cannot dictate terms to record companies whatever their contracts stipulate, because
record companies have complete control over their resources and, ultimately, acts
depend on the effective deployment of those resources in their own cause if they are
to make progress in the market place. But conflict in popular music production can
be shown to be more fundamental, more 'structural' even than this.
Structural conflict in record-making exists in and through the differences in
perspective, ambition and definition of the primary contributing parties to pop
commodification. If we deal with each of these 'parties' in turn, then the act can be
argued to hold a conception of itself as, predominantly, a musical entity. On this
basis, its perspective on record-making will centre on the translation of its music into
a recorded form - an aspirant act is 'expert' in its own music-making but not in
record-making. Managers, whether experienced or not, are not music-makers, their
expertise lies in 'producing' the act, in the fundamental, but non-musical, sense of
organising it as an entity that must fulfil a recording contract - a contract that the
manager will have been instrumental in negotiating and securing. In this loose, but
important, sense, the manager's expertise lies in record-making. Finally, the record
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company's expertise is an over-arching one - record company personnel are not
music-makers and neither are they record-makers, as such; rather, their expertise lies
in commodity-making. In this very broad way, three entities combine from three
perspectives with a single goal in mind, not a 'good' record (imprecise though this is)
but a successful one. Almost inevitably, definitions of what a 'successful' record will
consist of, and how this might be brought about, will differ not just from 'party' to
'party', but often within the territory of each party. Once we accept that the record-
making relationship is structurally conflictual in this most fundamental way of all,
then we are better placed not just to understand the experiences of the acts in the case
histories (and, arguably, pop acts in general), but also to begin to theorise those
experiences.
(2). The Detail .
To have arrived at a point where a comparison between the experiences of Respect,
Roadhouse and Latin Quarter is feasible, we have needed to identify methodological
'conditions' for that comparison. The selection of terms through which the
experiences of the three acts were represented in the case histories, and,
subsequently, in the previous discussion of Respect and Roadhouse in this chapter,
was derived from a combination of sources already referred to: my experience of
making records, the action of my experience on my engagement with PMS texts that
discuss pop commodification, and the identification, through this process, of key
aspects of commodification and key weaknesses in their general representation -
notably those associated with mediation. We can now compare and contrast the
experiences of Respect and Roadhouse with those of Latin Quarter through reference
to the common concepts that have been used to construct their case histories - on the
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basis that these concepts have been informed, in a equivalent way, by the use of
terms connected with my own process of reflection on the experience of making
records, to describe and analyse the objects and relationships discussed with
respondents.
(i) . The Acts and Music-making.
At one point, in Chapter Seven, I contrast Respect and Roadhouse with Latin
Quarter on the basis that Latin Quarter was formed to play music that was already
written. In one sense, this observation is misleading - both Respect and Roadhouse
were signed ahead of the formation of a live act; they were signed on the strength of
their demo tapes . The consequences of this difference in origin between the acts is
quite profound. Latin Quarter, the act, was formed at the urging, mainly, of Marcus
Russell (Sean Clarke was always the secondary partner in Ignition management).
This introduced two conditions to the Latin Quarter experience that the other two acts
did not have to endure. Firstly, Russell was able to impose his vision of alive act' on
Skaith and myself; or, rather, his determination to see such an act established created
a field of conflict between Ignition and myself, Skaith and Wright that grew
relentlessly throughout our time together. Secondly, the creation of 'Latin Quarter'
introduced five strangers into the already problematic set of relations that had been
initiated by Russell's search for a 'deal' for the songs I played him.
There has been no place, thus far, in this study for the exploration of a pop act
(when this consists of more than one person) as a dynamic field in its own right . This
will be discussed below, but it is clear that the song-writing principals in Respect and
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Roadhouse only had each other to contend with. Those sets of principals were
extremely intimate with each other but Skaith and I lived in two separate cities, and
the chance that the eight people who came to comprise Latin Quarter would form the
kind of intimacy with each other that at least promised resilience in the face of
adversity was slim, indeed. The fact that the recruitment of the 'players' had a
decisive effect on the music that record companies heard was discussed in Chapter
Seven but, further, we need also to consider that the 'look' and the 'story' of Latin
Quarter were changed irrevocably by the recruitment of playing members ahead of
any deal. What caused Jeff Gilbert to make Latin Quarter his first signing was the
combination of 'look' and music and this opened up another site of tension and
conflict - Latin Quarter could never have become the act he hoped it would be, for
the reason that Skaith and I would continue to write material, and behave from
precepts, that would always conflict with 'the new Fleetwood Mac' dream. At the
same time, while the other members of Latin Quarter would be allowed no access to
song-writing decisions and, therefore, were not truly equal members of the act (they
were 'players' rather than 'band members') their appearance, and the stories that could
be told about them as people, would still dominate how the act would be 'constructed'
for public consumption. This point will be developed shortly, here it reinforces the
recognition that where Latin Quarter was concerned, 'artist development' was
constitutionally conflictual.
(i i). The Acts and their Management.
The fact that Roadhouse was not managed was discussed earlier. Again, their
lack of management proved a source of weakness for them because it allowed a
known record company autocrat free reign over them. In the cases of Respect and
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Latin Quarter, there are remarkable similarities in their progress to, and fortunes at,
their respective record companies. If Respect's progress was described by sequential
exchange through a chain of intermediaries then so was Latin Quarter's. The crucial
difference between the two cases is that Russell was a friend of mine (and an
acquaintance of Skaith's through their shared membership of the same political
organisation). Jack Stephens' involvement with Respect was 'third-hand', and
therefore less likely to be confused by the emotional and political ties between
Russell, Skaith and myself. These differences proved to be differential sources of
weakness - Respect had only Stephens' 'word' and his 'track record' to trust; I trusted
Russell because of my intimacy with him, but what Russell rapidly became was a
figure like Jack Stephens, someone able to survive on their wits in the music
industry.
If we consider this last point more closely, we need to appreciate 'who'
managers are and where they come from. As we saw in the discussions of Frith and
Negus, both these theorists refer to the role and practice of management and both
were criticised for the inadequacy of their treatment of this particular pop variable.
'Artist development' has to begin with the earliest decision of individuals that they
want to play music together. As we have seen, pop is music that is sold in great
quantities and is sold as a commodity that is more than music. Negus is right to stress
the importance of style and identity in the pop 'equation'; the identity ('look' and
'story') of the performer is an intrinsic part of why a major record company feels
willing to invest the capital in acts to make records. New pop acts have to begin as
consumers of pop music. It can be argued that, when they first begin to play together
and, especially, when they begin to write original material, the members of nascent
pop acts reproduce the conditions of the experience they have consumed (music that
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has been commodified as a total of the act, its look and its story). In this way, nascent
pop acts create more than music, they create themselves as a pop act in this
comprehensive and thorough way: they `re-invent' themselves as `pop-stars-in-
waiting' - artist development begins at home.
Once 'created', in the manner described above, nascent, or, by now, aspirant
pop acts find it impossible to progress their own efforts at artist development; they
cannot access record companies without a go-between. These 'go-betweens' are
managers and they, too, will be individuals who have been inspired by their
consumption of pop to become involved in the music industry. Similarly, they, too,
will have their own developmental conceptions of 'what it takes' to become
successful. In Respect's case, Stephens had already enjoyed success with Scarlett
Fantastic. Russell had had no success, but he developed very quickly into someone
who felt confident that he knew how success could be achieved, arguably because the
kinds of tasks that managers need to undertake gives them an 'education' in the ways,
in the culture, of the music industry that acts do not experience.
In Chapter Three, Frith was criticised for painting an overly-sanguine picture
of the pop manager; 'a manager does everything for his artiste but get up there and
sing' (Tony Hatch, quoted without qualification). What this leaves out is not just
those unanswered questions discussed in that chapter, but also the related
implications of the objective, structural position of the manager in relationship to the
act. For example, a manager may be an altruist but, whatever his or her aims in
managing a particular act, these individuals, unless they are completely incompetent,
cannot avoid accumulating a monopoly of information about the act's position in
relation to all outside agencies. This, in turn, means that they can directly access a
variety of sources of information and understanding that are operationally closed to
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acts (discussions with record company personnel at all levels and in a range of
countries; discussions with every one from fly-posters to record producers, and so
on). The tempo of this accumulation of information (which becomes 'knowledge'
through its practical application, successful or otherwise) quickens dramatically after
the act signs to a record label and, even more so, after the record is released and
promoted. This 'monopoly' position may not have been deliberately pursued - and it
might not be exploited - but power'comes with the job' and the temptation to abuse it
must be persistent and, when acts become 'troublesome', difficult to resist
The power referred to above is, at base, the manager's 'orienting practice' (see
Negus) or 'working theory' (Gamham, in Negus, 1992) and it develops almost
entirely through the clear need for managers to 'learn the lie of the land' - mainly of
the 'land' of the record company; but also those of publishers, publicists, promoters,
agents, and so on. Again, almost inevitably, given the precarious nature of the music
industry on a local, immediate level, the vast bulk of these people will display all the
characteristic intensity of music industry personnel. What a manager does is to soak
up this the prerogatives of this collective, adrenaline-fuelled 'culture of practice' and
learn how to live with it and how to draw on its power when required; or, at least, if
they fail to, they fail as managers. At its worst, this 'working theory' can be used by
managers to raise 'smoke screens' around their decision-making where, ultimately, it
is the act that will bear the penalties of any bad deals made in its name. Under the
constant pressure of recording and promotional schedules, the energy and morale of
an act can quickly be drained if they go on registering the effects of bad decisions
without locating their source (because of smoke-screening); all of this frustration and
demoralisation, not unreasonably, can be argued to erode creativity and, in turn, to
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have a negative effect on relations with the record company who, in turn, will be
increasingly less willing to work hard for surly and bad-tempered acts.
The above, then, encapsulates the experience of Respect and of Latin Quarter
with regard to management, but rather than apportion 'blame' it is vital to see how the
in-built structural disadvantage of the act is exacerbated when the act, itself, does not
question the structural role of the manager. In Respect's case they appear simply to
have trusted Stephens; in Latin Quarter's case, the act challenged Russell only on his
competence to decide their music, not their fates. The making of Mick and Caroline
was permeated with rows and conflict. By his own admission 'something changed' in
Russell (after Latin Quarter rejected Stewart Levine and took on Darren Abraham as
drummer). He began to manage The Bible and looked to further expand and diversify
the activities of Ignition Management. In sum, Russell took the decision to survive as
a manager rather than survive as the manager of Latin Quarter. He took no
responsibility for the impact of his wrong decisions with regard to the act up to that
point - this much is clear from his comments in Hewitt's book on Oasis:
(Latin Quarter) self-destructed. It sounds a bit dramatic but I think everyone gets
bugged by the level of success they have or haven't got. And I was unable to give
them that confidence in that time. (Hewitt, 1997, p.184)
This, at the very least, is disingenuous - Latin Quarter with Marcus Russell at the
helm 'self-destructed'. This is not to criticise Russell's commitment - he worked
tremendously hard throughout his time as manager - but the fact remains that he was
determined to assert his competence at all times, in the face of all eventualities. In the
same way, Jack Stephens 'led the way' with Respect. To reiterate one of Josie
Robson's observations from Chapter Six:
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He was so aggressive all the time, "I'm not having this for my band", and so on
.... We were unhappy about a lot of things, we were quite a Bolshie band - about
the singles, the sleeves. I was very concerned that I didn't want to be marketed as
a woman ... we were a group, a band, we each had our role to play ... and Jack
absolutely supported us in all of that. He was important but I wonder whether we
were right. (Robson interview, ibid)
This quote, complete with its air of bewilderment, is one of many that
represents Stephens' own commitment to his singular understanding of how to create
a hit act. Richard Day, on the other hand, lamented the lack of such a figure, but only
because his, and Roadhouse's, experience of life with a major record company was so
destructive.
(iii). The Acts and their Record Companies.
It might be anticipated that, in a consideration of how pop acts experience
mediation, the relationship between the acts and their record companies would
demand the most detailed attention of all, for the reason that, in practice, record
companies are the primary media institutions that acts encounter. This is the unstated
but clear thrust of Negus's work, but the whole tenor of the analysis thus far has been
to argue not only that 'artist development' begins long before pop acts arrive at record
companies but also that - and this is still to be demonstrated - the act's 'pre-history' of
artist development decisively conditions its experience of the record companies own
efforts in this direction.
It has already been argued that record companies are competent in
commodity-making - although not as competent as everyone imagines them to be,
given the extremely high failure rate amongst signed acts. Negus is our best guide to
the internal regimes of record companies, but the weaknesses in his representation of
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them have already been detailed. In the light of the material furnished through the
case studies we can reinforce those criticisms. For example, Roadhouse have already
been shown to have undergone an experience that was anything but 'nurturing'. At the
same time, Jeff Gilbert revealed (but not when it might have made a difference to
Latin Quarter) that many of Arista's employees 'did not like' the act - there was no
active de-motivation, here, simply an'unearned' antipathy. Josie Robson's account of
Chrysalis is closest to Negus's version of record company practice - we can recognise
the ways in which an ostensibly supportive 'artist development' team may have
become de-motivated - but, again, not by the act but by the act's manager.
Beyond these remarks, it is worth indicating how not one of the three acts had
any knowledge of the internal 'health' of the record companies they joined (this was
lack was particularly damaging in the case of Latin Quarter). Equally, all three acts
were dependent on single individuals to support them in their relationship with 'artist
development' as a whole. As a consequence, Roadhouse was at the mercy of Dave
Bates; Respect's tenure at Chrysalis ended immediately Peter Robinson was sacked;
and Latin Quarter's fortunes rose and fell with Jeff Gilbert's fluctuating influence
inside a highly unstable Arista. Beyond this, the case histories actually tell us very
little about the acts' relationships with their respective record companies - but,
conversely, this tells us a great deal about how the commodification process works.
The members of Respect, Roadhouse and Latin Quarter interviewed for this
research all had little to say about their relationships with the record companies to
which they signed, because they enjoyed very little access to the decisions made
about them by those companies. Again, the most graphic example of the high degree
of ignorance of the decision-making process suffered by pop acts is that of Respect.
So insecure was their tenure at Chrysalis that, even with a completed album whose
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review copies had already gone to press, the regime which took over following the
sacking of Peter Robinson was able to gauge the staffs antipathy to them so rapidly
that the decision to drop Respect was taken immediately. Similarly, Roadhouse
developed no understanding of Phonogram's 'game-plan' for them, and they had so
little purchase on the company that the tapes of their album could be taken to an
unknown studio and re-mixed by an engineer they never met. Viewed against this
extreme background, Latin Quarter's experience was the least fraught, yet, as Marcus
Russell put it, 'there was a lot of shit going on .. that you don't even know about
(Russell interview, ibid. We need to note the present tense here, Russell still had not
given me the whole story seven years after Mick and Caroline had contributed
decisively to the demise of Latin Quarter.
If Negus can be criticised for making one aspect of the commodification
process stand for its entirety, the weakness of the method employed above should be
equally apparent. All of the above remarks should indicate how dynamic is the
process of commodification; or, more accurately, commodification should be
conceived of as a process that is defined by a combined dynamism, a continuous
cross-cutting of dynamics between and within the constituent parties to that
commodification. Rather than try to learn about these experiences by examining each
in isolation from each other, we should attempt to envisage, and analyse, record-
making and the commodification that both organises and contextualises it,
holistically. In attempting a dynamic, holistic account of the pop act's experience of
the major label we need to look outside PMS literature but to Organisation Theory
rather than to Media theory, as such.
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Organisation Theory and Popular Music.
(1). Theoretical Context.
The role, for this research, of the study of organisations as a point of merger
between method and theory was introduced in Chapter Five, but the implication that
organisational concepts would need to be drawn on to explain what happens in pop
commodification - and why what happens there so often results in failure - has been
present in the conceptual vocabulary of this study since its beginning. Again, this
vocabulary derives from the aspects of a personal 'history' recounted previously - my
own need to understand what had 'happened' in the making of Mick and Caroline and
the fact that PMS literature did not immediately clarify my experience of making
records. As I intimated in Chapter Five, reading organisational theory gave a shape to
my experience that PMS literature did not. It gave 'shape' to experience because of
the concepts I encountered in that particular literature - most notably those associated
with Silverman's 'Social Action Theory' or 'Action Frame of Reference' (Silverman,
1970), the subsequent genesis of his work, and of responses to it, within the broader
field of Organisation Theory (OT), itself.
Thompson and McHugh (1995) provide a useful overview of recent
developments in OT. Their identification of Burrell and Morgan's (1979) work on
'paradigm diversity' in OT as a watershed in the development of the discipline is
echoed in further texts edited by Hassard and Pym (1990) and Hassard and Parker
(1993 and 1994). The significance of Burrell and Morgan's work was that it
attempted to bring order to a branch of sociology, industrial sociology, that had
experienced, with the social sciences as a whole, the upheavals of the profound
period of social questioning associated with the 1960's. Industrial Sociology had long
been dominated by the US school of 'Functionalism' or 'Systems Theory' (Hirsch's
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work is interesting in this respect because his Functionalist account of how the record
industry worked was produced in what was rapidly to become the twilight of
Functionalism, in general). Even so, Systems Theory 'clung on' in industrial
sociology longer than in other areas - perhaps because a concern with the functioning
(and, therefore, with improving the efficiency of) organisations had proved so
important in the US economy, the economy that had pioneered 'scientific
management' and the Fordist assembly line. This US commitment to the power of
'managerialism' (supported by its effective 'abolition' of militant trade unionism
which allowed managers a far greater 'scope' to change working practices than they
enjoyed in Western Europe) was reflected in a significant academic commitment to
research into the theory and practice of organisations and the term 'organisation' is
commonly spelled as 'organization' to reflect the US provenance of much of OT
research.
For Thompson and McHugh, Silverman's 'The Theory of Organizations'
(1970) signalled the coming of 'the most significant sign of a major alternative to
mainstream perspectives' (Thompson and McHugh, 1995, p.369). By the time Burrell
and Morgan had 'summed up' the replacement of the single mainstream perspective
of Functionalism with a diversity of ways of theorising organisations, Silverman had,
to an extent, moved on from his founding work (see Silverman, 1994), but by this
time, his 'Social Action Theory', as a variant of 'interpretivism', was established as
one of the theoretical 'paradigms' they identified. The basis of Silverman's theory was
that, in contradistinction to Functionalist Systems Theory, human beings are not
defined by the positions given to them by a system that exists above and beyond their
actions; rather, those systems existed only through human action and only through
the meanings that humans give to their actions. In this version of organisational
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'functioning', how organisations 'are' is how, and why, organisational actors cause
them to be.
In the tenor of its time of publication (and in common with Berger and
Luckmann's, Social Construction of Reality which, in part, inspired it) Silverman's
work was heralded as a radical theory of organisation in the sense that it re-
established the significance of the individual in the face of the over-arching goals of
'the system', of any system. However, the impact of the work was restricted both
inside and beyond OT, partially for very practical reasons (the book was not widely
promoted in the key market for such texts, the USA - see Hassard, 1994) but, more
pertinently, because Silverman's work also drew heavily on that of Garfinkel and
Ethnomethodology. This, in turn, at a time when certainly European academia was in
ferment over exactly how to characterise the relationship between social structure and
social action, severely restricted its significance within that ferment, for the simple
(and also highly complex) reason that Ethnomethodology denies the 'objective'
existence of social structures As Hassard puts it,
'ethnomethodologists are concerned to account for how actions are given
meaning (sic) in the flow of the "life-world" (Schutz and Luckmann 1974) and
especially how actors are constantly trying to make sense of the world and
interpret what is happening. From this perspective, social structure, instead of
being a hard facticity "out there" in the external world, is something that is
continuously generated within the process of social construction'. (Hassard,
1994, p.98)
In Hassard's account, Ethnomethodologists concentrate on the analysis of
social interaction through a focus on 'how subjects .. make sense of verbal and non-
verbal cues'. These cues are referred to as 'indexicals' and their meaning is 'dependent
on the context of production'. Human beings constantly encounter each other at work,
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in the home, and in their social lives. It is easy to take all of the diverse social
relationships and institutions implicated in these encounters for granted, as enjoying
an 'objective' existence, above and beyond the human beings that work and play and
maintain themselves, but this, for Ethnomethodologists, is to entirely miss the point
of how those relationships and institutions are reproduced. As Hassard further
observes of the work of Ethnomethodologists:
'Their objective is to understand how participants make sense of, and construct,
their immediate social situations..( ).. Ethnomethodologists argue that social
research should study processes, rather than accept the effects of process as
given and proceed from there ... They dissociate themselves from what they see
as the dominant orientation within academic sociology.. 'constructive analysis'..
and instead confine themselves to understanding the "awesome indexicality" of
everyday accounts. The approach is oriented towards empirical study, and
especially to understanding how social actors make sense of common-place
events'. (Hassard, 1994, pp.99-100).
The object of researching the case histories in this study was to try to attempt
to understand what it is about the production of popular music that so frequently
leads to failure. In the discussion of these case histories, and in the discussion of the
representation of commodification in the literature, an emphasis has been placed on
commodification as a transformative process. Similarly, that process has been
characterised as a distinctive one in mediational terms for the way in which it
proceeds through the constant interaction of pop act, management and record
company with the purpose of defining how best to construct, not simply a musical
record, but a complete representation of the act to consumers in the market place.
Again, within a context that is structurally conflictual, this mediational
distinctiveness is expressed by the need to arrive at the definition of the most
effective combination of the commodifiable elements of a pop act - its sound, look
and story - through the medium of a dominant assertion of the likelihood that a
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particular configuration of these elements will be the one most likely to attract mass
sales.
Already, the connections with the work of Silverman and with
Ethnomethodology should be apparent - three parties come together and, 'through
social interaction, make sense of verbal and non-verbal cues'; in this sense-making
they 'construct' the commodity and, with it, the experience of commodification. In
this version, the failed commodity is the outcome of 'poor construction', in both the
senses used here. The problem with this (appealing) notion derives from the general
problem identified even by sympathetic critics of Silverman - that, in emphasising
the need to understand why people take the actions they do (which actions 'construct'
the social world), Social Action Theory, and ethnomethodology as a method and
perspective that supports and demonstrates this theory, denies the reality of the
structures that define people's lives and that dominate them through inequalities in
access to power.
For example, the 'airport' analogy has been used consistently in this study to
convey the limitations on the actions of pop acts. The argument will be made below
that a pop record and, with it, the act that makes the record, is very much an outcome
constructed through interactions, but those interactions can only exist because,
somewhere, a bank account exists which is drawn on to pay for studio time; a
contract exists that is enforceable in law; a calendar exists by which temporal targets
are established for the completion of the commodification process; and retail outlets
exist that decide whether or not to stock, and to sell, the proposed commodity. In
brief, the 'Action' perspective in the original work of Silverman needed to be
reconciled with a sense of 'structure. By exploring the most significant attempts at
resolving apparent dichotomies between 'action' and 'structure' mounted within OT,
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some final assessment can be made of why so many signed pop acts fail to make
music that becomes popular.
Organisational Theory and Popular Music.
(2). Theory and Practice.
Functionalism posed organisations as systems that, because they were
systems, were capable of, and amenable to, contiguous fine tuning in the pursuit of
an 'efficiency' that would serve the interests of employees and customers, alike. But
this is a 'managerialism' without resistance and the tension between this view and
most other discussions of organisations is, very broadly (given the diversity and
incommensurability among them), that the organisation 'on the page' is not the
organisation in reality. Silverman's work registered the first major break with the
Functionalist version of organisational life but the limitations of his method
(discussed above) closed him off from those wider upheavals that first saw Marxism
gain an ascendancy in the social sciences only to be supplanted by the various
schools collected under the rubric 'post modernism', as Marxism's own deterministic
weaknesses were exposed. The relevance for this study of this dense synopsis of two-
and-a-half decades of social thought is that various attempts have been mounted to
overcome the dichotomy described by the counter-opposition of a 'Systems' approach
and an 'Action' approach to social and, in this case, organisational analysis.
In his discussion of Silverman's work, Clegg (1994) makes this generous
statement of the 'legacy' of Silverman's foundational work,
An emphasis on "institutional frameworks" within which people calculate,
construct and attempt to accomplish their actions in projects of power is an
enduring legacy ... Various institutional frameworks provide the strategic raw
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material for making sense, translating this into action and seeking to enrol others
to the sense made. Other interests in and around organizations are involved in
precisely the same activities, often in conflict and contradiction to each other.
(Clegg, 1994, p. 28)
From this point, Clegg makes the ambitious attempt to 'up-date' Silverman's earliest
work in the light of subsequent developments in OT and in social theory in general .
Clearly, it would be difficult, and perhaps distracting, to rehearse this entire process
here. Instead, I intend to proceed by gathering together previous observations on the
experience of pop commodification in the form of a proposal that will connect the
mediational experiences of pop acts in general, and of failed acts in particular, with
the principal features of Clegg's argument.
Commodification and the 'Supra-Organis ation'.
The caution was raised previously that we cannot advance our understanding
of pop commodification, and of why so many acts fail within it, by examining each
'party' to commodification in turn and, by this process of 'artificial' separation,
drawing conclusions from how it is we believe they 'work'. Rather, the argument
continues, we should recognise commodification for what it is - a dynamic whole. On
this basis it can be argued that, for the duration of commodification, a 'supra-
organisation' comes into existence. Thompson and McHugh define organisations as
'consciously created arrangements to achieve goals by collective means' (Thompson
and McHugh, 1995, p.3). I believe it is possible to criticise this definition
(particularly in terms of the degree of 'consciousness' involved in their formation and
practice) but it will serve to support the proposal that what pop acts, their managers,
and the record company staff employed in artist development do when they combine
to make a record and to commodify the act is to form a temporary, working alliance
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that exhibits, for a limited period, all the primary characteristics of an organisation. If
the typical outcome of such alliances is failure, and if such alliances are accepted as
transitory 'supra-organisations', then we must explore their marked tendency to create
failed products in their inability to function as effective organisations.
Before we proceed, it is worth noting that the term 'function' here is not
evidence of an implication that the 'supra-organisation' is conceived as some
hermetically-sealed whole. Rather, what problematises the 'supra-organisation' from
its inception is that all parties are, simultaneously, members of the commodification
'team' and members of their originating 'teams' - they are members of pop acts that
are managed; managers who have employees and separate organisational goals;
record company staff who are also working on other 'projects'. In this way, what each
constituent brings to the alliance is knowledge and power derived from sources both
inside and outside the temporary supra-organisation. In recognition that these
remarks may be cryptic it is necessary to return to Clegg's assessment of Silverman,
and of OT, in general, in order to elucidate them.
Clegg and 'Strategic Agency'.
Clegg's principal criticism of Silverman is that, in his use of the term 'actor' to
identify an organisational member, he elides the 'person' with 'agent'. Clegg's
argument is that,
Agency is not a generic term for people: it may well refer to collective forms of
decision making such as organization. (Clegg, 1994, p.29)
From here Clegg proposes that, when people are members of organisations, two
sources of agency can be determined that may differ considerably in their 'definition
307
of the organizational situation' - the person and the organisation. He then argues that
it is the role of management to ensure that organisational agency predominates over
individual conceptions of agency, or over sub-organisational agencies, in order that
the goals of the organisation are met. In this sense, organisation is an active,
accomplished state, rather than the idealised representation of connecting parts
familiar from Functionalism. To attempt to ensure that the organisation does what it
was intended to do, managers must work constantly against the resistances to their
favoured methods of work organisation that arise in different ways, and from
different sectors, of the organisation. As Clegg puts it,
In large, complex organisations where there is an organisational culture, and not
a multiplicity of contradictory cultures rooted in very different life-worlds, some
agency must have configured things this way. (Clegg, 1994, p.29)
For Clegg, the 'agency' that has 'configured things this way' is a strategic agency -
one that,
depends on the subordination by some power or coalition of powers of the other
constitutive parts of the organisation (Clegg, 1994, p. 30)
In this concern with power, Clegg makes the important connection between
the Marxist notion of 'the relations of production', in which management attempts to
subordinate workers by a variety of strategies that devolve on how tasks are
structured and work routines organised; and 'the relations of meaning' a term he
derives from Silverman's work in which members of the organisation comply with
the roles designated for them by internalising explanations for the goals of the
organisation established by management. Neither of these conditions is stable and
they will be continually open to contest - even from within the managerial layer itself
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where some managers may ally with others and seek to change these relations on the
basis that goals will be achieved more effectively by some other means. In any
instance, how the organisation functions is a consequence of the configuration of
'strategic agency' and how this defines and organises the organisation for its
members. As Clegg puts it,
The articulation of interests by strategic agencies is thus the medium and
outcome of unique positioning over the discretion of others in the strategic field..
its reproduction is power; its transformation effective resistance to it ...
(organisational) Topography ., will always be the result of previous and current
contest. (Clegg, 1994, p.33)
The immediate criticism might be raised here that we cannot usefully
compare a tiny team of people with a 'large complex organisation' but this is an issue
of quantity, not of quality. As we have seen, pop commodification brings together
three very different 'disciplines' - those of music-making, record-making, and
commodity-making. Each of these disciplines, and the 'actors' that practise them, will
be differently constructed through different forms of knowledge. Yet, somehow, they
must be combined to realise a specific goal - the goal of success, the goal of a mass-
selling commodity, the goal of popular music. In Producing Pop, Negus refers to
commodification as ajigsaw' but the problem with this analogy is its implication that
a single, finished 'picture' exists and that everyone involved in pop commodification
is working towards the completion of that same picture. It is reasonable to suggest
that all of the previous analysis has argued against this conception of the pop process.
No finished picture can exist because the 'finished picture' is the mass selling
commodity and there can be no guarantee that any commodity will attract mass sales.
Further, if no finished picture exists, then it follows that, firstly, every party to
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commodification will have a different 'finished picture' in his or her head; and,
secondly, what final picture is worked to is the result of a combination of verbal
approximations and, decisively, the result of a struggle, not just to define the
working picture, but to impose that working picture on the rest of the supra-
organisation.
Viewed in this way, not only is pop commodification structurally conflictual,
it is also inherently unstable. What 'destabilises' it is the fact that there is no
guarantee that even members of the same pop act will understand (or agree with)
each other's version of 'the picture', the 'total star text' (to use Negus's term), they are
hoping will be created of them and their work. At the same time, the act and its
manager will constantly be negotiating and re-negotiating their combined version of
'the picture'; and, similarly, managers and record companies will negotiate and re-
negotiate yet another version of 'the picture', usually without the participation of the
act. The reason that so many conflicting versions of a finished picture can come to
exist can be argued to be rooted in the peculiar difficulties of commodifying music.
The language in which pop is discussed can be very imprecise, even amongst
musicians, but, at least musicians can play their parts and adjust them in line with the
parts played by their colleagues (although I have been witness to furious rows
between musicians who still fail to communicate this way). When non-musicians join
the fray and bring the imprecision of their language to bear on what musicians are
meant to do, or meant not to have done, then the potential for conflict, instability and
generalised incoherence multiplies in an exponential way.
The general tenor of these observations should begin to clarify the relevance
of Organisational Theory to this study. Clegg's work draws our attention to the role of
agency in organisational practice - where agency can be the work of the organisation
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as a whole or of groups or individuals within those organisations. 'Strategic agency'
is, then, the attempt,
to fix interpretation in such a way as to serve the agency's definition of its own
interest (Clegg, 1994, p.36)
The contest for the 'fixing' of 'interpretation' and, therefore, for the definition of the
commodity, is apparent throughout the case histories. As Clegg further observes,
Different occupational and organizational identities and positions are marshalled
in support of distinct and opposed interpretations. Discursive politics over texts
and talk are the normal condition of existence of organization life, from the most
innocuous remark or memorandum to .. full-blown engagements. (Clegg, 1994,
p.36)
I can verify this in the experience of Latin Quarter through my own part in this
definitional power struggle, or in the many such struggles that go on simultaneously
in the life of a pop act, and that come to a head in the time-frame of making an
album. We can only guess at the detail of these struggles in the experiences of
Respect and Roadhouse, but both Robson and Day intimate how conflictual were
their respective experiences of commodification.
The Pop Act's experience of the 'Supra-Organisation'.
As we know, most signed pop acts fail at the first hurdle; those that make it
over this barrier go on to make money and enjoy fame, but not indefinitely. What
such acts must contend with is the fact that they have entered a spiral on which there
is no point of rest; either they make another successful record - one that, by the logic
of capitalism, needs to be more successful than the previous one - or their record
company refuses to take up their 'option' for a further record and, instead, invests its
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capital in a new signing. Even so, at least a successful act should be better prepared
for the next round of the commodification process. 'Preparation' alone is no
guarantee, however, that they will survive commodification to make the record they
want and one that is promoted in and through a representation of them as an act that
they feel able to 'live with'. There are many more factors in pop success than this, but,
from the experience of the acts in the case histories, we can see that if 'preparation' is
not the guarantee of success, it is at least its invitation.
To amplify the last point, Respect and Roadhouse were argued to have
focused on their music and their style at the expense of other, equally important
considerations. Put crudely, they failed to 'take care of business' - and this same
charge can be levelled at Latin Quarter; but what does this expression mean? All an
act has to recommend itself to record companies, to the market-place and to the
world, is its combination of a sound, a look and a story. To 'take care of business' is
to know how to organise these elements and to mobilise them towards the realisation
of a goal - success. 'Organisation' and 'mobilisation' towards a target implies, and
demands, the drafting of a strategy. Respect, as a pop act, had no strategy of its own,
and the strategy they were eventually forced to pursue by their manager ('forced' in
the sense that they had no alternative) ended in failure. Further, they only acceded to
the strategy of this comparative stranger because their own initial lack of strategy had
led them into a series of intermediary connections and experiences that they did not
initiate, nor could they control. But acts are like that, it is in their nature. To reiterate
an earlier observation, pop acts are small businesses striving to become huge
businesses almost over-night, yet they have no business experience, qualifications or,
often, even raw acumen to help them; equally, they have no external agencies to
which to turn to help them prepare for pop commodification - all they have is a
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sound, a look and a story and they go casting around for anyone that might 'help'
them bring their unique combination of these aspects to the widest possible public. In
the case of Roadhouse, they lacked even a wrong or ineptly applied strategy of their
own and their experience was, in some ways, worse than that of Respect - who at
least had a 'good time' ('Respect went on a bender for eighteen months' - in their
search for a 'style' and an 'attitude' - as Josie Robson put it) until their dreadful
denouement.
Latin Quarter's lack of 'preparation' is better understood as an almost
complete lack of internal coherence. This incoherence took a multiplicity of forms -
my own naievety about the status of my song-writing; Skaith's naive refusal of 'pop
stardom'; our joint confusion about the 'political' nature of Latin Quarter; the virtual
imposition of five strangers to contend with as band members, to name but a very
few. But, if we could get as close to Respect and Roadhouse as we can to Latin
Quarter then we would be likely to find an equal degree of internal incoherence in
their cases (for example, Day reports the loss of coherence around the name change
from 'EastWest' to 'Roadhouse' as a downward point). For an act to be incoherent
about why it is doing what it is doing must be the worst preparation of all for the
commodification process.
The absence of internal coherence expresses itself in a lack of clear direction,
an absence of strategy for the promotion by the act of its own interests and, decisively
an inability to assert or create any degree of strategic agency inside the 'supra-
organisation' they enter once commodification is under way. On this basis, we can
confirm that it is not, necessarily, the changes that acts and their material are forced
to experience that leads to failure but how well they cope with the pressures and
stresses of transformation. Many factors influence why consumers do or do not buy
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records, but it is certain that the record market is not a perfect one - acts do not enter
the market on an equal footing. This is not a factor of over-production, it is a factor
of over-signing by record companies. Commodification is a perilous process for acts,
they must convince record companies at all stages that what they are likely to
produce is likely to sell in order that they retain the company's best efforts with
regard to them (rather than switching attention to another of its signings).
Within the supra-organisation an act must fight for its own definition of itself
and its material, but it can only conduct that fight effectively if it knows the extent of
the record companies commitment to it, and intentions for it. However, acts can
never truly gain this knowledge because they never truly engage with 'the record
company' as an entity but only with the few staff assigned to work with them.
Further, it is the act's manager who spends most time in substantive discussion with
record staff. In this way, an act endures a double- or even triple-mediation - they are
represented by a manager to a record company 'team'; by that 'team' to the rest of the
company, nationally and internationally; and by that company to the market. In this
way, acts are structurally disadvantaged within commodification. Because their
objective structural position is a weak one, any degree of internal incoherence on
their part will weaken them further. In this regard, management is a problematic
'resource' for the act: firstly, a manager will have an over-riding commitment to his or
her own career, whatever their relationship to the act; secondly, managers are
mediators not music-makers and, at the very least, they will come quickly to 'speak
the language' of mediation. Under this condition, the act has no recourse to any other
agency or resource to support its position; instead, it is drawn into a discourse of the
definition of the 'final picture' that will almost certainly be established and
maintained by the mediators - management and record company - that they must
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work with if they are to become 'successes'. On this basis, it is not necessarily the
case that failed acts experience more conflict than successful ones, but it is very
likely that acts who fail lack the ability to withstand the conflict that is structural to,
and endemic in, commodification.
Conclusion.
Why so many signed pop acts fail to make hit records and fail, therefore, to
make music that is truly popular music, is not due, simply, to the negative impact on
them of intermediaries; rather, it is the potentially negative experience of mediation
that newly-signed, aspirant pop acts so frequently fall foul of. This does not mean
that we should not ask hard questions about intermediary figures and about their
claims to expertise, but the lengthy argument mounted through this study has come to
devolve on the pop act's preparation for mediation, rather than on the effects of
mediation itself. In this way, acts are not the victims either of bad faith or ill-luck;
rather, again, they are the victims of their own naivety in an environment that
punishes the naive.
Addendum to the Conclusion.
In drawing the above conclusion I am aware that several large questions are
begged by it - notably, how do we know that successful acts are not equally naive;
and how can we demonstrate this naivety in practice? I feel that the value of this
conclusion lies, not in providing a definitive answer to these questions, but in
furnishing a method through which they might be answered. This method would be
to explore the usefulness of the supra-organisation as an heuristic device by adopting
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the research method favoured by Silverman in demonstrating 'the practical rationality
of actors in particular settings' (Silverman 1994, p. 6). As researchers into pop we
need to know why musical decisions are taken by composers and why, also, decisions
both about music and about music-makers are taken by intermediary figures and
institutions in the ways that they are. Unless we can identify why some sounds (and
sound-makers) were committed to tape in certain ways, and why records of those
sounds were sold, or failed to be sold, for certain reasons, then all we conduct is
guesswork about pop of varying degrees of sophistication.
Silverman identifies his method as 'Ethnomethodological Ethnography'. As
we have seen, Cohen has made an eloquent plea for a greater commitment to
ethnography in PMS. Arguably, ethnomethodological ethnography strengthens the
ethnographer's hand by allowing the researcher to identify, in Hassard's words, 'how
power relations are reflected in .. forms of language' (Hassard, 1990, p. 106). When
'forms of language' can be argued to be so decisive to the prosecution of musical and
commodification decisions in pop, then we ignore them at our peril. This observed, it
remains the case that ethnomethodology presents researchers with the additional
meta-methodological problem of its refusal of structure as a dimension of
organisational existence. In this regard, we can only be guided by those efforts made,
separately, by theorists such as Giddens and Clegg to furnish what Wilmott has
described as a framework, 'designed to reveal how "agency" and "structure" are
simultaneously present in the accomplishment of social practices'. (Willmott, 1990,
p . 52)
On the basis of the above, it is possible to represent this research as
`preliminary' to further discrete, but related, research projects into three aspects of
popular music-making:
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1. The `lived experience' of the pop act during commodification requires
detailed attention. It has not been possible to explore the studies either of Stokes or
Hennion in this research but their works remain touchstones for investigation into,
and reflection on, the experience of commodification. Both studies need to be `up-
dated' and re-located in a British context - the `next stage' of Cohen's foundational
project is now overdue. However, in mounting an ethnography of the `signed act', the
`holistic' approach argued previously would seem to have a role to play.
2. It has been implied throughout this study that music-making is not an
autonomous activity - the musical decisions of composers have been argued to
derive, in the first instance, from their consumption of (successful) music; further,
composers have been argued to be at least pressurised by the demands of the
commodification process. These broadly industrial dimensions of compositional
practice have been argued to be absent from musicological accounts of popular
music-making. Again, through a dynamic, holistic approach to the pop process, the
relationship between popular music `texts' and popular music `contexts' might be
broached - arguably through a new system of notation.
3. In the discussion of commodification through the heuristic device of the
`supra organisation', the notion of `process' as dynamic and transformative played a
pivotal role. What, again, was implied but remained unexplored in the analysis of the
dynamics of process was a broader analysis of the origins and expressions ofpower
within the processes that make up commodification. A caution against deterministic
explanations for the power of record companies, and of intermediaries in general, is
raised at several junctures in the argument, but the existence of power in record-
making as a force that is derived culturally as much as economically needs to be
theorised.
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Pop Music is a social practice; it is the product neither of the 'artist' working
alone, nor of the 'standardising' efforts of global media conglomerates. In order to
understand what pop is, we need to be able to explore that practice as a whole;
consequently, our method of analysis needs to be an holistic one. Ultimately, we
should understand records in the dual sense of recordings and of diaries or logs - a
record is the outcome of all the process interactions that led to its recording and
release; and to its fate as a commodity. To begin to explore the social practice, and
social process, of record-making we require a method that allows us access,
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